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Abstract 
 
This work seeks to establish indirect feminist rhetoric, rhetoric that denies, elides, parodies, or 
co-opts its perceived exigencies, within the emergence of spectacular technologies of writing in 
the early 20th century, technologies that included personality journalism, scenario and 
screenwriting, and writing for the Broadway stage between roughly 1905 and 1930.  Following 
the work of a cohort of indirect feminist rhetors, Marcet Haldeman-Julius, Anita Loos, and Mae 
West, all of whom, in different ways, wrote feminist critiques of the powerful and sometimes 
abusive men in their lives, often while these men functioned as the very gatekeepers to the 
audiences sought by these women, this dissertation challenges traditional notions that effective 
rhetoric takes place out in the open, with the free exchange of propositions, offering that 
sometimes the proliferation of rhetoric and critique is more useful in situations that circumvent 
the potential for reciprocal postulations, functioning counter- or even non-propositionally.  
Finally, in their approach to feminist critique, these indirect feminist rhetors – both in content 
and in style – challenge traditional feminist historiographies of what public women could say and 
be heard saying in the years leading up to and immediately following suffrage.  In those ways, 
this study merges questions of rhetoric, gender, history, writing, and technology that lay the 
groundwork for scholars participating in the ongoing discussions of writing, rhetoric, and 
embodiment in digital worlds.        
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction: Isolating Feminist Rhetorical Indirection – A Few Coincidences Regarding 
Women, Spectacle, and What Can’t Be Said (or Heard) 
 
 
Why do any of us act and speak in ways that entail social cost 
when we could do otherwise? – Barry Brummett, A Rhetoric of 
Style 
 
 Feminism and indirect rhetoric are not comfortable bedfellows, neither wanting to be 
caught in delecte flagranto.  Indirect rhetoric, rhetoric that denies, parodies, subverts, co-opts, or 
otherwise underplays or misdirects its own purpose (not to mention the potential for a counter-
statement) is a means of writing or speaking that, though it may attend to matters of 
consciousness-raising, fails – by definition – to follow through with the most fundamental aspect 
of ancient and modern rhetoric: it circumvents the sphere of rational-critical debate, undermines 
the free exchange of propositions, and forecloses upon all but a few aspects of the spectrum for 
response.  These two are strange bedfellows because feminism from its inception was a political 
movement that first generally and then specifically advocated for the private and public equality 
of women.  Rhetoric, as coined by Plato “was constituted as the opposite of philosophy,” though 
both are understood as taking place out in the open amid the free exchange of propositions 
(Campbell “Consciousness” 49).  Indirect feminist rhetoric, however, does the opposite: it 
functions as a counterpropositional discourse, one that attempts to raise the consciousness of 
audiences (or selected sections of audiences) while structurally denying the potential for a 
counter-proposition from the subject of that critique.  In this study, those counterpropositional, 
discursive critiques are aimed at taking the air out of the atmosphere of rational-critical debate, 
especially when its rules are dictated by patriarchic presumption—that is, male voices cannot 
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trivialize, cannot suppress, and cannot answer the critique without jeopardizing their own ethos.  
This slyly subversive rhetorical method is particularly present in U.S. popular culture in the 
1920s, a culture brimming with irony, humor, and Freudian anxieties about what lies beneath the 
surface of language.     
Locating Indirect Feminist Rhetoric  
Indirect feminist rhetoric, at least as it is embodied by the subjects of this study, Marcet 
Haldeman-Julius (1887-1941), Anita Loos (1888-1981), and Mae West (1893-1980), stands 
apart from traditional modalities of feminist rhetoric and feminist historiography, insofar as it 
entails a rejection of identity politics – a central tenet of feminism in the first and second waves – 
and embraces performances of identity as potential strategies for situational female 
empowerment.    
Indirection, in the cases investigated here, is a function of celebrity, with these women 
operating as “known commodities.”  Hence, audiences anticipated taking them lightly.  These 
women, a personality-journalist, a screenwriter, and a playwright, were merely expected to 
entertain, and that expectation colored the delivery methods of their critiques of male power and 
gender inequality.  Their very public-ness shrouded them in the camouflage of audience 
expectation, allowing them to get away with sometimes scathing critiques, as long as they played 
them off as jokes.  As Freud writes in Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious, jokes can 
sometimes be the most effective method of truth-telling, not to mention an effective way of 
garnering an audience for that truth-telling.  Reading these women as indirect feminist rhetors is 
a conscious scholarly choice, and the effect of this reading is that these women are transplanted 
from the middling terrain of popular entertainment to the subversive space of proto-third-wave 
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feminists in the 1920s.1  Of course, though, they existed in both spaces simultaneously.  The very 
implicational nature of their critique, as well, served as a way to maintain their varying degrees 
and modalities of celebrity status, all the while allowing them the exceptional capability of 
pressing feminism beyond the borders of identity into the realm of the performative.   
The degree to which each performs feminism is incremental, moving from lower to 
higher levels of abstraction, with Haldeman-Julius playing the good wife, Loos playing the 
selfless star-maker and intellectual apprentice, and West playing West – an experiment in which 
the façade and the reality almost merge into complete, seamless, spectacle.  All these spaces use 
identity toward the ends of female empowerment; they hold men accountable for personal and 
social traumas inflicted, and they manage to keep their audiences (laughing) while they do so.  
Studying them in this light is a significant break from the feminist rhetorical tradition, though 
considering the extent to which contemporary culture is spectacularized (where Angelina Jolie 
can go from playing videogame character Lara Croft to distributing aid with Kofi Annan), 
studying women rhetors like these makes good sense.      
Research into women’s rhetorical strategies has not remained static in the academy; it is, 
rather like the feminist rhetorics of this cohort, developmental.  In the past, as Carol Mattingly 
explains, “feminist research addressed recovery primarily” (99).  This type of work, early on, 
suffered accusations of privileging individualism and ignoring the collective element of feminist 
resistance, reinscribing a sexist orientation toward individualist ideologies by “validating token 
women” (100).  This emphasis on particular, exceptional women led early feminist scholars to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Doubtlessly, this assignation carries an odor of presentism, which I argue is necessary in this work for challenging 
and reshaping traditional feminist historiographies of the 1920s where forward-thinking women were often relegated 
to one side or the other of the flapper/suffragette binary.  These women, I argue, found a third way, one that plays 
with identity-politics through the modalities of textual performance; they, perhaps, would not have known or 
accepted what they were doing as feminist (within the limited feminist lexicons of their day), but it is my belief that 
it was indeed – and radically so.   
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elevate particular examples of feminism above others – particularly leaders like Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton or Susan B. Anthony.   This approach, critics warned, “promoted a presumption that few 
women were rhetorically active in nineteenth-century America” (102), a presumption that led 
scholars to focus on leaders of feminist organizations, from the NWSA to the WCTU, and to 
ignore other types of feminists.  Though focusing on individual women, this dissertation is an 
attempt to expand the conversation of what counts as feminist rhetoric – indeed what counts as 
feminism – not to limit it.   
In that regard, this project locates itself within the tradition of the work of  Cheryl Glenn, 
Susan Jarratt, Rory Ong, Patricia Bizzell, Gesa Kirsch, and Jacqueline Jones Royster (among 
many others), who, in the 1990s, challenged traditional notions of what counted as histo-
rhetorical evidence, preferring to venture into uncharted territory, spaces of silence, spaces of 
fragmentary or nonexistent primary source material, spaces that demanded an interpretational, 
risk-taking commitment to their subjects and a public acknowledgement of primacy of the 
writer’s own choices and point of view.  Treatments of traditionally fragmentary subjects such as 
Aspasia, Sappho, Sojourner Truth, and the Sophists stimulated a new orientation to historical 
rhetorics.  Jarratt’s work on the Sophists, for instance, lays important groundwork for this study 
in her close attention to the performance backgrounds of sophistic rhetoric.  In Rereading the 
Sophists, Jarratt explains, 
If this experience of public performance was commonplace in the eighth, seventh, 
and sixth centuries, the tendency for fifth-century rhetoricians to seek pleasurable 
effects in their new prose derives from a well-established tradition rather than 
representing an innovation or manipulation. (34) 
5 
	  
This project’s emphasis on the celebrity and spectacular performance of indirect feminist rhetoric 
comes from a post-third-wave, post-identity politics position regarding both the packaging and 
distribution of feminist critiques.  Feminist scholars like Glenn, Mattingly, and Jarratt have gone 
a great distance toward making this kind of study possible in their recognitions that, historically, 
when “traditional tools of rhetoric were denied them, women found it necessary to consider 
techniques beyond masculine speakers’ attention to argument and delivery, techniques equally 
important in rhetorical effectiveness” (Mattingly 105).  Haldeman-Julius, Loos, and West were 
not denied the traditional tools of rhetoric; they invented their own because the rise of celebrity 
and the technologies of spectacle allowed them to convert and subvert, as long as they remained 
covert.    
 As Jarratt reminds us, these alternative approaches to feminist rhetoric of the last two 
decades have been presented in numerous productive ways, from Page duBois’s discussions of 
“metarhetoric,” to Krista Ratcliffe’s explanations of women’s “rhetorical activities,” from Joy 
Ritchie and Kate Ronald’s attention to women’s “available means” to Cheryl Glenn’s analysis of 
Sappho’s “protorhetoric” (“Sappho” 12).  While fundamentally changing the research and 
interpretative historical landscape of women’s rhetoric, these approaches all consider – to 
varying degrees – women’s rhetorical enterprises as being limited or constrained by the 
“available means” of their gender-roles, of their identity-categories; to a certain degree, at least 
in terms of how they constructed their own celebrity, this trio’s rhetorical potential was 
constrained by the necessity to keep the audiences coming back through the humorous or 
performative envelopes into which their gendered critique was folded.  Importantly, then, 
Campbell, Glenn, Jarratt, Lunsford, Swearingen, duBois, Kirsch, Royster, and Wertheimer 
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carved out particular spaces that challenged both what women could publicly say and do and 
how scholars could talk about their rhetorical activities. 
 This rich and exciting work in women’s history, rhetoric, and historiography has both 
laid the groundwork for the current study and, to an extent, is interrogated by it.  All these 
challenges to research, interpretation, rhetorical means, and women’s agency, whether in ancient 
or modern contexts, draw upon the notion that feminist rhetors are engaged in a fundamentally 
politico-propositional discursive space.  As Hui Wu explains, 
feminist inquiry is linked avowedly to a political concern, that is, to “denounce 
sexism and discrimination against women, to expose the origins, foundations, and 
workings of patriarchy, and subsequently to formulate and implement strategies 
for its eventual demolition” (Kelly-Gadol 15). (85) 
While uncovering the political and social conditions that motivated women to throw off the yoke 
of patriarchy remains extraordinarily important, this dissertation attempts to fill the space that 
strict attention to propositional rhetoric has left vacant.  Feminism is political, but it need not 
speak that way.  It is time, I propose, to turn our scholarly ears toward women we only half-
listened to before, paying attention to more than whether we are entertained.  
 This dissertation explores rhetorical operations created by women in the spaces around 
politicization, outside contexts in which traditional political propositions about women’s roles 
circulate.  The women in this study, though, do not operate out of scarcity models of available 
means but rather spaces of overdetermination.  These women, all masters of particular 
technologies of writing (personality journalism, early scenario and screenwriting, writing for the 
stage) chose not to exchange propositions in the public sphere (which is both bourgeois and 
necessarily masculinized) and thus chose to operate in spaces that violate the long held principle 
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that underlies both feminism and rhetoric – namely that “if rhetoric is to serve the public good, it 
must involve the reciprocal exchange of ideas in a charitable context”2 (Couture and Kent 9).  
These indirect feminist rhetorics take place in heavily mediated technological, generic, ironic, 
parodic, or co-optive spaces and function counterpropositionally, denying the objects of their 
critique the potential for counter-response.  Making the necessary adjustment in the populations 
studied, these indirect feminist rhetors operate in spaces, as James C. Scott indicates, “outside the 
intimidating force of power,” spaces in which a radical (and radically strange) “dissonant 
political culture is possible,” a “politics of disguise and anonymity,” of “double meaning,” of 
“[r]umor, gossip, folktales, jokes, songs, rituals, codes, and euphemisms” (18-19).          
 These indirect critiques operate outside discourses built upon political propositions, 
outside audiences equipped with prearticulated agendas, but they still, like a dog-whistle, have 
the potential to raise the consciousness of subsections of audiences, those somehow prepared to 
hear the oblique message dressed in the language of ritualized, gendered, deferential behavior.  
This rhetorical technique invokes subsets of audiences, potential counterpublics, game for or 
capable of the necessary decoding of messages involved in making sense of indirect feminist 
critique.  Paying attention to this unique species of messages still involves recognizing the genus 
of operation: feminist consciousness-raising as a “discursive practice,” (Campbell 
“Consciousness” 45).  This feminist philosophy, as Karlyn Kohrs Campell explains, challenges 
the dichotomies of reason and passion, knowledge and feeling, body and mind 
that have been staples of traditional Western thought, dichotomies that define and 
reinforce gender and that, in turn, are reinforced by the stereotypes undergirding 
gender polarization. (“Consciousness” 49) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Italics added. 
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Campbell explains that, traditionally, feminist rhetorical scholarship has included the “recovery 
and validation of elements that have been denigrated, elided, and omitted” (49), and thus it is 
with celebrities who function as closet-feminists, subverting identity and putting it to use.  This 
project pays special attention to those moments when feminist rhetors themselves have 
purposefully elided, omitted, and toward the subversive ends of gendered critique, even rendered 
themselves as stereotypes by participating actively in genres, conversations, or even styles of 
writing that presupposed and worked within and alongside masculinist power structures, claims, 
and habits of mind and speech.  This dissertation aims to look for places where feminist scholars 
have claimed to “embrace some symbolic functions while suppressing others” (Campbell 
“Consciousness” 49).    
 Though most of Campbell’s scholarship has functioned in the mode of rhetorical 
recovery, her dissertation on Jean Paul Sartre, she recalls, did something very different, 
“describing how a rhetorical theory could be extracted from works that did not purport to be 
rhetorical theory” (“Consciousness” 55), much like this present project, and it differs 
significantly from, to take an example, Cheryl Glenn’s work on Julian of Norwich, Margery 
Kempe, and Anne Askew, which promotes “rhetoric as self-creation … [as a] discourse through 
which identities emerge” (Campbell “Consciousness” 57).  Not attempting anything as bold as 
tracing the emergence of identities, this dissertation has assumed, from the beginning, the 
development of critical agendas behind the façade of female celebrity identities in the 1920s.  
For Marcet Haldeman-Julius, Anita Loos, and Mae West, rhetoric (or at least rhetorical 
indirection) centered not on the elaboration of their own identities; rather, it circled around their 
varying and developmental critiques of masculine overreach, male power, or personal, gendered 
trauma.     
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  Haldeman-Julius’s, Loos’s, and West’s previously unseen brand of feminist rhetorical 
critique emerged as wildly different from its eighteenth and nineteenth century mother-
feminisms, a critique wielded by women who, in most cases, did not wear their feminism on 
their sleeves but rather performed their gendered roles “adequately” to overcome or undermine 
gatekeepers in different types of media to attain access to the public, at which time, then, in 
coded ways,3 they unleashed critiques of masculinity taken from personal experiences of 
dominant, abusive, or absent husbands or from the experience of more institutional or even 
abstracted types of sexism or gendered discrimination.  The nature of their indirect rhetoric 
depended on a potential spectacular audience awareness of standardized gendered limitations of 
public women, and the focus on these particular women attempts to “open up conversations 
about the history of rhetorical possibilities of mass communication” by targeting individuals and 
drawing attention to “important but overlooked social forms it has lighted upon” (Simonsen 3).  
What I will attempt to frame as indirect feminist rhetoric is indeed one of these long-repressed 
“social species of mass communication” not to mention of personal exigency that were “left 
behind” in the process both of the formulation of modern day rhetoric and mass communications 
but also by traditional feminist historiography (3).      
Gendered Domination and Rewriting the Public Transcript 
 In Domination and the Arts of Resistance, James C. Scott offers a helpful frame for 
tackling the subject of indirect rhetoric in the negotiation of what he calls the public transcript 
and the hidden transcript.  “Public” here, Scott tells us, “refers to action that is openly avowed to 
the other party in the power relationship, and transcript is used almost in its juridical sense” as “a 
complete record of what was said” (2).  Negotiations between dominant and subordinate groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 By coded, here, I mean that these women made use of the conditions of indirection inherent in the spectacle of 
mass media. 
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maintain both publicly available and veiled elements, the public record, in most cases, 
demonstrating performances of subordination by subgroups designed to appease elites and /or to 
draw attention away from associations and ideas that threaten the typical scripts of public power.  
That said, because the public transcript represents what Scott calls the self-portraits of elites, its 
truth-value is jeopardized by its assumption of hegemonic expectations of and consequent 
performances from subordinate groups.  This is the story of the kindly master who believes – 
given the evidence of their public performances of submission and respect – that his slaves love 
and respect him.  Of course, beside and behind the hegemonic public transcript, another one 
exists “offstage,” one that is much harder for scholars to access. 
 The hidden transcript is “derivative in the sense that it consists of those offstage 
speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public 
transcript” (4).  That said, it is virtually impossible to get hold of, as real performances of 
subordination typically do not come with their own “asides,” invitations into the backstage 
action, as those moves would threaten the legitimacy of subgroups’ hegemonic performances – 
performances that are meant to be believed.  Though it is a helpful idea, the hidden transcript, in 
my view, is an analytic fantasy – if it does exist at all in 99 percent of cases, it is necessarily 
inaccessible, though Scott’s hope to look below “the placid surface that the public 
accommodation to the existing distribution of power, wealth, and status” is a noteworthy goal 
(15).  In some ways, the scholar’s assumption that such a hidden transcript exists could be read 
as a colonizing move, particularly if it were viewed as a singular, monolithic text rather than a 
set of interrelated, contextually variable, and potentially incommensurate narratives that are 
“brought to light” in lieu of the scholar’s own normative, cultural, and professional agendas. 
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 Nonetheless, “in the short run, it is in the interest of the subordinate to produce a more or 
less credible performance, speaking the lines and making the gestures he knows are expected of 
him,” and the more total and/or arbitrary the rule, the greater the expectation is that these 
maneuvers will be observable, recordable, part of the public transcript (3).  Though Scott does 
not spend much time on it, presenting it as merely suggestive, another transcript exists, though, 
between the untrustworthy public transcript and the inaccessible hidden one, a transcript that is 
public (at least is not hidden) but that negotiates the public transcript in coded ways.  Indirect 
feminist rhetoric, in my view, is but one example of this type of intermediary textual and 
rhetorical production.  This tertiary entity is less a transcript than a meta-transcript, one that can 
appear in public while indirectly negating the power of hegemonic performances of 
subservience, an entity that suggests a negotiation of the public transcript as a form of 
“surveillance in power relations” (3), one “designed to be evasive” (19), one that encapsulates “a 
politics of anonymity that takes place in public view but is designed to have a double meaning or 
to shield the identity of the actors. … [A] good part of the folk culture of subordinate groups – fit 
this description” (19).  What each member of this cohort of indirect feminist rhetors represents in 
her public rhetoric is an ironic, parodic, or co-optational “portrait of dominant elites” that resists, 
however subtly, a full-on flattery (18), each of these representing a rhetorical move that denies or 
elides the rhetor’s critical agency.  It is fully public, indeed a mass-communicative feminist 
critique that eschews the trickster figures rather than calling attention to them.  
 Without a doubt, Loos, Haldeman-Julius, and West were in many ways not, like the 
populations of slaves, peasants, and untouchables that Scott surveys, relegated to the strictest 
division between the public and hidden transcripts.  They had access to mediatized public spaces 
and were partial creators of what Julie Hedgepeth Williams explains in her analysis of Publick 
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Occurrences, America’s first newspaper (originally published in September of 1690), the 
“personification of society” (46).  The populous took on a personality.  This personification 
existed, too, in “[o]ther forms of media which followed the newspaper, such as radio and 
television,” which also “developed that portrait-painting function, molding and sculpting it to fit 
their own styles and capabilities” (47).  In short, as journalists, screenwriters, and playwrights, 
these were women with access to publics at a moment when the public sphere’s permeability was 
at a high not seen since the rise of the bourgeois sphere documented by Jürgen Habermas (1968) 
and facilitated by the invention of the printing press in 1454 and the rise of the newspaper 
industry in the eighteenth century, with its consequent product the public intellectual.  
Habermas’s analysis is a prolegomena of sorts to the early 20th century’s proliferation of new 
publics through new technologies of production and reproduction.  As Walter Benjamin explains, 
    It might be stated as a general formula that the technology of reproduction  
  detaches the reproduced object from the sphere of tradition.  By replicating the  
  work many times over, it substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence.  And  
  in permitting the reproduction to reach the recipient in his or her own situation, it 
  actualizes that which is reproduced. (22) 
Unlike Benjamin, though, who sees this reproduction-cycle as a “liquidation” of history and 
culture, I see the potential in these technologies to create rare but important critical spaces, 
spaces in which new culture thrives.  In many important ways, Loos, Haldeman-Julius, and West 
operated in a public rhetorical space that was begging for an interruption by an intermediary 
discourse and intermediary rhetorical strategies that brought some concerns of the hidden 
transcript out in the open, albeit in “a wide variety of low-profile forms of resistance that dare 
not speak their name” (Scott 19).  Just as “the earliest artworks originated in the service of rituals 
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– first magical, then religious,” this cohort of rhetors seeks to alter the public transcript in such a 
way as to disrupt rituals of gender and sex power, rerouting the circuits of gender power by 
means of mass reproductive technologies (Benjamin 24).  They are, to riff on Benjamin a little, 
inserting authenticity into the very cycle of social reproduction, integrating critique into the 
machinery of social intercourse.     
 The conditions for these forms of resistance and their instantiation differ for all members 
of the Haldeman-Julius/Loos/West cohort, but they have in common that, despite the long-
standing institutionalization of sexism, elements of personal, gendered domination and residue of 
traumas left by powerful men.  “Although they are highly institutionalized,” Scott argues, “ these 
forms of domination also have a strong element of personal rule … the great latitude for arbitrary 
and capricious conduct by the master toward his slave, the lord to his serf, the Brahmin to his 
untouchable,” to which I would add the husband to his wife (21).  Gendered domination, 
particularly within a marriage between gatekeepers and writers, differs vividly from Scott’s 
given scenarios but are, even for him, “suggestive” (22).   
  In the case of women, relations of subordination have typically been both more  
  personal and more intimate; joint procreation and family life have meant that  
  imagining an entirely separate existence for the subordinate group requires a more 
  radical step than it has for serfs or slaves.  Analogies become more strained in  
  contemporary settings where choice of marriage partner is possible and where  
  women have civil and political rights. (Scott 22)  
Scott’s reservations here are wise, especially in relation to this cohort of rhetorical writers 
because of their status as modern women, women who have chosen their relationships with men, 
husbands, and the public.  
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  In this case, indirect feminist rhetoric is not simply understandable in terms of an 
empowered/disempowered binary.  That divorce is ostensibly possible, and that marital choices 
are voluntary does less harm to the analogy than it works to create a new analytic dimension.  
Here, the rhetor herself is implicated, somewhat, in the relationship of domination, often to the 
end of negotiating male intimates as gatekeepers of the public sphere.  Hence, in this space – a 
space where domination and subordination still takes place, albeit in a very private and bounded 
geography – the appeal of indirect critique has both a didactic aim (the appeal to mass audiences) 
and a cathartic one.  One thing that remains true in terms of Scott’s analysis, no matter how 
much his strict binaries are complicated by gender and modernity, is that the “greater the 
disparity in power between the dominant and subordinate and the more arbitrarily it is 
exercised,” the more the “public transcript of the subordinates will take on a stereotyped, 
ritualistic cast” (3).  The closer they are to the gatekeepers, the more strictly monitored, from 
Haldeman-Julius to Loos to West, the greater the chance is that their indirect feminist critique 
will take on more and more stereotyped isomorphic tendencies.  Husbands served as gatekeepers 
and dominant forces for all three women but at varying levels.  These levels of control are 
manifest in how far each woman can push the boundary of gendered critique and by what means 
she uses to do so.   
 Indirect rhetoric begins with a betrayal of sorts (actually, several), a betrayal of gendered 
expectations, a betrayal of confidence (the reductionist confidence inherent in patriarchal 
methods of rhetorical comprehension), and a betrayal of disciplinary boundaries and traditional 
expectations about what feminist rhetoric is or means, a betrayal of publics who, ostensibly, just 
wanted to be entertained.  I approach questions of motive, method, and context as a cautious 
feminist, a quasi-revisionist historian of rhetoric and writing who measures and accounts for the 
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clear disconnections between how writing mediates women’s private lives and public power.  
Traditionally, the subjects of this study have been conveyed (or conveyed themselves) as “simple 
symptomal subject[s]” of gender; in my view, though, their voices should be amplified, their 
reverberations traced, allowing willing listeners to “hear in [their] voice[s] what is … 
intractable” (Barthes 3).  The principal characteristic of Haldeman-Julius, Loos, and West’s 
gendered rhetoric is its very intractability, its stubborn resistance to final interpretation, its 
structural avoidance of resolution as well as its coded consciousness-raising methods that at all 
times work to deny feminist exigence.  It is a coded “technology of resistance” that works 
against a heterogeneous, gendered domination, a response as complex as its adherents’ domestic 
situations and public power, particularly because all this feminist critique (critique of male 
sexual power) has to make it past the male-dominated gatekeepers of the public sphere, from 
husbands, to publishers, to directors, to audiences.   
Negotiating Spectacles of Mass Communication 
 Though the spectacle reoccurs in critical circles perennially, it remains, as Steve Neale 
argues, “notoriously resistant to analysis” (“Hollywood” 54).  Several reasons exist for this 
difficulty, not the least of which is that the spectacle itself, to the extent that scholars can agree 
on what it is or might be, has been a concept that seems to resist historicization, despite its 
obvious organic connection with emergent media in the early twentieth century.  Indeed, the first 
sustained treatment of the concept comes from Guy Debord’s work in the late 1960s for the 
Situationalist International in Paris, The Society of Spectacle (1968).  Debord’s simplest 
definition of the spectacle is “the social relationship between people that is mediated by images” 
(12).  The spectacle is the product of a three tier process borrowed from Ludwig Feuerbach (the 
thinker whose work turns Marx from Hegelianism to materialism).  In The Essence of Religion 
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(1841), Feuerbach argues that 1) humans invent the concept of God, 2) they forget they invented 
the concept, and 3) they reverse the original order, beginning to believe that God invented them – 
a simple argument but one that perfectly mirrors the process of how images can come to mediate 
and indeed order the social relationships of actual individuals rather than vice versa.   Debord’s 
Marxist critique is never far from the surface; he considers the spectacle “a concrete inversion of 
life” (12) that “serves as total justification for the conditions and aims of the existing system” 
(13), a complex, multi-layered, ethotic sleight of hand performed by the dominant class, the  
major effect of which, for Debord anyway, is the transforming of “[a]ll that once was directly 
lived” into “mere representation” (12).  Not surprisingly, Feuerbach gets Spectacle’s first 
epigraph.    
 The spectacle represents a tautology of ends and means, as well (Debord 15), in its 
proclamation of “the predominance of appearances and assertations that all human life, which is 
to say all social life, is mere appearance,” becoming a negation “that has invented a visual form 
of itself” (14).  On this point I do not so much differ with Debord as desire to offer a qualification 
that divests my own use of the spectacle from Debord’s intentions in two ways: First, Debord’s 
concept (strange for a Marxist) is relatively ahistorical.  But his move here is intentional, as he 
builds into this free-floating conceptual structure a critique of time itself, seemingly derived from 
Hegel, Marx, and Heidegger.  He argues that historicization of the concept of spectacle is 
potentially fruitless because the spectacle itself “being the reigning social organization of a 
paralyzed history, of a paralyzed memory, of an abandonment of any history founded in 
historical time, is in effect a false consciousness of time” (114).   
 On the other hand, for this study anyway, Debord’s philosophical maneuver here elides 
all sorts of potential micro-analyses and historicizations of the spectacle, largely because the 
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spectacle to some degree always relies on technological means (as I have already mentioned, 
from the printing press, to newspapers, to radio, to television and film); Debord mistakes this 
failure to do specific analysis (perhaps because he sees himself writing philosophy) with the 
inability to do analysis of the spectacle and using the spectacle – both of which I intend to 
attempt here.   
Second, Debord’s notion of the spectacle fails partially due to its Marxist vocabulary of 
the real and the unreal, of the actual and the fantastic – and it fails to account for the fact that the 
fantastic is indeed historical (thanks largely to Freud’s influence), something Debord’s own 
ideological predisposition obscures, transforming him into a victim of the “necessary 
alienation[,] … the medium in which the subject realizes himself while losing himself,” he 
originally attempts to point out (115).  The result is a spectacle that becomes overly monolithic 
and class-based, a view that ignores both the potential for spectacular exigency that can either 
eschew or trump class domination.  Additionally, the overly monolithic spectacle overlooks 
space where spectacularized media has the potential to create space for critique, for 
insubordination, for consciousness-raising.  
 A conceptual schema drawn from Debord’s notion of spectacle and Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus makes possible the analytic ability to cut across audiences into counterpublics (as 
dictated by Nancy Fraser [1991] and Michael Warner [2004]), into smaller segmentations of 
audience that activist writers understand consume generalized media but also which contain the 
appropriate interpretive mechanisms to decipher coded critique (critique in which the spectacle is 
put to use, disrupting the notion that all spectacle is tautological, that its means and ends are 
necessarily the same): to see feminist critique, the critique of gendered power structures where 
the mass audience sees only pulp media.  Potential counterpublics have a more unstable, 
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dynamic habitus and are more sensitized to the cognitive itch of slyly subversive material (and 
some, of course, are looking directly for it).  In this way, Marxist theory plays into the question 
of coded feminist rhetoric – but fitfully.  For Haldeman-Julius, West, and Loos, gendered 
rhetorical indirection did not have systemic revolutionary ends, did not approach its audiences 
oppositionally, and did not aggregate its ethos.  If anything, its agents avoided those kinds of 
moves so as not to complicate necessary performances of subservience.  As Richard Dyer 
explains, spectacular space need not proliferate domination, as its technical function (he uses 
film as an example here) is to  
  present either complex or unpleasant feelings (e.g. involvement in personal or  
  political events; jealously, loss of love, defeat) in a way that makes them seem  
  uncomplicated, direct and vivid, not ‘qualified’ or ‘ambiguous’ as day-to-day life  
  makes them, and without intimations of self-deception and pretence. (23) 
Spectacle is a condensing machine, a technology of sheen, but, traditionally, scholarship on it has 
looked only at how that sheen perpetuates various types of domination, not its possibilities for 
resistance.  What film historians like Tom Brown do well is to elaborate on elements or 
characteristics of particular spectacles (like “the décor of history” and the “spectacular vista” in 
history films), but they fail to pursue an analysis of the spectacle as an encompassing, non-
normative, not-necessarily-Marxist concept (159).  The spectacle is, after all, generated by 
media, but it lives in the minds of audience members, a product of textually generated potentially 
activating rhetorical engagement-mechanisms.   
 Indirect feminist rhetoric operating in the spectacle plays with the space between the 
built-in mass-audience response and the potential counterpublic response, something very similar 
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to what Leo Charney calls “drift.”  Cinema, Charney’s chosen spectacular medium in the early 
part of the twentieth century, 
  formed a nexus of two characteristic elements of the culture of modernity: an  
  ontology of representation and an epistemology of drift.  The absence of tangible  
  present moments gave rise to a culture of re-presentation in which experience was 
  always already lost, accessible only through retrospective textualization.  Re- 
  presentation as a mode of experience took the form of drift, which transfigured  
  empty presence into a new modern epistemology. (8) 
Charney’s work on drift is important for our understanding of spectacle for a number of reasons.  
Initially and most important, Charney’s notion of modernity as a mediatized moment of text-
audience engagement brings out a notion of a “culture of representation” a meta-organization of 
social impulses and habitus centered on and mediated by textual technologies.  This particularly 
American spectacle is but one example of a historical culture of representation.  Charney’s work 
never deals with the spectacle explicitly but gets very close to it in some but not all ways.  For 
instance, drift, for Charney, is “mercurial” while, rhetorically speaking anyway, spectacularity is 
purposive, motivated, and driven by exigency.  Nonetheless, capitalizing on the notion of a 
culture of representation, Charney also identifies for us the spectacular space, the realm of play 
between the given and the real, between the mediatized and the actual.   
 Debord’s notion, then, that the spectacle, “[i]n all its specific manifestations – news or 
propaganda, advertising or the actual consumption of entertainment … epitomizes the 
omnipresent celebration of a choice already made in the sphere of production, and the 
consummate result of that choice” is rather unsatisfying and unhelpful, due to its Marxist 
circularity (13).  Here, in my view, Debord delegitimizes the spectacle, making it a kind of 
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circular mode of domination, whereas (as Loos, Haldeman-Julius, and West will demonstrate) it 
can be a quasi-revolutionary tool, especially during moments where the proliferation of media 
coincides with a kind popular rejection of oppositional themes. 
 In “Gesturing toward Peace: On Silence, the Society of the Spectacle, and the Women in 
Black Antiwar Protests,” Ashley Elliott Pryor calls on Giorgio Agamben’s notion of spectacle, 
an updated but still limited concept.  Pryor explains,  
  In the Society of the Spectacle, Nelson Mandela’s birthday becomes an occasion  
  to buy M & Ms, as in the case of the South African advertisement featuring the  
  antiapartheid activist’s beaming face fashioned complexly out of M&Ms and a  
  birthday wish: “Thanks for encouraging us to embrace all our colours.  Happy  
  Birthday, Madiba.” (181) 
Generally, I agree with Pryor’s critique of the cynicism of the contemporary spectacle, one that  
  [f]or Agamben … extends well beyond the sum total of commodities to name an  
  entire social relation whereby everything that was once directly lived or   
  experienced has receded into a representational form, is distanced from its use  
  value, and is replaced by “fetishistic” powers to stimulate awe, wonder, desire,  
  fantasy, and deep identification.  As such, the Society of the Spectacle is   
  capitalism’s “extreme figure” and represents “the commodity’s final   
  metamorphosis, in which exchange value has completely eclipsed use value and  
  can now achieve the status of absolute irresponsible sovereignty over life in its  
  entirety, after having falsified the entire social production” (76). (183)    
While I have no desire to argue with Agamben or Pryor’s central claims and their apt description 
of contemporary spectacle in all its sinister glory, the pair’s reliance on Marxist depth-models 
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and the privileging of use value and exchange value fails to capture the potential (at least the 
historical potential) of the spectacle to be a space used for good – particularly, I think, a space 
used by some early twentieth century women to combat gender domination and make money.  
The sinister qualities of the spectacle as laid down by Agamben and Pryor certainly exist, but 
they do not tell the whole story, do not recognize the spectacle as a culture-space focused on 
representation and the critical capacities of underrepresented groups to use representation to their 
strategic and monetary advantage.   
 As Rachel Dressler explains in “Gender as Spectacle and Construct,” gestures in 
spectacular space “depend on the beholder’s gaze to activate them,” a moment where “the viewer 
[or, more generally, the audience member] becomes a participant in the … performance” (1).  
That spectacular culture-space has historically been a place for female empowerment through 
coded rhetoric has not heretofore been considered.  For this approach to be believable, the reader 
must understand the spectacle not as inert space, not simply as “to-be-looked-at-ness” as Laura 
Mulvey calls it (837) but rather as an activating space, one that seems simple, but one whose 
sheen – and the expectation of public women’s propriety – hid the possibility of raising the 
awareness of groups of audience members, potential counterpublics.  These spectacular moments 
are conversations that take place between writers/rhetors and audience members in the very 
space of drift, the very modes of representation where the spectacle presents itself as life that 
shines but does not nourish.  Gender is key here.  As Brown explains of his notions of the two 
elements in historical films, “[t]hese two kinds of spectacle can be said to have their own 
gendered associations.  The décor of history is associated with the domestic sphere … whereas 
the spectacular vista [is] generally … associated with the world of men” (160).  Brown’s work 
here, though focused only on one type of film, can and should be extrapolated: Gender pervades 
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the spectacle.  Sometimes it is put to use by the spectacle to fulfill the capitalist’s “choice already 
made” (Debord 13), but other times the spectacle can be put to use to call attention to that very 
choice, its gendered features, its assumed trajectories of domination.  As Alex Jeffry, Colin 
McFarlane, and Alex Vasudevan explain in their guest editor’s introduction to an issue of Public 
Culture called “Debating Capital, Spectacle, and Modernity,” the spectacle can also be used to 
draw attention to itself. 
  On first inspection, we see an image of a crammed kitchen, unwashed dishes  
  carelessly stacked on an aluminum stove and in a half-filled sink.  A pink plastic  
  pitcher, an empty egg carton, an unfinished bowl of soup, and a discarded orange  
  peel suggest a banal still life.  Yet what reads like a prosaic domestic scene is, on  
  closer inspection, itself a reconstruction, a paper model whose minute   
  imperfections – an exposed edge, a visible pencil mark – draw attention to the  
  very mechanisms of its making.  Thomas Demand’s Kitchen derives from a news  
  photograph of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s hideaway near his   
  hometown of Tikrit, where he was forced to take refuge during the American  
  invasion of 2003. (531) 
Here, in these moments when the spectacle draws attention to its own spectacularization, is 
where radical feminist rhetoric fits.  Between 1917 and 1930, Haldeman-Julius, Loos, and West, 
all masters of public spectacle, managed to very subtly show their own exposed edges, edges not 
visible to the mass audiences that consumed their works – but visible to those who were 
sensitized to the need for gendered critique.  It is in this space where spectacle’s drift turns 
hopeful and radical and relinquishes the insidious qualities that Marxist theorists cling to in their 
descriptions.  It is subtle and historical, and if one looks close enough, it is there.  
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The Divided Self and Spectacle as Dreamwork 
 In her longitudinal study of the phases and development of American autobiographical 
writing, Interpreting the Self, Diane Bjorklund reminds us of the historical and social 
contingency of the self and its necessary location.  “As part of our socialization,” she explains, 
“we learn vocabularies of self to think about and assess our experiences and behavior” (7).  And, 
for Bjorklund, “[s]uch vocabularies of self are not strictly personal”; they are social, historical, 
dynamic and periodizable (7).  In the United States, Bjorklund argues, self-representation begins 
in the colonial era with presentations of the self-as-morality-play, which graduates into 
autobiographies of what she calls “masters of the universe” as the nineteenth century draws to a 
close (88).  But the self-mastery of the robber barons gives way at the turn of the twentieth as 
Freud’s ideas begin to take root in popular American consciousness, and Freud’s self is a 
divided, somewhat unknowable, desiring, and ultimately an anxious self.  Bjorklund continues: 
  “We are importing the plague,” remarked Sigmund Freud to Carl Jung when they  
  visited the United States in 1909.  Since then, numerous commentators have  
  agreed – perhaps not with Freud’s choice of metaphor – but with the view that his  
  ideas, as well as the field of psychology in general, have had a considerable  
  impact on thought in the United States and throughout the Western world. (89) … 
  [Autobiographies] began to look at the “battle within” in different terms –   
  discussing the troubling “passions” in the more neutral terms of instincts and  
  drives.  And they no longer assumed that introspection was a simple task. (90) 
One element of particular importance when considering the early twentieth century’s facilitation 
of the “uncertain self” is how mediatized spectacle not only packaged these Freudian ideas but 
also came to embody the disassociation of unconscious drives and desires, spectacularizing 
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Americans’ internal uncertainties, uncertainties that divided the self not only into the conscious 
and unconscious selves but also divided (particularly the world of George Herbert Mead) the self 
into the internal “I” and the social “me” (Mead 173), a division that succinctly explains the 
juxtaposition in the early twentieth century between two rising disciplines: psychology and 
sociology.  For both Freud and Mead, then, though one is directed inwardly and the other 
outwardly, the principle of the divided – and hence the anxious – self is crucial to characterizing 
the American mind in the early twentieth century.  For Bjorklund and important to this study, the 
fundamental characteristic of this period is a fixation on “motive” (95).   
 Sigmund Freud’s visit to Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1909 to speak at Clark University 
represented a major milestone in the transformation of American consciousness and in Freud’s 
career.  As Nathan Hale explains, before his trip to Clark, Freud “was still a relatively obscure 
Viennese neurologist, known chiefly to physicians and psychologists on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  His popular vogue in America had not yet begun” (3).  As Freud recalled years later,  
  As I stepped on to the platform at Worcester to deliver my Five Lectures on  
  Psychoanalysis it seemed like the realization of some incredible daydream:  
  psychoanalysis was no longer a product of delusion, it had become a valuable part 
  of reality. (Hale 4)   
Freud’s ideas of the unconscious, the expansive, largely unknowable internality of the self 
played very nicely to American audiences that caught on immediately to its fit for American 
culture.  Though ostensibly focused on the internal nature of the mind, of past experience, and of 
psycho-sexual development, psychoanalysis was, for Freud’s soon-to-be former student Carl 
Jung, at least, “an extroverted doctrine, one-sidedly oriented toward the external world and 
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viewing this world as the ultimate touchstone of reality”; for Jung, Freud’s claim at internality 
demonstrated a move of indirection itself (Rosenweig 212). 
 In point of fact, Freud’s trip to America represented an extremely fraught situation on 
several levels.  He wanted desperately to expand psychoanalysis to a global audience, and 
despite his oft-recorded distaste for the United States, he knew it was crucial for him.  Toward 
the end of establishing widespread and credible notoriety, Freud brought along his wayward 
disciple Carl Jung.  By 1909, Freud and Jung’s relationship had begun to deteriorate.  By 1915, 
the friendship was finished, Jung announcing that he was fed up with Freud’s “tricks” 
(Rosenweig 216).   
 Freud knew that two things were to be gained from his trip to the States: one was 
legitimacy in American psychological circles, circles that by this time were much more 
interested in Wilhelm Wundt’s laboratory psychology than psychoanalysis.  This is why, for 
instance, an invitation from G. Stanely Hall at Clark was such an important opening for Freud; it 
represented his ability to slip into the door of academically legitimate American psychology.  In 
addition, though, it also represented the chance to activate the American public to Freud’s 
particular theory of the self, a theory that allowed for the power of the unconscious wish, which 
“was incomparably stronger than a wish of which one was fully aware, for one could condemn 
the latter with all one’s strength and maturity of judgment,” while the former remained true but 
elusive (Hale 12).  The Clark conference offered 
  a prophetic example of the social interaction that accounts for … the swift spread  
  of new ideas in the United States.  Present at Clark were three major agents of  
  cultural diffusion – professionals, laymen, and the press.  Traditionally, each  
  group influenced the others.  Professionals with innovations to introduce tried to  
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  win public support.  Laymen took a keen interest in the latest scientific expertise.   
  The press, with which professionals often eagerly cooperated, crystallized styles  
  and disseminated information in hyperbolic and simplistic ways. (Hale 17) 
 Though Freud’s ideas would not reach their cultural peak in the United States until the late 
1930s, his theories would reach the first wave of the cultural elite by the early teens – by 1919, 
sixty percent of Freud’s patients were American (Douglas 123).  Hale continues, “In America, 
popular and professional culture were closely bound together, and, beginning with the Clark 
Conference, the reception of psychoanalysis occurred on both levels” (20). 
 Freud’s contribution to the spectacularization of the American mind cannot go 
understated, as his theories of consciousness and sexuality created the conditions for mass media 
to step in and fulfill the conditions of the desire-mechanisms, tools of the desiring individuals 
that Freud “helped” Americans realize they were.  Haldeman-Julius, Loos, and West all had 
intimate connections with Freud’s thought, and each capitalized on his effect on American 
consciousness.  Haldeman-Julius’s press was one of the first American publishing houses, 
besides Boni and Liveright (for which Freud’s nephew Edward Bernays worked and with whom 
Bernays facilitated the first American publication of A General Introduction of Psychoanalysis in 
1920) to publish work on Freud (Freud on Sleep and Sexual Dreams by Anton Booker in 1925), 
while Anita Loos’s famous protagonist in Gentlemen Prefer Blondes (also 1925), Lorelei Lee, 
paid a famous visit to “Dr. Froyd,” and Mae West made a serious study of Freud’s theories of 
sexuality before she attained popularity as a writer for stage and screen.  Echoes of Freud abound 
in her first Broadway play, Sex (1926).  In Blondes, Lorelei explains, 
  So, Dr. Froyd and I had quite a long talk in the english landguage.  So it seems  
  that everybody seems to have a thing called inhibitions, which is when you want  
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  to do a thing and you do not do it.  So then you dream about it instead.  So Dr.  
  Froyd  asked me, what I seemed to dream about.  So I told him that I never really  
  dream about anything.  I mean I use my brains so much in the day time that at  
  night they do not seem to do anything else but rest. … So then he seemed very  
  very intreeged at a girl who always seemed to do everything she wanted to do. …  
  So then he called in his assistance and he pointed at me and talked to his   
  assistance quite a lot in the Viennese landguage.  So then his assistance Looked at 
  me and looked and me and it really seems as if I was quite a famous case.  So then 
  Dr. Froyd said that all I needed was to cultivate a few inhibitions and get some  
  sleep. (Loos Blondes 90) 
Freud was not simply a mine for jokes, though; rather, he conditioned in the American mind the 
spectacle of media as a kind of dream-state, a place where desire is mapped, where our 
unconscious, sexualized impulses draw us to identity, where the real and imagined coalesce.  As 
Freud explains in Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious (1905)  
  At the end of the chapter which dealt with the elucidation of the technique of wit  
  (p. 125) we asserted that the processes of condensation with and without   
  substitutive formation, displacement, representation through absurdity,   
  representation through the opposite, indirect representation, etc., all of which we  
  found participated in the formation of wit, evinced a far-reaching agreement with  
  the processes of “dream-work.” (249)4 
This spectacle-as-social dreamspace, though, is a social/ideational relation in which and through 
which projected, spectacularized desires offer a world that is at once apart from and somewhere 
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inside us.  For Haldeman-Julius, Loos, and West, Freud’s contribution to the emergent spectacles 
of media came in the effect his theories had on orienting the American public comfortably to its 
own spectacularization, its own self-representation.  What Freud added to mediatized spectacle, 
for these women, was a critical space into which indirect critique could be inserted.  The 
important parallel Freud makes between wit and dream-work is of the greatest significance in the 
exploration of his role in helping to create a particularly American spectacle, where media-space, 
American’s collective gendered identity-crises, and eventually feminist critique merged.   
 While Freud’s Three Essays on Sexuality (1905) has garnered much critical, Wit and its 
Relation to the Unconscious has not.  When read together, Freud’s contribution to the spectacle 
becomes clearer: he is defining the parameters of sexual desire (and hence the politics of gender) 
at the same time that he is relating both of these to the practice of world-making, writing, and 
speaking.  Freud’s theory of wit, in particular, echoes the tautological aspects of Debord’s 
(admittedly later) theorization of the spectacle – it functions as an arresting of progress, the 
confluence of ends and means.  In The Rhetoric of Concealment, Rosemary Kegl argues that 
“Freud’s own theories about joking assert a notion of simultaneity [and] resistance to temporal 
process” that echo the spectacle’s illusory quality, elements that indicate the spectacle as a rich, 
nuanced, gendered political/critical space (22). 
The Spectacular Modern Woman 
 From their numerous magazine interviews in the teens and twenties, their interest in 
fashion, and her witty banter, it doesn’t take much effort to understand these subjects as a 
modern women and therefore, to some degree, anyway, as entities of appearance.  Despite their 
media-friendliness and courtship of the spotlight, these women were first writers – more notable, 
at first, anyway, for manipulating the public’s gaze than being subject to it.  Liz Conor argues 
29 
	  
that the modern woman’s subjectivity was constructed by her very awareness of being seen, her 
ability “to appear,” a theme about which Loos, Haldeman-Julius, and West were ambivalent, 
often noting the importance of appearance and its captivating potential.  
 Conor borrows the notion of appearing from Judith Butler’s performance feminism, 
feminism that disrupts ontological binaries by subversively agglomerating complex signifiers 
within one palimpsest/body.  For Butler, the feminine “enacts the repetitive performance of 
‘appearing to be’ the phallus” (4).  In Butler’s reading of Freud, though, women do not ever 
realize the phallus; they internalize its inaccessibility and through a process much like mourning 
the death of a loved one, incorporate that lost other into themselves in a complex and 
melancholic act of identification (58).  For Butler, this act of self-denial-via-identification 
parallels gender’s imitative appetite for appearances and appearing.  Conor’s argument that 
modern women have identified with the social pressure to be seen, with the scopophilic fixation 
on their externalities and have consequently built reflexive subject positions around this 
awareness-of-awareness is catalyzing though problematic.  “Does one,” she asks, “appear to be a 
woman in accordance with a preordained designation as woman, or come into being as woman 
through appearing to be feminine?” (5) 
 Women’s awareness of appearing is highlighted by modernity’s developing technologies.  
Rather than Benjamin’s work of art in the age of mechanical production, the new question 
becomes the status of identity-work in the age of mechanical reproduction.  
  “Appearing” describes how the changed conditions of feminine visibility in  
  modernity invited a practice of the self which was centered on one’s visual status  
  and effects.  “Feminine visibility” refers to the entire range of women’s capacity  
  to be seen: from self-apprehension in a mirror, to being seen in public space, to  
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  becoming an image through industrialized visual technologies such as the camera.  
  The Modern Woman was spectacularized.  For women to identify themselves as  
  modern, the performance of their gendered identity had to take place within the  
  modern spectacularization of everyday life. (Conor 7) 
Butler attributes this recognition by the modern woman that her primary ontology comes in being 
seen a kind of melancholic substitution-anxiety borrowed from Freud.  Conor’s rereading of 
(Butler’s) Freud, then, arrives at the notion that the modern woman is necessarily melancholic. 
 In The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud argues that in this state, the id’s desired object and 
its entire system of cathexes is absorbed into the ego through the process of “setting up … the 
object inside the ego” (24).  For Freud, female subjects are particularly prone to melancholic 
substitution.  “In women,” he argues, “who have had many experiences in love there seems to be 
no difficulty in finding vestiges of their object-cathexes in the traits of their character. … In such 
cases,” he goes on, “the alteration in character has been able to survive the object-relation and in 
a certain sense to conserve it,” not unlike the process of the internalization of the Oedipal Father 
and the subsequent production of the superego, a stage fraught with obstacles – even for males – 
who (hopefully) experience eventual graduation into self-control, into phallic-ownership (24).  
That said, following Butler, even the perception of phallic ownership becomes more like a shady 
lease agreement, a pretense, a performance of ownership (59).   
 Conor’s belief that the modern woman became complacent with the internalization of her 
own image is both provocative and somewhat misleading, particularly as her notion of the 
spectacle – the mode of her self-differentiation – diverges radically from its origin in Debord’s 
work.  For Debord, whose Marxism demanded a repudiation of Freud’s individual as a bourgeois 
fantasy, the spectacular had a decidedly negative function.  Spectacularization, according to 
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Debord, results in a sociocultural process shockingly similar to Freud’s melancholia.  It is a 
function of derealization, of loss, of separation.  In the spectacle,  
  Images detached from every aspect of life merge into a common stream, and the  
  former unity of life is lost forever.  Apprehended in a partial way, reality unfolds  
  in a new generality as a pseudo-world apart, solely as an object of contemplation.  
  The tendency toward the specialization of image-of-the-world finds its highest  
  expression in the world of the autonomous image, where deceit deceives itself.  
  The spectacle in its generality is a concrete insertion of life, and, as such, the  
  autonomous movement of non-life. (12)  
While it is clear that Debord is rewriting Feuerbach’s Essence of Religion (1841) for 
contemporary mediatized times, it is also clear that the spectacle for him is an intensely negative 
thing, analogous to the church in Feuerbach’s work, both necessary to understand human 
trajectories and antithetical to them.  God, for Feuerbach and his left-Hegelian brethren, results 
in a process of invention, forgetting, and inversion, a process that results in a contradiction 
between faith and love, a self-aggrandizing self-denial.   
 Genealogically, this does not bode well for Conor’s modern woman, relegated to the 
fabric of representation in which she struggles to find power that is at once not hers and not real 
but through which she can, in the production of self, determine her own view of being viewed, 
her own guilty complicity in the spectacle.  “Modernity’s visions of women,” Conor argues, 
“became part of women’s self-perception as modern: gendered representations became 
embodied” (8).  Being seen, though, hardly approaches the complexity of modern woman’s 
experience and cultural power.  Lest scholars oversimplify the modern woman, film historian 
Janet Steiger reminds us that this 
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  ideological vision also included the possibilities for Woman.  Moreover, because  
  no unified middle-class position existed, the representation was not a coherent and 
  unified act of repression but indexed struggle instead.  Thus the New Good  
  Woman was actually a lot of New Good Women, counterbalanced by many New  
  Bad Women.  The more people represented Woman the more possibilities   
  developed for complexity and contradiction.  Rather than see Woman as Other  
  (the “opposition” thesis), we need to understand Woman as a sign with multiple  
  meanings. (xiv) 
Conor’s emphasis on the visible works against what Rita Felski calls the “recurring identification 
of the modern with the public” that is “responsible for the belief that women were situated 
outside processes of history and social change” (16).  Women can enter public culture through 
the doors of visibility-induced identity formation, or, as the women in this cohort of rhetors 
demonstrate, they can enter through the creation or manipulation of those visible parameters.  
While access to public culture is crucial in reading the modern woman, her deference to 
spectacular visibility is not.  Indeed, a radical subset of modern women made and remade public 
culture by way of seeing rather than being seen.  If the a/effect of visibility conditioned the 
empowered though melancholic modern woman, the employment of visibility conditioned the 
radical modern woman.  Identity, in both cases, functions as the axis upon which 
appearance/appearing is either (in the melancholic) internalized or (in the radical) 
instrumentalized.    
 Though this theorizing of the modern woman is noteworthy, not much work has been 
done on the rhetorical methods put to use by certain modern women, methods used in the 
creation of public constructions of spectacularized masculinity.  European literary modernity, 
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according to Felski, had begun this process well-before spectacular American modernity caught 
up and “repositioned” the male body “as a source of visual pleasure and an object of desire” even 
as it tended to reveal that body “as a highly coded and artificial construct” (103).  Indeed, as 
Conors argues, the “correlation between spectatorship and modern subjectivity is crucial” (16). 
  It not only underpins the claim that modernity centers on the visual, but it implies  
  that only spectators can be included in the category of the modern subject.  The  
  traditional divide between subject and object is reproduced between spectator and  
  spectacle. … If this division is also gendered, an alternative view of the feminine  
  spectacle is obscured: one that is not exclusionary, one that challenges rather than  
  confirms the traditional division between spectator and spectacle, subject and  
  object.  The newly emerged subject position of the modern appearing woman  
  subverted those divisions, inviting a reappraisal of their appropriateness in the  
  analysis of visual culture. (16) 
Backpedaling against earlier overtures toward Freudian melancholia, Conor ultimately places the 
modern woman outside the divisions of subject and object, buffered by awareness, a move that 
risks her own loss of the academic’s generic frame in the name of identity politics; Conor herself 
espouses the importance of being seen in her own development.  Those modern women, the 
modern writers and rhetors who manufactured feminine spectacles, were, for a brief but 
fortuitous time, bearers of the potential for radical public power.   
Performance and Audience in Indirect Feminist Rhetoric 
 Expanding on spectacle as a frame for indirect feminist rhetoric between the turn of the 
century and 1930 means sensitizing ourselves to the “quantum change [that] occurred in the 
quality of public life” during this era, when Americans’ “reality began to alter” through the 
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supplementation of celebrity-centered media and its spectacular consolidating of consumer 
attention (Schickel 8).  But this moment represents, in media’s grasping for the attention of mass 
audiences, not just the centralization of cultural attention and opinion but the possibility of 
radical indirect feminist rhetoric that made use of spectacular, centralizing space as well as 
assumptions about the proprietary constraints of women writing in the public sphere.   
 As Richard Schickel argues in His Picture in the Papers: A Speculation on Celebrity in 
America Based on the Life of Douglas Fairbanks, Sr.,  
  [t]he people who existed in this separate reality – the stars and celebrities – were  
  as familiar to us, in some ways, as our friends and neighbors.  In many respects  
  we were – and are – more profoundly involved with their fates than we are with  
  those of most of the people we know personally.  They command enormous  
  amounts of our psychic energy and attention. … It is in this surreal world that all  
  significant national questions are personified and dramatized. (8,10)   
For Debord, and extremely useful for this study, this personification and dramatization of 
individuality function to create the spectacle as a kind of social organization, taking 
Freudian/Burkean identification mechanisms and extending them to the arrangement of social 
agents.   
 The spectacle is not, as Ashley Elliott Pryor argues, a place, only, where 
  exchange value has completely eclipsed use value and can now achieve the status  
  of absolute irresponsible sovereignty over life in its entirety, after having falsified  
  the entire social production. (Agamben qtd. in Pryor 183) 
Agamben and Pryor’s use of the spectacle-as-cultural-waste-bin fails to account for the 
portentous rise of critical possibilities that the spectacle-in-transition generated in the early 
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twentieth century.  The spectacle, for each member of this dissertation’s subject-cohort, was a 
place to make money, but financial ends were red herrings – to a large degree – that covered over 
the much more important pursuance of publics by radically covert writers.  Pryor and Agamben 
see the spectacle only as the “culmination of modern capitalist production in which the value of 
human production shifts from its use and exchange values to its value as image or representation 
– as a commodity” (182).  Each fails to see the radical import and space created within modes of 
representation, especially when they are historicized.  Even the spectacle, what they call a 
culmination of modern production, was incipient and vulnerable to occupation at some point, as 
was the culture in which it proliferated.  That said, there are similarities between what Pryor and 
Agamben call the “culture of gesture” and the culture of incipient spectacle in the sense used in 
this dissertation insofar as 
  when thought functions by way of the gesture, what becomes significant in a  
  given human activity is less how well it accords with a pre-given structure or  
  schema … but rather the character or quality of its enactment within its given  
  environment of context (what we could call its sense of responsiveness). (185) 
In that way, it becomes relatively simple to read the moves made by Loos, Haldeman-Julius, and 
West as spectacular gestures, gestures not only meant to raise consciousness about gender 
domination but also to raise awareness about the very means by which that gesture is conveyed.  
The historical and mediatized context for this cohort’s indirect feminist rhetoric is fundamental 
to this study, lest we lose even the “gesture,” which becomes “[the] communication of a 
communicability” (185).  While this is interesting, I find it a kind of dead-end.  Loos, Haldeman-
Julius, and West did have something to say, but because of gatekeepers at home or in the 
audience, they had to speak in code.  That said, there is no denying the gestural quality of their 
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work, but their differing gendered critiques keep them from drifting off into the no (wo)man’s 
land of “pure mediality.”   
 In sum, feminist indirection in these years represents a kind of evolution of the traditional 
Habermasian public sphere, one that challenges the notion of the public sphere as being dictated 
by reason or rationality, though it does maintain the important imprint of its bourgeois 
beginnings (indeed, feminist indirect rhetoric during this period is definitionally market-friendly) 
(Habermas 14).  Here, the public is dictated not by the distribution of information for the means 
of public debate but seems to function in a distinctly opposite way – it is a unifier, a tool used to 
coalesce the American mind along issues of national identity, gender expectations, and 
commoditization.  As George Bataille argues in The Accursed Share, capitalism is, after all, “an 
unreserved surrender to things, heedless of consequences and seeing nothing beyond them … 
[whose] advantage was clear, in minds always quick to grasp the real object, of allowing 
intimacy to recede beyond the threshold of consciousness” (136).  Bataille’s analysis comes from 
a more Marxist place than mine, but it remains useful in its notion of how spectacular 
commodification of people-as-things (celebrities, for instance), allows for intimacy’s crossing 
the threshold of consciousness, not unlike a Trojan horse, loaded with subversive ideas.5       
 Indirection of this sort has manifested before in literature on folk histories and techniques 
and represents a rich history of negotiations and interpretations of indirect responses to the public 
transcript.  In Folk Women and Indirection in Morrison, Ni Dhuibhne, Hurston, and Lavin, for 
instance, Jacqueline Fulmer suggests that indirection may be traceable back to Aristotle’s very 
definition of rhetoric as taking in and acting upon “in any given case[,] the available means of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 My hope is that this study, once completed, could lead to or play into another, more contemporary look at celebrity 
and its mediatized technologies of self – not in the terms that Foucault used (the technologies of repression) but 
rather in terms like Scott would use (the technologies of resistance).  In some very real ways, we have not come to 
the end of the American Spectacular, particularly noting our continuing devotion to celebrity and the advent of 
things like reality television.  
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persuasion” (Fulmer 1).  This apparent (though not actual) conflation of rhetoric and indirection 
comes from Fulmer’s emphasis on the purposes of indirection.  Fulmer offers that the basis for 
comparing the authors she reads does not stem from preemptive confusion of rhetoric and 
indirection generally but instead from the use of “story as a means of meeting a rhetor’s 
expressive goals” that “can allow him or her to evade the societal limits placed on speech or 
writing” (1).6  For Fulmer, the creative use of story-as-indirection serves to highlight her 
explanation of how women can “write on subjects not often seen in print, either before or during 
their eras” (1).  Importantly, as well, Fulmer articulates rhetorical indirection as a sub-genre 
(perhaps an autochthonous one) of feminist criticism, calling upon  and paraphrasing Sandra 
Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s well-taken claim in The Madwoman in the Attic that public (or 
writing) women are often subject to “female stereotyping along a scale of extremes” (3).  In this 
case, indirect rhetoric demonstrates itself to be elegantly in tune with topographies of audience 
expectation about “extremes of Otherness” (3).          
 The philosophical and folk history elements of rhetorical indirection tie Fulmer’s book to 
Henry Louis Gates Jr.’s foundational text, The Signifyin’ Monkey, through analyses of Zora 
Neale Hurston’s use of free indirect discourse, which is a third person narration style that adopts 
conventionally first person tendencies.  For Gates, “Hurston draws upon free indirect discourse 
as a written voice masked by a speakerly voice” (243) a move allows Hurston’s fiction writing to 
deftly foreground orality in Their Eyes Were Watching God “[a]s an element of theme and as a 
highly accomplished rhetorical strategy”; free indirect discourse, for Gates, “depends for its 
effect on … bivocality,” the “voicing of a divided consciousness” (240).  It is, to risk sounding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In any new and responsible work, these constraints have to be articulated, their political, personal, and situational 
encumbrances made explicit.  No longer, in work that appeals to indirection, should authors speak out against some 
kind of abstractions – for that is a shortcut, a strawmang move that ultimately undercuts the value of indirection, 
value that is situationally-laden.  
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oblique, a kind of showing and telling.  Despite its potential and no matter its reflexive 
capacities, free indirect discourse tends toward what Wayne Booth calls “stable or fixed” irony 
(a stable or fixed indirection)  (6).7  In A Rhetoric of Irony, Booth explains that “once a 
reconstruction of meaning has been made, the reader is not then invited to undermine it with 
further demolitions and reconstructions” (6).  Hence, Hurston’s free indirect discourse fixes 
orality and the attention to orality as its interpretive axis, becoming at once both substance and 
subject. 
 Booth’s project in A Rhetoric of Irony locates the production of indirection in the ether of 
style and tone, but as rhetorical indirection is not the central theme of his book, discussions about 
it are limited.  However, Booth does offer an insight into the historical germination and growth 
of indirect rhetoric.  
  We thus have two curiously parallel projects of expansion in modern times.  Two  
  devices of indirection that once kept their place in a classically defined order,  
  performing metaphoric or ironic functions in genres with larger or at least   
  different demands, have expanded themselves – in Symbolism and what might be  
  called Ironism – to fill the whole world of the maker.  “The Metaphor” and “the  
  Irony” have thus been proclaimed as genres in their own right. (177) 
This dissertation diverges from Booth’s implication that indirection itself may well have become 
its own genre, after an incipiency and germination in other genres.8  This is an important point: 
rhetorical indirection, even as I attempt to define its parameters, fundamentally demands a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This fixity, though, it up for debate.  For instance, in Anita Loos’s highly parodic work Gentlemen Prefer Blondes 
(1925), Loos uses free indirect discourse, but her radicalism comes in its combination with other types of rhetorical 
indirection (like genre coding), which allow her to create a multi-layered critical parody that resists final 
interpretation (very much the opposite of the way, say, Jonathan Swift’s parody A Modest Proposal does not).  
8 This is to say that rhetorical indirection always depends on a genre to a greater or lesser degree.  It can never grow 
into its own genre, else it loses its critical leverage and reason for being, its very character.  
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locality, a specific place and time – lest its conceptual status becomes drained both of its 
historical and criticial potential and a radical vehicle for social critique is lost to self-immolation.   
 For feminists, embodying and contextualizing rhetorical indirection is crucial.  Tellingly, 
Karen Kopelson puts her finger on a problem not just salient in classroom situations but any 
situations in which feminist/radical/activist rhetors (and in her case, teachers) approach their 
radical content through oppositional strategies, strategies that she characterizes as “resistance” 
(119).  Kopelson’s point that for members of marginalized communities who happen to be 
teachers of writing, pedagogical approaches to activist subject matter, subject matter that 
“force[s] us to inhabit the world in fundamentally new and different ways,” create 
communication barriers in which the given teacher is read as playing out his or her own 
autobiographical and political impulses on students who prefer a seemingly more objective 
approach (119).  Kopelson explains, 
  In fact, I would argue that in today’s suspicious and resistant classrooms, it is  
  often this very conscientiousness, the concerted effort with which we do “teach  
  for diversity,” that itself delimits pedagogical effects and effectiveness, especially  
  if we are marked or read as “different” in such a way that students may ascribe  
  political agendas to us the minute we walk into the classroom. (120) 
In many ways, despite their rhetorical contexts being separated by nearly a century and their 
audiences being somewhat differently composed, Kopelson’s performative teachers, teachers 
who perform neutrality and take on personas that feign “objectivity,” are very similar to Loos, 
Haldeman-Julius, and West as feminists.  While on face indirect, rhetorical feminism and 
composition instruction do not seem that similar, they share inner didactic or consciousness-
raising elements and depend largely for their success on their abilities to convey information in 
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convincing ways.  Historically, beginning with suffrage movements in the nineteenth century, 
feminism has, like contemporary composition instruction, preferred “resistant” approaches, 
approaches that foregrounded their didacticism.   
 In Writing Permitted in Designated Areas Only, Linda Brodkey’s relation to Kopelson’s 
text returns the discussion to the role of the researcher/teacher/scholar’s role in the reproduction 
of hegemonic stories; that is, it returns to my status as conveyer of the (and I know how funny 
this sounds) the truth behind the indirection I record and assert.  This work does not amend 
itself to Brodkey’s notion of negative critique.  This is a good thing, as she asserts that many if 
not most of these critiques simply reproduce the hegemonic structures whatever theory leads 
researchers to look for.  “So, an ethnographer who enters the scene on the presumption that the 
social arrangements” in a given situation “will favor the interests of a dominant group is 
undeniably looking for hegemonic practices” but is also constrained by these practices, 
constrained to see and record things a certain, terministic way (107).  I privilege not negative 
critique but a kind of celebratory/celebrity ethnography of mediatized indirection, a kind of 
reverse critique that shows counter-hegemonic activity in registers that are traditionally 
overlooked, allowing my readers (like Kopelson’s students) to form their own critical opinions of 
the hegemonic positions and rhetorical situations these women were put in to begin with.  For 
Brodkey, “The only way to fight a hegemonic discourse is to teach ourselves and others 
alternative ways of seeing the world and discussing what it is we have come to understand as 
theory, research, and practice” (113).  Indeed, pushing the limits of expected research and 
accepted research is part of history writing, according to Wendy B. Sharer’s notion that it ought 
to fill the “gaps of existing historical accounts” (120).  It should also, though, expand the 
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questions that underlie those gaps, not just questions of hegemony, power, culture, but questions 
of motive, language-use, and exigence.   
  Habermas defined the public sphere as a mediatized space characterized by “people’s 
use of their reason” (27),9 and, in a nutshell, this “reason,” the hegemonic agreement between 
and among dominant modes of economic and sociopolitical behavior (as well as assumptions 
about the proprietary restrictions of public women, women who attained audiences), provides the 
context for gendered indirect rhetoric by which marginalized voices access the public sphere, 
create “counterpublics” within it, or co-opt its market strategies for radical ends.  That said, 
indirect rhetoric is not everything or everywhere; rather, its manifestations are multiple but 
limited, its strategies irregular, and its outcomes often overlooked, particularly when its 
practitioners are women.  It is inextricably (and sometimes quixotically) linked to what Scott in a 
revisionist twist on the debate-filled but relatively homogeneous (Habermasian) bourgeois public 
sphere calls the “symbolization of domination by demonstrations and enactments of power” (45).  
Rhetorical indirection does not comprise a sneaky rejection of a monolithic truth.  Instead, it 
comprises a tactical and visionary rejection, parodization, or co-optation of the public transcript’s 
“appearance of unanimity,” its “dramaturgy … of domination,” and ultimately, a co-optation of 
its audience (45, 66).   
 The one thing that is, perhaps, the greatest risk in this dissertation is that it, at times, fails 
to take women writers’ words about themselves and their subject positions as the truth, seeking 
instead to engender the idea that indirect rhetoric begins with some sort of elision of one’s true 
exigence.  This comes, certainly, from my life-long tendency to become, as Julie Jung explains, 
“energized intellectually and personally by the disruptions that result when I put two ‘wrong’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Italics added. 
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things together” (xi), out of the strange thrill that comes in creating what Jung calls “a 
revisionary rhetoric,” a rhetoric that is “situated at the intersection of feminism and revision,” 
one that highlights “a rhetoric of relationship, one grounded in a feminist postmodern 
epistemology” (9) but not confined exclusively to its negative critical ethos.    
 My reconstruction of Jung’s useful approach is rather simple: sometimes women rhetors 
are likely to be more effective when they seem to work within the limitations inscribed on them 
from without while at the same time using those very expectations as springboards for more 
structurally radical critiques, critiques that are, due to their elision of oppositional discourse, 
more likely to find popular audiences.  As film historian Molly Haskell explains of Loos’s work 
in the teens and twenties, Loos “always knew [women] were more intelligent than men, but that 
in [her scenarios and screenplays, she was] smart enough not to let men know it” (44).  Loos and 
her cohort are not just assembling a complex dodge or con, but rather they are forming indirect 
feminist ethos as codesmiths, assembling critiques through their establishment of oblique and 
complex “writer/reader relationship[s]” (Jung 10).  What keeps this, I hope, from falling prey to 
the critique that my approach is misogynist (that I read women as manipulative or 
constitutionally or situationally unable to plainly state the truth) is that I focus on indirect 
rhetoric as a performative rhetorical enterprise, an enterprise that, I argue, these powerful, public 
women chose, one which these burgeoning technologies of communication allow them.  These 
women find mass popularity as well as feminist legitimacy.   
 In performing these indirect feminist rhetorics, Loos, Haldeman-Julius, and West, in their 
own different ways, seek to overturn the paradox of audience that, as Jacques Ranciere points 
out, relegates the spectator to one simply who views, one whose activity consists in “the opposite 
of knowing,” one who is “held before an appearance in a state of ignorance about the process of 
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production of this appearance and about the reality it conceals” (2).  Audiences for indirect 
feminist rhetors such as these are necessarily lifted out of passivity, activated by the very dog-
whistle quality of the message they witness.  They are, if the message is properly received, 
implicated in it.  This implication speaks to the second way that indirect feminist rhetoric 
overturns traditional audience paradoxes.  Ranciere argues that these audiences who remain 
ignorant and passive are “separated from both the capacity to know and the power to act” (2).  In 
a very real sense, what makes the messages sent by these women, be they ironic vivisections of 
masculine power and limitation or desperate pleas for help from beneath the rein of an abusive 
spouse, so important is that they are always pleas for action, for changes in interpretation, for 
consciousness-raising.   
 Indirect feminist rhetoric, , like Ranciere’s project, is an emancipation of the spectator – a 
challenge to the audience.  These rhetors know, ultimately, that though their messages are often 
alien to the spectacular media in which they are delivered, that their audiences are small 
subsections of the generalized “other” expected to exist on the receiving side of mass-media, 
whose principle goal is to create future counter-publics from within the mass, to create resistance 
to gendered and sexual subversion: “she at least knows one thing: she knows that she must do 
one thing – overcome the gulf separating activity from passivity” (Ranciere 12).  Ranciere 
continues, 
 For in all these performances what is involved is linking what one knows with 
 what one does not know; being at once a performer deploying her skills and a 
 spectator observing what these skills might produce in a new context among other 
 spectators.  Like researchers, artists construct the stages where the manifestation 
 and effect of their skills are exhibited, rendered uncertain in the terms of the new 
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 idiom that conveys a new intellectual adventure.  The effect of the idiom cannot 
 be anticipated.  It requires spectators who play the role of active interpreters, who 
 develop their own translation in order to appropriate the ‘story’ and make it their 
 own story.  An emancipated community is a community of narrators and 
 translators. (22) 
The idea that indirect feminist rhetoric is at play in the spectacular space made possible by forms 
of mass communication does not shy away from “the truth of the concept of spectacle as fixed by 
Guy Debord: the spectacle is not the display of images concealing reality.  It is the existence of 
social activity and social wealth as a separate reality,” and it is from this reality, from this 
isolated place – one Ranciere compares “to that of the shackled prisoners in Plato’s cave” – 
where gender is constructed as topos for indirect rhetoric, a “place where images are taken for 
realities, ignorance for knowledge, and poverty for wealth” (45).  It is because these indirect 
feminist rhetors demonstrate their shackles back to their publics through the indirection made 
possible by the fire light on Plato’s cave wall that makes them so delightfully subversive and 
which, in the end, demarcates them as a select cohort of rhetors (45).  Neither do they resist the 
spectacle, nor do they accept what it has made of them; through the spectacle, however shadowy, 
traces of feminism emerge – but only to audiences who, at the time of writing or later, are 
accustomed to listening closely.  That is the aim of this project.   
This dissertation is structured upon three major sections, each focusing on the recovery of 
a particular feminist literary figure and paying attention to the modalities or technologies in 
which that particular thinker proffered what I call indirect feminist rhetoric.  The work centers on 
the questions of how a woman can be a feminist without claiming to be one, how a woman can 
offer feminist rhetoric in multiple writing technologies, and how a woman can offer feminist 
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critique in counterpropositional ways, ways in which she herself avoids direct propositionality 
(the principle fodder of traditional rhetoric), that is, avoids making straightforward claims as well 
as denying the person under scrutiny the ability to argue back in propositional ways.  In this way, 
this dissertation offers a challenge to traditional rhetoric and traditional feminism, both of which 
have functioned in a tacitly acknowledged public and political space (with its suggestion of 
political or at least propositional equanimity).  By undermining the requirement for 
propositionality in both of these discursive traditions, this work seeks to extend the boundaries of 
rhetoric and feminism, making possible the recovery of women previously assumed to lie outside 
the parameters of feminism.  Secondarily, this approach makes possible the creation of rhetorical 
analytics previously unseen in the rhetorical tradition (particularly those of indirection).  I argue 
that both feminism and rhetoric will be greatly enriched by this approach, which seeks to extend 
the discussions beyond the propositional rhetorics assumed in spaces (all too) comfortable with 
identity politics.  Finally, I pose the question: What messages and people get lost behind, around, 
and in-between these propositions?  The answer to this question is biographical, technological, 
and rhetorical.  
 Chapter one, then, approaches the development of Marcet Haldeman-Julius’s indirect 
feminist rhetoric in relation to the writing technologies available to her, specifically via a 
socialist publishing company operated by Haldeman-Julius and her husband; her indirect 
rhetorical strategy manifests itself in the concrete denial of exigence as well as what I call genre 
camouflage – writing autobiographically in genres where autobiographical detail is not expected.  
Sensitized politically from her earliest work with her aunt Jane Addams at Hull House and 
versed in performance from her years as a Broadway ingénue, Haldeman-Julius had both a desire 
for social justice and a deep connection for the political potential of performance; these elements 
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combined when, upon returning to her native Kansas from New York, she entered into a difficult 
marriage with Emanuel Julius, a socialist writer.  Trapped in an abusive marriage where her 
significant assets were stolen and hidden and her personal worth attacked, Haldeman-Julius 
combined her performative nuance with her political and personal desire to gain audiences by 
critiquing her husband through several modalities of writing: the novel, the gossip column, and 
the historical monograph.  Denied her property and dignity by her husband, Haldeman-Julius’s 
indirect critiques of the man who functioned as the gatekeeper to a public audience represents the 
least abstract form of indirect feminist rhetoric: the explicit or implicit denial of exigence.   
 Chapter two recovers the feminist work of Anita Loos, whose indirect rhetorical 
feminism operates on a level abstracted from Haldeman-Julius’s: the ironic construction of male 
privilege and the parodic construction of feminine power.  Loos, as a writer for early Hollywood, 
begins her career surreptitiously aping the blind male privilege of Douglas Fairbanks (and his 
onscreen counterpart), creating him as a kind of puppet whose performances indicate a complete 
lack of self-awareness, particularly in her 1916 work, His Picture in the Papers.  Loos continues 
to develop her use of irony and parody as indirect rhetorical critique in her 1925 novella 
Gentlemen Prefer Blondes and its protagonist, Lorelei Lee, best remembered perhaps as played 
by Marilyn Monroe in Howard Hawkes’ 1954 film adaptation.  Using Lee’s persona and the 
genre camouflage of the “diary of a professional woman,” a woman whose lack of intelligence is 
encapsulated in hilariously misconstructed phrases, misspellings, and conceptual vagary, Loos 
proffers a bold critique.  Here, Loos critiques her friend and “idol” H.L. Mencken’s 1917 work 
In Defense of Women, a work that claims women are smarter because they are weaker.  Loos’s 
construction of Lee takes Mencken at his misogynistic word and creates a character that both 
rhetorically undermines and counterpropositionally deflates Mencken’s windy self-importance.  
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Loos’s development from ironist of male privilege to parodist of the limitations of female 
empowerment represents the second level of abstraction in this work’s indirect rhetorical 
analytic. 
 Chapter three demonstrates, in its analysis of the writings of Mae West, the final level of 
abstraction in the indirect feminist rhetorical analytic: audience co-optation, made possible 
through the fusing of the biographical reality and spectacular creation through a rhetoric of 
ekphrasis, the textualization of the visual (the spectacularization of textuality).  This move 
underscores West’s almost complete convergence with the spectacle as, among other things, a 
negotiation of personal trauma and a consolidating of gendered rhetorical power.10  West’s work 
as a Broadway writer indicates her use of that modality to woo audiences for her bawdy, 
lowbrow humor and to co-opt their gaze by creating for herself a character space of rhetorical 
redoubling gender performance, as her childhood crush, Bert Williams, redoubled and disrupted 
race on the vaudeville stage as an African American man who performed in blackface.  West 
renders herself a space, a spectacular space, against which audience desires are broadcast – but a 
space that confuses and challenges those projections, questioning the ontological voracity of 
gender itself, as well as the traditional expectations of power that come with ontological 
constructions of sex as a form of male privilege.   
West’s creation of this character space functions rhetorically as exadversion, a rhetorical 
enterprise where one asserts things through double negative.  What allows West to confuse and 
challenge the assumed ontologies of gender and sexuality is her ability to simultaneously operate 
within and without the diegetical frames she constructs for herself in her performances.  West’s 
final and most interesting play from her theatrical period is her coup de grace of ontological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 West’s work negotiates both her own early sexual traumas and the parallel traumas of homosexual men. 
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gender critique, The Drag (1927).  The play consisted of a cast made up largely of gay male 
characters in drag and ended with a huge spectacular drag ball, the loud music and bright lights 
of which cover over the vicious murder of a gay man by his disgruntled lover.  In the last scene, 
the dead man’s father ashamedly lies about the murder, whitewashing his son’s sexuality out of 
existence.  West’s rhetorical indirection is fundamentally more abstract than Haldeman-Julius’s 
or Loos’s because it does not deign to critique particular men; rather, it pulls the rug out from 
under gender itself, along with all the assumptions about power that come with it.  If Haldeman-
Julius’s feminist genius comes in the critique of her abuser in mediums through which he 
functioned as her gatekeeper and Loos’s feminist genius comes in the ability to ironize and 
parodize both genders toward the critique of blind male privilege, then West’s genius comes in 
her ability to undermine the fundamental hierarchies of gender and power.  All the while, each of 
these women functioned as wildly successful writers who continued to entertain and challenge, 
making them members of an elite club of feminists so often erased from feminist history.  This 
work is an attempt to relocate them, their legacies, their technologies, and their power.            
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Chapter 2 
“What the Editor’s Wife is Thinking About”: Performance, Politics, and Personhood in Marcet 
Haldeman-Julius’s Indirect Feminist Rhetoric   
 
In so far as machinery dispenses with muscular power, it becomes 
a means of employing  labourers of  slight muscular strength, … 
but whose limbs are all the more supple. – Karl Marx, Capital, Vol 
I.     
  
[Women] are still at it[. …] They are working more  
inconspicuously than in the old days, but with the same amazing 
clarity and tenacity of purpose. – Crystal Eastman, On Women and 
Revolution  
 
A woman, especially if she has the misfortune of knowing 
anything, should conceal it as well as she can. – Jane Austen, 
Northanger Abbey 
 
 Here, I offer a case study examining the rhetorical strategies employed by early 
twentieth-century feminist and socialist author Marcet Haldeman-Julius (1887-1941).   This 
chapter attempts to answer the question of how rhetorical critique and feminist self-avowal can 
thrive in unlikely contexts, contexts where its messages, if delivered in propositional format, are 
unwelcome, where self-disclosure is encircled by either gatekeepers or disinterested audiences.  
Born to wealthy parents in the small Kansas hamlet of Girard and a niece to the internationally 
famous humanitarian, Jane Addams, Marcet grew up privileged.  She was educated at Bryn 
Mawr and the American Academy of Dramatic Arts, had a short-lived stage career, returning 
home to Kansas at the behest of her mother’s will, which threatened to take away her inheritance 
if she did not.  Back in Kansas and nearing 30, Marcet met and married another former New 
Yorker, Emanuel Julius, a veteran of the national socialist press newly arrived in Girard to work 
at the town’s famous socialist paper, The Appeal to Reason.  Though Marcet had maintained and 
nurtured a desire to write for public audiences as a young person, her increasingly abusive and 
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isolating marriage motivated her to develop indirect rhetorical strategies to both reach out to 
sympathetic female audiences and to take her husband to task in ways that would not impinge 
upon his editorial sensibilities.  These indirect interventions were represented in her most 
compelling authorial output, coming in the last years of her explosive marriage, just before her 
early death from breast cancer at age 54.     
Marcet Haldeman-Julius’s indirect rhetoric grows throughout the course of her life, and 
this chapter traces those developments.  After situating Haldeman-Julius in a generational and 
ideological conversation with her aunt Jane Addams, I pursue the origins of her indirect 
rhetorical style to a rejection of Franklin Sargent’s Delsartean performance semiotics at the 
American Academy of Dramatic Arts in New York and her subsequent return home to Girard, 
Kansas.  Next, I explore Haldeman-Julius’s developing relation to publics and the rise of her 
critical, feminist exigence – an abusive marriage to her editor and publisher, around and about 
whom she writes in the couple’s first gritty, realist novel, Dust (1924).  While Dust represents 
the first phase of Haldeman-Julius’s continually devolving marriage and critical response, her 
gossip column “What the Editor’s Wife is Thinking About,” occasionally published in the 
couple’s periodical, the Haldeman-Julius Monthly, represents her fully developed indirect 
feminist critique, particularly in its employment of strategic rhetorical silences.     
 Many of the primary texts I will engage were written during Haldeman-Julius’s most 
productive fifteen-year period, between 1921 and 1936, a period when her marriage deteriorated 
rapidly and the author had to write, sometimes, to feed her children, to appeal to larger 
audiences, especially those sympathetic to her indirect feminist critique. I examine her first 
novel, Dust (1921); four of her later nonfiction works, What the Editor’s Wife is Thinking About 
(1924), Talks with Joseph McCabe and Other Confidential Sketches (1931), Three Generations 
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of Changing Morals (1936), and Jane Addams as I Knew Her (1936); as well as a number of 
personal documents and archival sources. Ultimately, this is a search for those moments, to use 
Burke’s reading of Milton as an example, where the author “include[s] what [s]he would have 
had to exclude, if reduced to a conceptually analytic statement” (5). After all, despite her success 
as one of the best-selling authors (and co-owners) of one of the world’s largest private publishing 
houses, Haldeman-Julius wrote her feminism subversively, under the watchful eye of her abusive 
husband, editor, and publisher. Haldeman-Julius attempted the impossible: to write against the 
one person who represented her best access to a reading audience. 
 Haldeman-Julius’s public attempts at self-disclosure/avowal are made in metonymic 
rhetorical constructions she considered less threatening to her husband due to their publicity (and 
his assumption of personal decorum that came with that publicity). While burgeoning mega-
publisher Emanuel Haldeman-Julius no doubt held a profit motive for publishing his wife’s work 
(he was, after all, called the Wrigley and the Henry Ford of publishing before losing much of his 
fortune in the stock market crash of 1929), his personal feelings about her resistance are more 
difficult to ascertain, but since his wife published tens of thousands of books,11 her popularity 
may have trumped any of Emanuel’s personal reticence, and her rhetorical subtlety helped keep 
the message palatable. This work attempts to stand in the gap between history and subjectivity, 
personal motive and public writing, feminist opposition and compulsory social constraint.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Emanuel Haldeman-Julius documented his wife’s success (to a small degree), along with that of other authors 
who wrote about sex and gender, in his first autobiography, The First Hundred Million (1928).  Documenting the 
success of his Little Blue Book advertising strategy and his subsequent insinuation into the homes of millions of 
Americans, Emanuel included numbers of certain categories of books published up until his autobiography was 
printed.  Marcet Haldeman-Julius’s  Little Blue Book Why I Believe in Companionate Marriage alone sold 64,000 
copies before 1928, and reprints of What the Editor’s Wife is Thinking About, under various titles, approached 
20,000 copies sold.  These were not her only big sellers, most of which came in the middle to late 1930s.      
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Situating Marcet Haldeman-Julius 
 After her 1916 marriage to Emanuel Julius, who had recently moved to town to take an 
editorial position at the local socialist weekly, Haldeman-Julius’s notion of ideological place 
shifted, as she added to her own intellectual milieu the fervent socialism of her husband and his 
associates. The spirit of socialism abounded in Girard, Haldeman-Julius’s hometown and the 
county seat of Crawford County in the southeastern part of Kansas. With such notable friends 
and associates as Mother Jones, Eugene Debs, Upton Sinclair, and Clarence Darrow all coming 
often to Girard and writing for The Appeal to Reason,12 which was, by 1916, the world’s largest 
socialist weekly, Haldeman-Julius turned, with caution, to the radical left. Indeed, before World 
War I, socialism was contagious in southeast Kansas. According to one socialist comrade present 
in the town square in May 1908 to hear Eugene Debs give his first speech as the socialist 
candidate for president, “one can fairly feel the spirit of that world-wide brotherhood which we 
call International Socialism” (Shore 184). Sometime “or other,” Elliot Shore, Julius Wayland, the 
editor of The Appeal to Reason’s biographer, explains, “the comrades all come to Girard” (184). 
Haldeman-Julius’s turn to socialism was, it seemed, especially in light of her affiliation with the 
Appeal to Reason, unavoidable.  
 Helping run the Appeal was difficult at first for Haldeman-Julius. In a letter fragment to 
Addams, presumably from the fall of 1916, Haldeman-Julius’s reticence about her newfound 
marital and socialist responsibilities appears. Foreshadowing the ambiguous identity-spaces she 
will come to inhabit, she writes, 
  [H]ere I am, a good Republican, planning and working for the success of the 
  largest and most powerful Socialist paper in the U.S.A., the largest and one of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Haldeman-Julius would begin incrementally purchasing the Appeal to Reason in 1921, eventually turning it into 
the Haldeman-Julius publishing company. 
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  the most powerful in the world I guess. . . .When the [editorial] board meets, 
  and when Louis and Manuel and I discuss things, I seem to quit being myself 
  and see things altogether as Manuel’s wife. For the time being I accept his  
  point of view and see everything from that point of view. . . . Just what effect 
  it is going to have on my character, I can’t say.  
Long predating her marriage into the socialist elite, Haldeman-Julius’s radicalism had been 
developing through her affiliations with Addams. As a girl, Haldeman-Julius spent summers at 
Hull House, Addams’s famous settlement community located on Chicago’s bustling Halstead 
Street. Hull House was founded only two years after Haldeman-Julius’s birth, and the two grew 
up together, both, as it seemed, in Addams’s shadow.  
  Haldeman-Julius’s relationship to Jane Addams was complicated by her parents’ unique 
history and personal attitudes toward the reformer. Haldeman-Julius’s grandparents, Anna 
Haldeman and John Addams, married after the deaths of their first spouses, and each brought 
children to the marriage, settling on a nice farmstead in Cedarville, Illinois. The young Jane 
Addams became close friends with Anna Haldeman’s youngest son, Henry, while the two middle 
children, Sarah Alice Addams and Harry Haldeman, fell passionately though secretly in love. 
When their love was made public, neither of their parents was comfortable with the idea, not 
because the two were stepbrother and stepsister, but because Anna Haldeman did not see Alice 
as equal to the worth of her difficult middle son. The two siblings continued their 
correspondence well into Harry’s first pursuit of a medical education, which failed due to his 
emerging alcoholism (Bissell Brown 119). After John’s death, the siblings wed, and Alice’s 
influence served as a stabilizing force for Harry and helped him to facilitate and finish his 
medical education. Republicans, Harry and Alice eventually settled in Girard, where Harry 
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became the town doctor, the president of the local State Bank of Girard, and the owner of many 
of the mortgages in the area, mortgages his daughter would inherit, making her perhaps the 
town’s richest citizen (Bissell Brown 118-19). However, unlike Alice, who loved and admired 
her famous sister, Harry Haldeman saw Addams’s work at Hull House as unimportant and 
idealistic, an attitude famously shared by his mother, her stepmother.  
 During summers at Hull House, Haldeman-Julius cared for, bathed, dressed, educated, 
structured events for, and learned from the children of Chicago’s new immigrants, who brought 
their children to the settlement house during the day so they could seek the low-paying industrial 
jobs that were springing up all over the city in the late nineteenth century. Wanting more of her 
aunt’s attention than she was given, Haldeman-Julius fed herself on a healthy diet of work and 
idealism but was also plagued by a bit of growing skepticism regarding Addams’s long-term 
effectiveness in Chicago.13   
As she recalls in her book Jane Addams as I Knew Her, Haldeman-Julius began to suspect, as 
her intellect sharpened, that all was not quite what it seemed at Hull House. Of course, there 
were  
  Interesting activities, interesting people, interesting revelations––yet mingled 
  with them was mingled a bit of groping criticism. When I visited my earlier 
  playmates, with whom I had kept up friendship, I found that their living  
  conditions were unaltered. As Hull House had grown, with all its usefulness, 
  its building had displaced the old and unsightly landmarks of the   
  neighborhood; but, while some of the tenements of the poor were pushed a 
  little farther away, they remained essentially the same. . . . [T]here was a basic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Haldeman-Julius’s skepticism is marked, slightly at least, with her father’s scorn for Addams, as well has 
Haldeman-Julius’s adult desire to attain a public position about from and to some degree against Addams’s. 
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  . . . crowdedness and sordidness . . . [a basic] unchangingness of poverty.  
  (Jane 7) 
 While she appreciated Addams’s progressive desire for effectiveness, Haldeman-Julius, 
writing in 1936, rhetorically situated herself against Addams and in doing so stood out as one of 
Addams’s only critics of that decade. In Jane Addams as I Knew Her, Haldeman-Julius regularly 
failed to acknowledge the true extent of her aunt’s radicalism, as was the trend in the public 
media at the time. By 1936, the ire that had surrounded Addams in the teens and twenties had 
been replaced by a sort of idol worship that caricatured and reified Addams’s image. Her name, 
previously written in lists of America’s dangerous radicals, had come to adorn popular ladies’ 
magazines.  
 Republicans in Girard considered Addams a saint, despite her radical views, and boasted 
of their town’s ties with Addams and her work, despite her growing up at Cedarville (an estate 
Haldeman-Julius would eventually inherit). This image was beatified in Girard and other 
Midwestern locales, perhaps partly due to Addams’s own rhetorical savvy. She was not one to 
publicly repudiate such a characterization. This image beleaguered friend and fellow Hull House 
resident, Florence Kelley––a radical socialist and friend and translator of Friedrich Engels––who 
“was the only resident who ever made fun of ‘Sister Jane’” and of her image as a chaste, saintly 
woman. “‘Do you know what I would do if that woman calls you a saint again?’ she once asked 
Addams. ‘I’d show her my teeth, and if that didn’t convince her, I would bite her’” (Sklar 183). 
Addams’s national star demonstrated (however misinformed) the ideal of Victorian social hope 
embodied in female form.  
 Addams, ever a conscientious rhetor, played well to such audiences. On a 1912 visit to 
Sarah and Henry Haldeman in Girard , Addams spoke in a neighboring town on the topic of the 
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modern woman. A May 13, 1912 article in the Pittsburg [Kansas] Daily Headlight reprinted her 
speech. In it, she said, much to her niece’s chagrin, that the 
  modern woman as pictured in the newspapers is a myth. . . . The modern  
  woman would not be different from the ideal woman if she was given a  
  chance. So many things have been taken out of her home, freeing her of  
  responsibility, that she seems  different. But the world-old instincts of her sex 
  are too strong to change her, and through out all transitions of society she still 
  is a woman. Return to her the [domestic] responsibility which she once had, 
  and you will find her to be the true woman still. (“Not Proud” 6) 
This was a mold that Haldeman-Julius and many women of her generation wanted to throw off.   
 In Three Generations of Changing Morals, Haldeman-Julius historicizes/criticizes 
Addams’s generation, solidifying her own rhetorical and autobiographical position against it. 
Haldeman-Julius clearly and publicly reified her aunt in order to create her own rhetorical 
position. While not alluding to Addams specifically in this text, her ghost is present when 
Haldeman-Julius articulates that she has “more than a spectator’s understanding of the earlier . . . 
generation” and that she sees individuals as “the keys that unlock for me the composite mind of 
each period” (Generations 3). According to Haldeman-Julius, the women of Addams’s 
generation regarded themselves as “home-maker[s]––as wi[ves] and mother[s],” this status 
seeming “ordained and essential” (5). This preordination, according to Haldeman-Julius, 
“stemmed from a deeper act of submission” to men and the masculine order and a belief that 
“men and women were separate classes, almost separate races, divided in their rights and 
obligations by unalterable decrees of nature” (5-6). Addams’s generation, and, for Haldeman-
Julius, mistakenly, Addams, were submissive to patriarchal notions of women’s roles.  
57 
	  
 In 1915, when Marcet Haldeman-Julius had her first child with would-be mega-publisher 
Emanuel Julius, she built an enormous, stately home just outside of town, naming the house and 
surrounding grounds Bridleway Farm.  The home was sprawling, and its acreage included barns 
for horses, garages for cars, vast vegetable gardens, a stainless-steel in-ground swimming pool, 
and, perhaps most important of all for the young Kansas native, a stage.  Though Haldeman-
Julius’s work as an actress had taken her all over the country and placed her in the company of 
some of the most notable actors, actresses, and directors of her day – including Franklin Sargent 
and Cecil B. DeMille – audiences and directors soon tired of the young woman, who, in her late 
twenties, appeared too advanced to play the ingénue and who, as a handsome but plain-faced 
brunette, lacked the features necessary to play the vamp.  Indeed, upon her premature exit from 
Bryn Mawr in 1908, despite her aunt Jane Addams’s ties to its president, M. Carey Thomas, her 
mother, Sarah Alice, president of the State Bank of Girard, funded her daughter’s exploits at 
Sargent’s American Academy of Dramatic Arts, hoping the acting business and the big city 
would swiftly, if not summarily, overlook her daughter’s talents and leave her with no option but 
to return to her rightful home on the plains, where, her mother pined, she would take over the 
family bank and preside as the richest woman, perhaps the richest citizen, in town.  Her 
experience in the theater, especially her long and complex struggle against positivist Delsartean 
semiotics of performance, created the platform for Haldeman-Julius to develop, in her early 
thirties, her own written rhetorics of indirection, when she, as a wife and mother, became the 
subject of abuse by her husband, editor, and publisher, Emanuel Haldeman-Julius.   
 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell has argued that “[a]nalysis of persuasion by women indicates 
that many strategically adopted what might be called a feminine style to cope with the 
conflicting demands” of the public sphere and that this “style emerged out of their experiences as 
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women and was adapted” to audiences (12). Indeed Campbell’s recovery of nineteenth century 
feminist rhetoricians depends upon this notion of style as embodied in a generalizable 
performance of “other,” adopted from the common perception that most women from 1840 to 
1900 who spoke in public negotiated the notion of gender performance, in particular avoiding the 
deadly equivalence with “the masculine” (11). For her, female rhetors’ feminine style grew out 
of awareness of structures and preconditions of speaking or writing “in the public sphere” (11).  
In short, masculinity as an active, dominating force has prefigured feminist responses to personal 
domination, and traces of its residue – feminist indirect rhetoric – are evident in places where 
women negotiate future publics in coded or obverse ways.  Locating these moments, as I do here 
with Haldeman-Julius, stands as an alternative approach to what Carol Mattingly has called 
feminist rhetorical scholars’ preference for appreciating “those historical figures who most 
resemble academic feminists,” feminists, she explains, who “share our investment in 
confrontational and assertive approaches – at the expense of others worthy of our attention” 
(101).  Of particular importance is what Jane Danielewicz argues in “Personal Genres, Public 
Voices”: the fact that – even and perhaps especially in terms of the subversive indirect rhetoric 
that Marcet Haldeman-Julius creates — “[p]ersonal forms, as genres, depend for their coherence 
on the connection between the personal and the public” (421).  Haldeman-Julius puts her early 
performance training to work in her later, more subversive indirect feminist critiques, puts to use 
“texts in genres with recognizable social functions,” like the gossip column, and turns them on 
their heads, making them vehicles for indirect self-avowal (421).   
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Learning Performance, Gesture, Motive: 1908-1915 
 Marcet Haldeman-Julius’s arrival at the American Academy of Dramatic Arts in 1908 at 
the age of 21 differs from the traditional tale of the small-town Kansas girl’s trek to the big city.  
Unlike many of her primary and secondary school classmates in tiny Girard, Kansas, Haldeman-
Julius had tasted city life before, often summering-in-service in Chicago, working at Hull House, 
a community modeled after England’s Toynbee Hall in its complete refashioning of traditional 
notions of charity and community involvement.  Despite being the daughter of Addams’ favorite 
stepsibling, Sarah Alice Haldeman, the young Midwesterner spent relatively little time with her 
aunt who, in addition to providing care for immigrant children and women on Chicago’s busy 
Halstead Street, administrated the production of plays, scripted youth-club activities, and 
traveled to raise money to support the ever-expanding settlement.  Their relationship grew as 
Haldeman-Julius reached high school and then college age.  The trips began to take on more and 
more meaning for the young Kansan, and by her late teens and early twenties, the relationship 
flourished.  As Haldeman-Julius recollects,   
  Aunt Jane at this period commenced to make room in the midst of her busy life  
  for increasing attention to what I was doing and thinking.  One of the things  
  which I first definitely appreciated in her was the intelligent sympathy which she  
  showed toward my wish to enter the theater. (12) 
Addams’s support helped convince Haldeman-Julius’s parents that, after a three year stint at 
Bryn Mawr, she was ready to attend the American Academy of Dramatic Arts (AADA) in New 
York.   
 Performance held the young Kansan’s interest, as she sunk herself deeply into the courses 
at the AADA, courses in Stage Business and Rehearsal with David Belasco, others on 
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Pantomime with Franklin Sargent, General Education, Dancing, Fencing, Character Pantomime, 
Voice, Make-up, and French (McTeague 79).  Important for her later, mature rhetorical 
indirection, it was gestural technique at which Haldeman-Julius excelled; she absorbed much of 
the culture of the acting world as well and identified with it with a vigor that appears rarely in 
her life’s correspondence.  In a letter dated February 23, 1908, Haldeman-Julius announces to 
her mother that “I like actors and actresses better than any other one class of people, & I feel that 
when all is said and done, and differences cancelled, their standard is more my standard, their 
point of view, my point of view that that of any other group.”  She inquires,  
  Can you understand the heart of a bohemian?  Please try to, and don’t forget, that  
  if the bright flame of life burns red and strong within me, close beside it, rises the  
  white one of love for truth.  I love my work so much. 
Without a doubt, it was Addams’s acceptance of her theatrical pursuits that encouraged the 
young woman.  She recalls,  
  Struggling out of a stormy adolescence, I felt that the stage offered a medium  
  through which I could express myself.  This idea was unwelcome to my mother  
  and in her tenderly firm way she was reluctant and disapproving.  She discussed it 
  with Aunt Jane, who joined grandmother in supporting my wish.  Later I came to  
  realize that this readiness to enter into the plans of youth and to help with an open  
  mind in furthering unfolding desires for achievement in varied avenues of activity 
  was one of Jane Addams’ finest characteristics. (12) 
Haldeman-Julius continues, 
  During the next five years, while I was in the theater, Aunt Jane and I saw a good  
  deal of each other.  She never came to New York without letting me know and I  
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  visiting her dutifully at the hotel, the club, or the nurses’ settlement where she  
  might be staying.  (12) 
These visits led the two women to share insecurities that came with that public territory, where 
Addams’s “rare searching for self-criticism encouraged me to confide myself of my own 
shortcomings in theatrical work” (12).  “This,” Haldeman-Julius continues, “led to a discussion 
of the problems as well as the rewards which an actress and a lecturer had in common. … We 
chuckled over the discovery that we shared one peculiarity” (12).  Interestingly, “[i]t was 
difficult for me to appear in a play or for her to appear on the lecture platform with a hat or any 
kind of head covering – although often enough we both had to” (13).   
 In an early February, 1908 visit, near the beginnings of their burgeoning intimacy, Marcet 
Haldeman-Julius chose to introduce Addams to one of her favorite – and perhaps the most 
distinguished faculty members at the AADA – Franklin H. Sargent, a former Harvard elocution 
professor.  Sargent, along with Steele MacKaye, founded the American Academy of Dramatic 
Arts14 in 1884.  The two worked side by side, with MacKaye as the principal theorist of the 
movement and Sargent the administrative specialist who, much more than his associate, 
consolidated the school into a structured educational institution.  Though Sargent was a student 
of MacKaye’s and considered him his most significant influence, their professional collaboration 
was brief.  In April 1885, as James McTeague explains, 
  The Lyceum Theatre went through a crisis that resulted in MacKaye’s leaving.   
  He was occupied with rehearsals of his play, Dakolar, and was literally barricaded 
  inside the theatre until his show opened.  It was hoped that the Dakolar would  
  solve the financial ills of the Lyceum project.  The students rebelled, supposedly  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 At its founding, the AADA was called the Lyceam Theatre School. 
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  because of displeasure with the teaching methods; Gus Frohman was accused of  
  taking $33,000 in tuition money from the schools for the production of Dakolar,  
  and the rest of the faculty, including David Belasco, were preparing to leave the  
  enterprise for lack of pay. (48) 
When, after a successful two months of performance, MacKaye took the play on tour, he heard 
that “he was no longer connected with the school and that ‘the School authorities [meaning 
Sargent] are now repudiating his methods’” (McTeague 48).  This break is significant.  As of 
1884, Sargent and MacKaye had worked together for years, first as teacher and pupil at the 
Union Square Theater School, then as colleagues in the late 1870s at the Madison Square Theater 
School.  The break had ramifications first in the structure of the school that Sargent envisioned 
and also in subtle breaks away from MacKaye’s Delsarteanism, fraught with mysticism, and a 
new emphasis on what James Narremore calls in Acting in the Cinema its “prescriptive, 
formulaic descriptions of actory poses” (53).15  At this point, in order to shore up his losses and 
keep the educational apparatus he was building alive, Sargent changed the name of the Lyceum 
to the New York School of Acting in October of 1885.  It would become the American Academy 
of Dramatic Arts in 1892.  Perhaps the most important repercussion of Sargent’s break from 
Delsarte came in Sargent’s rejection of the pre-modern elements of Delsartean theory, its 
relationship to God, oneness, its mystical elements.  Using his education in elocution, Sargent’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15Delsarte believed that his “system points the fundamental unities of soul and body, through his emphasis on the 
body’s mechanical ability to point to larger truths and ultimately to what he calls the unity of the “ontological, 
moral, and organic” (Delsarte 64).  According to Robin Veder, Delsarte “believed that emotions reliably generated 
uniform, essential, eternal, and specific physical movements.  His goal,” she explains, “was to study the innate 
postures, gestures, and facial expressions that revealed genuine emotions, so that actors and other rhetoricians could 
learn to convincingly and sincerely manifest those feelings” (821).  As each movement, each position directly 
corresponded to a specific emotion or internal state, Delsarte’s vision for the semiosis of the body was, as Veder 
importantly reminds us, “semiotically … motivated, not arbitrary” (822).  
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method was a pared down, mechanical, modernist semiotics of gesture, one that would 
eventually feel uncomfortably limiting to the young Kansas actress.   
  After MacKaye’s departure, Sargent forwarded his vision of the Lyceum, pushing its 
students to meet the challenges and tastes of a rapidly developing critical audience.  Sargent, for 
three decades, remained a major figurehead in the dissemination of his own, more modernist, 
version of Delsartean performance theory and practice, making him a tributary of a stream that 
encompassed almost all acting culture in the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the 
first two of the twentieth.  As James Narremore argues,  
  Ultimately, the “Delsarte Movement” was so deeply embedded in the culture that  
  a good many actors could be described as Delsartean whether or not they ever  
  studied him – just as middle-class Americans once behaved according to Emily  
  Post whether or not they actually read her advice. (53)   
With the ghost of Desarte himself serving as the mystic guide, and with Sargent fulfilling the 
function of scientific practitioner, Sargent’s own brand of Delsartism permeated the AADA and, 
increasingly, made Haldeman-Julius uncomfortable, her own sense of purpose, self, and motive 
pushing back against what she saw as constraining technical emphases on the strictly gestural 
elements of performance.   
 As Diane Davis explains, Kenneth Burke, a contemporaneous surveyor of the motives of 
great literary characters, scholar of performance, as well as the father of modern rhetoric, lifts his 
central concepts and language about motive straight from Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams.  
“Burke,” she argues, “based his theory on Freud’s, and the overlap is readily discernable” 
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(124).16  For Freud, as well as for the newly emerging, performer/writer/activist, motives were 
not always clear, even if their performance was.  In short, Haldeman-Julius’s discomfort with 
Delsarte, the necessary (as she saw it) separation of the motive from its performance became, 
over time, a reminder of emergent domestic abuse and a recipe for its erasure.  Divesting herself 
of it or not, though, Delsarte’s system provides a basis for tracing the arc of the young Kansan’s 
performance, motive, and indirection.    
  A large part of Haldeman-Julius’s work at the American Academy of Dramatic Arts 
consisted of learning how to translate this highly regimented, positivistic technique into the “act 
of genius” that Delsarte, MacKaye, and Sargent wished to see.  In February of 1909, Haldeman-
Julius wrote to her mother that Addams had come once again to visit the school, her niece taking 
the opportunity to introduce her well-known aunt to her favorites among the students and faculty.  
Haldeman-Julius relates that, first, she took Addams “to see Mr. Sargent, whom I stand in awe 
of,” and, possibly due to the surprise of such a notable guest, “[he] didn’t have much to say,” 
offering, though, that “I was very faithful in my work & wasn’t very emotional – ought to be 
more so.”  This series of letters indicate an important and continuous struggle that Haldeman-
Julius suffered during her time in New York under Delsarte’s modernism: the relationship 
between true, honest, complex emotion and what she considered the regimented frameworks 
these scientists of gesture constructed to convey them.  It was a system she worked very hard to 
master but one that evaded her, left her feeling rather hollowed out and stilted.  She continues in 
the same letter, “I have been sticking pretty closely to mechanics feeling that what I must get 
now was my technique, for it is so hard to master. – Feeling sure that a little later I could press 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Interestingly, a large part of Haldeman’s later publishing success came in the marketing of Freudian ideas, ideas 
that posed, as she was aware at the time, the undoing of the mechanical elements of Delsarte’s semiotics of 
performance.   
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the button so to speak & let the golden light of emotion flood through me.  Perhaps,” she 
recollects, “I have overemphasized the technique.”    
 Though the initial moments in New York and the study of drama inspired the young 
Kansas transplant with its bohemian flair, inspiring her to report emphatically her loathing of the 
“narrow pedantic atmosphere of college,” she continued to struggle to bring the emotional 
elements, the “truths” she sought as an actress, in line with the external mechanics she inherited 
from Delsarte and Sargent.  In the end, though Haldeman-Julius worked somewhat steadily in 
theater for a few years, she continued to struggle against and to incrementally buck the modernist 
semiotic that she saw in Delsarte’s frameworks, though they provided for her the frameworks for 
her later developments as a writer and, ultimately, as an indirect rhetor.  For, as she reported 
home in January of 1909, she felt a growing discomfort with many of these “objective” notions 
that were handed down by her instructors, notions, for instance, that insisted that “the reason we 
study the poorer classes is – Because – their emotions are more elemental & more easily 
separated.”   
 For a young woman who had grown up working amid the complex human milieu of Hull 
House, where immigrants were encouraged to write and represent their experiences and their 
feelings through literature, club-work, and drama, such obtuse and uninformed directives not 
only demonstrated the unfeeling and detached nature of theatrical instruction, but they also 
served as a blockade against truth itself, a blockade against self and internality.  Haldeman-Julius 
valued the complex internality she saw at work in the writings of her aunt and her colleagues 
Florence Kelley, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, all of whom were working to liberate 
human thought from the static and oppressive dualisms of social inequality (in Addams’s and 
Kelley’s case) and the social/psychological self (in Dewey and Mead’s case), not to mention that 
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“Nietzsche, Freud, Bergson, and William James[s’]” influence on “introspection,” a more 
complex matrix for human understanding and expression, one that emphasized “being instead of 
mimicking,” had begun to creep into American consciousness (Narremore 60).   
 While her time in New York became more and more fraught with employment woes, 
Haldeman-Julius experienced a kind of hollowing-out.  As she continued efforts to fulfill the 
expectations of male theater managers and directors, all the while honing a mechanics of 
performance she increasingly saw as not only mediocre and incomplete but also limiting, sexist, 
and self-erasing, Haldeman-Julius succumbed to a deep and lasting depression.  Her disquiet was 
not aided by the fact that her theatrical work was never quite enough to pay the bills, and she 
found herself in 1913, at the age of 26, tired and well past the sunny years of youthful ingénue 
work. Her letters to her parents continued to ask for monetary assistance, each more 
apologetically than the last, each describing in greater detail the difficulties of finding work. In a 
1913 letter to “My Dear Family,” Haldeman-Julius relayed that she “suddenly collapsed” and has 
“lost more weight.”  
  I got dressed, lunched, and went downtown [to look for a new part]. But I  
  might as well have spared myself the effort for there is no use in looking  
  for a job unless you put your heart into it … . [Eventually,] I got into my  
  old stride of doing the offices. But not quite. I still felt as if the whole  
  thing were an endless game. Scarcely worth the candle. But I did my  
  best.  
As parts dried up, Haldeman-Julius struggled with the senselessness of her career choice, 
particularly of what she considered to be the inhumanity that accompanies a life of not only 
imitation but of imitating ideals set by and for men.  For the first time in her adult life, she 
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viscerally rebelled against the subtle, highly coded world of masculine domination – in particular 
its performative structures.   
 The path that remained was to regain her agency and to escape the mechanisms of self-
annulment she was forced to internalize at the AADA; she had to write, as her aunt had done 
before her.  Print, here, becomes a mechanism for self-attainment, self-avowal, but not only the 
attainment of self, its actualization, but also its assertion into some public.  In her last two years 
in New York, Haldeman-Julius, with the help of vaudeville and film actress Lillian Concord 
Jonasen (known publicly only as Lillian Concord), Haldeman-Julius began to write her first 
book, one that she would self-publish in 1916 under the title, Once upon a Time: The Faerie 
Doings in Cedar Creek Valley.  “At home again in the late afternoon I wanted like everything to 
write on my story but I had sworn [it] off for several days and I like to be able to keep faith with 
myself,” Haldeman recalls, “ [s]o I picked out an interesting book of [William J.] Locke’s called 
‘Stella Maris’ [sic].”  She continues,  
  Presently I came to this passage:  
  “For perhaps the first time in his pleasant life he was overwhelmed … by  
  the sense of futility of his work, which every artist, actor, painter, and poet  
  is doomed to feel at times. The painted faces of his colleagues, the vain  
  canvas of the set, the stereotyped words, gestures, inflections, the whole  
  elaborate make-believe of life that at once is and is not the theatre, - all  
  this oppressed him and filled him with shame and disgust. It had no  
  meaning. It was an idle show. He had given to inanity a life that might  
  have been devoted to the pursuit of noble ideals.”  
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  A simpler[,] better photograph of my own state of mind would have been   
  impossible. And suddenly I realized, how much we all run to type. How little any  
  of us, really have to say about ourselves. 
“I have,” the deflated 27 year old wrote, “accomplished so little.”  
 This moment in Haldeman-Julius’s life is, for the historian of rhetoric, overdetermined.  
It represents, definitively, though, the moment at which Haldeman internalizes and then rejects 
what she sees as Sargent’s oppressively shallow, modernist performative semiotics, which, for 
the actress, offered less a map toward self and more an evasion of its very possibility.  Despite 
her earnest and lengthy education and practice on the stage, it failed to represent the laboratory 
of social change so touted by her instructors.  Whether she failed as an actress or rejected acting 
as a serious vocation is somewhat ambiguous, though the two are likely related.  Though the 
Delsarte system “was conceived to aid the imagination in discovering the best means of 
express,” it had, indeed, the opposite effect (McTeague 11).  The acting self, the performative 
self, as Haldeman-Julius internalized it at the AADA, was a trapped and isolated self, a self only 
tenuously linked to society through the fragile machinery of gesture.   
 Despite its deceptively child-like title and its overtly escapist themes, the book 
Haldeman-Julius worked on throughout her time on the stage in the early teens fairly echoed 
with themes of entrapment and estrangement from community.  The story is fashioned somewhat 
as a loose allegory that follows a little girl and boy, Faith and Freedom, as they struggle against 
imprisonment and enchantment by a corrupted (or confused) political leader – a peacock, no less 
– with a penchant for audacious showmanship and vane disregard for others.  Though her 
writerly craft is incipient at this stage, Haldeman-Julius’s early work is hugely important in 
helping trace the development of her social conscience within and against questions of rhetorical 
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power and authenticity.  That the young actress felt captured within the spotlight was clear in her 
portrayal of several of the characters.  Of a sylph, a fairy-like captive in the book, her captors 
explain 
She used to bring the dew each morn, 
Until the day her wing was torn. 
She wept; we tasted of her tears! 
Such a drink had not been ours for years. 
We caught her with a pretty net. 
We’re glad to say we have her yet. 
We give her food and tender care. 
We’ve made a chain for her to wear 
And forged it to a log. (Haldeman, Faerie 46-47) 
As with an actress, the sylph remains on display, tended to by her captors (the audience), who 
feast upon her tears.  Performance, then, becomes an ambivalent critical area.  For Delsarte and 
Sargent, performance is a place of agency, of figuring a better world or of representing social 
evils, of perhaps even stimulating social change.  Inversely, performance is also conscripted and 
limiting, as the ties that connect the stage with the outside world of audiences and publics are 
someone else’s.  Though Delsarte was famous for his notion that “[n]othing is more deplorable 
than a gesture without a motive” (McTeague 13), Haldeman-Julius struggled more and more 
with the origins of those motives, that they lay in the characters, which, as McTeague explains, 
required complete submission.  Especially under Sargent, “the actor is the servant of the 
character, and the actor’s feelings must correspond with the character he is portraying” (62), and 
though this notion of acting is more supple than the mechanical renditions of the AADA and its 
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legacies, it nonetheless remains based on a relationship of servitude, on the limitation or 
complete subsumption of self.  In searching for her characters’ motives over those years under 
Franklin Sargent and others on stage, including DeMille, Marcet Haldeman-Julius, almost by 
accident, began to discover her own.  Her struggle with her own performative subjectivity, the 
tension between her external context’s demand for “appropriate” communication and her internal 
motive, would define her future as a writer. 
Courtship, Publishing, and the Seeds of Indirection: 1915-1919  
 Upon hearing of her daughter’s change of heart concerning the stage in New York, Sarah 
Alice invited Haldeman-Julius home to Kansas, promising her work at the family’s State Bank of 
Girard, of which she became president after her husband’s death in March 1905.  Though 
following in the footsteps of the first woman in Kansas ever to function as the president of a 
bank (and “vying with Katherine R. Williams of Indiana for the distinction of being the first such 
in America,” according to Eugene DeGruson) was nothing to balk at, the task lacked the 
excitement Haldeman-Julius craved (DeGruson, “Afterward” par. 2).  She balked at the 
invitation and remained in the city for slightly over a year.  Her mother, though, was ill and 
urged her daughter to move back in her final months but died before she could return.  Upon 
Haldeman-Julius’s return to Girard, a town of 3000, she became the town’s wealthiest citizen.  
She had traveled widely in the United States with various theatrical troupes, performing with the 
Easton Stock Company Theatre in Easton, Pennsylvania, working as a Vaudevillian in 
Gloversville, New York, touring New England with Cecil B. DeMille’s company, and working 
in To Serve the Cross in Baltimore, Trenton, and Montreal, Ben Hur in Baltimore and 
Philadelphia, and acting in various troops in Portland, Bangor, and Sanford, Maine.  Perhaps 
because of her wide travels and taste of public notoriety, Haldeman-Julius’s move back to Girard 
71 
	  
in the early months of 1915 was difficult for her.  As writer and critic Alexander Woollcott 
explained the arrangement in a 1925 New Yorker Haldeman-Julius retrospective:  
  A wise and gracious lady was Mrs. Haldeman, less celebrated in the  
  outside world than her sister, Jane Addams of Hull House, but not less  
  highly regarded in Girard. It is possible that she had small confidence in  
  her daughter’s career as an actress: it is certain she had great patience with  
  it. To Marcet she willed the Haldeman fortune, with no stipulations  
  dictated by the inordinate vanity of the dead. She left it all to her daughter  
  with a single condition. Marcet was to enter into her inheritance only after  
  she had dwelt for a whole year in Girard. If, thereafter, she preferred New  
  York and the hard benches of the managers’ waiting rooms, it would at  
  least not be because she did not really know how pleasant life could be in  
  Girard, especially if one lived in its finest house and in the Spring twilight  
  could motor out along the new roads and look at all the newly planted  
  fields on which she held the mortgages. (Woollcott 7-8)  
Woollcott paints an idyllic picture of Haldeman-Julius’s return to her hometown, explaining that 
the young actress went on to “her destiny: meeting and falling in love with Emanuel Julius, a  
young Jewish Socialist journalist who was hired by the Appeal [to Reason] in September 1915” 
(Woollcott 8). 
 Julius, in 1915, was a recent transplant from New York City, having responded to an 
offer from Louis Kopelin, a former colleague at the New York Call, who had himself been hired 
by Walter Wayland, the son of Julius Wayland – the paper’s original owner and publisher.  Julius 
Wayland’s Appeal was, at the time of his suicide, the best selling leftist periodical in the United 
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States – reaching 750,000 per week the following year, but Eugene Debs’s defeat as the socialist 
candidate in that election; the loss of Wayland’s second wife in an automobile accident; and the 
anguish of being accused of “seducing an orphan girl, [then[taking her to Missouri where she 
was killed during an abortion,” an accusation that would lead to his prosecution for white slavery 
under the Mann Act of 1910, proved too much for the publisher (Graham 15).  After successfully 
speaking for the working man’s condition for decades, after revolutionizing subscription 
practices, and after fostering support for many of the country’s socialist elite, including Debs, 
Upton Sinclair, and others, Wayland had had enough.  In the suicide note he tucked into Edward 
Bellamy’s Looking Backward, he wrote “The struggle under the competitive system is not worth 
the effort; let it pass” (Graham 15).  Wayland’s suicide proved, ultimately, the death knell of the 
Appeal, as his son Walter lacked what John Graham explains as “radical will or political 
sophistication” and who instead “attended almost exclusively to business details” (15).  Knowing 
the paper needed to quickly regain its socialist chops, in 1913, Walter Wayland invited the Call’s 
Kopelin– who brought Emanual Julius along in 1915.  Kopelin struggled to understand the 
Appeal’s audience, which, according to Graham, was Debsian and differed significantly with 
Victor Berger’s audience in Wisconsin, where Kopelin honed his socialist publishing skills. (14-
15).       
 Historians who have worked on Emanuel Julius almost universally paint him as a strong 
and avowed socialist and a confident, though formally uneducated, journalist who had worked at 
virtually all the major socialist periodicals of the day, including the Milwaukee Leader, the 
California Social Democrat, and the New York Call – from which he was called to Kansas and 
given a $10-a-week raise.  Andrew Cothran (1966), Dale Herder (1975), and Eugene DeGruson 
(1992) all posit Julius as a firmly entrenched socialist, driven by his unwavering belief in the 
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workingman’s agenda, but not all scholars agree.  More characteristically, I think, Julius was an 
opportunist who wanted, mainly, prestige, money, and power.  In Yours for the Revolution 
(1990), John Graham elaborates on what in the scholarship on Julius is a singular – and, I think, 
the correct – interpretation of the man’s character. 
  A political dilettante, a man who toyed with socialism and had no convictions that 
  seriously challenged his own self-interest, Haldeman-Julius proved to have no  
  commitment to the socialist movement and neither understood nor valued the  
  Appeal’s significance in the movement. (Graham 15)        
Graham’s emphasis on the nature of Julius’s character is crucial to this study of his wife’s 
developing indirect feminist rhetorical skill, as it is ultimately under his dominion that Marcet 
has to learn to fight subversively against her husband’s domination and humiliation through the 
mechanisms of public-finding and audience activation that their joint publishing house provides 
her.  Emanuel Julius’s self-interest provides the backdrop and the complex and developing 
rhetorical situation in and through which his wife’s performative rhetorics emerge. 
 As Graham continues, “Julius soon married Marcet Haldeman, Girard’s banking heiress 
and niece of Jane Addams” and “Marcet’s inherited wealth enabled her husband to buy first a 
third interest in the Appeal and finally entire ownership of the paper” (15).  While the facts of the 
Haldeman-Julius’s acquisitions are clear, the story of the couple’s meeting is difficult to pin 
down.  Though a finding aid at in the special collections at the University of Illinois, Chicago 
indicates that Haldeman-Julius had met Emanuel Julius, her future husband, in New York, no 
correspondence confirms that claim.  It does confirm, though, that the two had lived for a short 
time in the same building in New York.  Meeting in Girard, the two young cosmopolitans had 
much in common.  It is the first time in any of her correspondence that Haldeman-Julius starts 
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talking about being in love; all other suitors up to that time are held at arm’s length, but Julius’s 
prolixity, writerly confidence, and background in socialist journalism intrigued the young 
woman, who had taken writing up as the kind of true and valiant pursuit that the stage could not 
provide her – writing had, by 1915, supplanted acting as Marcet Haldeman-Julius’s vocation, 
despite her banking work.  Without a doubt, from Julius’s point of view, the marriage to 
Haldeman-Julius vaulted him, immediately, out of poverty, giving him not only an editorial 
voice in the nation’s largest socialist paper but also enough money to leverage himself, along 
with his wife, its owner.  Despite his newly acquired access to wealth – which, importantly, 
Marcet held in our own accounts for the first three years of their marriage—, Julius and his team 
could not save the Appeal.  Wayland, Kopelin, and Haldeman-Julius failed “to redirect the 
Appeal and mobilize its readers,” a move that ultimately “pushed the paper into decline” 
(Graham 15).      
 Part of the struggle to maintain the paper’s success came in Emanuel and Kopelin’s 
editorial decisions surrounding World War I.  Initially, like most socialist outlets in the nation, 
the paper maintained an anti-war stance, hiring Alan Benson (who would run for president on the 
socialist ticket in 1916) (Graham 15) and George Kirkpatrick as figureheads of that movement.  
Graham argues that it was with the passage of the Espionage Act and the Sedition Act (1917 and 
1918, respectively) that led the editors to change course and proclaim a pro-war stance.  This 
claim is only partially true, however.  The actual reasons for the paper’s momentous shift on the 
issue came in the personage of Emanuel Haldeman-Julius.  First – before all else – Emanuel was 
a capitalist (no matter if this standpoint flagrantly disregarded his printed material), and anti-war 
socialist material was simply not selling.  The paper was in a tailspin.  Second, Emanuel himself 
heard in 1918 that his draft status had been notched up from Level 2 to Level 1, something he 
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fought initially but something he realized could provide a spectacle for helping to make him a 
celebrity: he could prove his bravery by supporting the war that his public knew he might serve 
in (despite fighting the draft board mightily – though silently – on the local and state levels).  As 
Graham explains, the end of the Appeal to Reason was imminent:    
  The last issue of the Appeal to Reason appeared on November 4, 1922, but the  
  paper had been truly alive only sporadically during its final years of publication.   
  It was replaced by the Haldeman-Julius Weekly.  “By improving one’s self,”  
  Haldeman-Julius wrote as the new paper’s credo, “the degree of general   
  excellence will be permanently improved.  The Haldeman-Julius Weekly, hitherto  
  known as the Appeal to Reason, will carry out a carefully wrought policy of  
  individual self help and development through one’s own efforts.”  For socialists,  
  the irony was inescapable.  The old Appeal’s understanding of the impossibility of 
  even conceiving a self apart from historical and contemporaneous relations, of the 
  practical necessity of mobilizing a people with a shared vision of economic and  
  social justice, of an egalitarian world that could only be brought into being by  
  mutual effort and caring for others, had dissolved into barren self-interest.   
  (Graham 16)  
Emanuel’s “barren self-interest” thematizes Marcet Haldeman-Julius’s marital life and serves as 
a major motive for her ultimate indirect feminist writing, her sounding out for potential 
audiences, publics.    
 Immediately upon the paper’s acquisition, Marcet was thrown into a complex situation, 
one that encompassed her personal and professional life, drawing them into difficult relationship.  
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Despite her status as a well-known Republican17 and the former secretary of the Kansas state 
banker’s organization (She had resigned in April of 1917 to take on a larger role at the paper and 
to care for the couple’s first child, Alice), a position Haldeman-Julius was thrown into that was, 
on face, untenable.  She explains to a friend she addresses as “Euterpe,” in 1918: 
  I don’t know whether or not you hear through any of our mutual friends that we  
  bought a third interest in the New Appeal, the paper on which Manuel used to  
  work and of which he is now Managing Editor.  It is [a] Socialist paper – the  
  largest, I believe, published anywhere.  To thousands of people the Appeal is their 
  bible.  Manuel and Louis Kopelin, who also owns a third interest, swung the  
  paper and a vast number of the Socialists of this contry [sic] to a pro-war policy  
  and the National Headquarters of the Social Democratic League of America is  
  now established here.  Henry L. Slobodin of New York is the Chariman [sic],  
  William English Walling the Secretary and Phelps Stokes the Treasurer.  As  
  Walling does his work from the Eastern office, Manuel is acting Secretary at this  
  end and your humble sergant [sic] does half the work.  It is some little job. 
In this letter, Marcet Haldeman-Julius raises several issues.  First, she is the manager of a paper 
that holds an ideological disposition to which she does not ascribe.  Second, she understands her 
husband, to whom she has lent a significant amount of money to attain this paper, exists in a 
precarious position, vis a vis the draft.  This matters to the young bride, who  
  owing to the fact that Louis [Kopelin] was drafted and Manuel is overworked, [is] 
  doing the work of Associate Editor down at the paper so as to be thoroughly  
  trained by the time Manuel, himself, has to go to war. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Haldeman’s family had a long and well-established relationship to the Republican party, one that traced its way 
back to John Addams, Jane Addams’s father, and his friendship with Abraham Lincoln.  
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Haldeman-Julius contines, “Running a county bank is like driving a comfortable reliable family 
horse, but running the paper is like riding a high spirited hunter and a ditch or fence appears 
every other minute.”  That the paper exacts significant attention from Haldeman-Julius is of 
importance, not just on the level of labor demands but because it exacts a serious psychological 
price as well.  It is in 1918, while running the Appeal, that Haldeman-Julius’s first cognitive split 
occurs, out of which her indirect rhetoric emerges.  She continues, 
  Now, … you must bear in mind that I am not a socialist.  Also I think those  
  who know me best would assert that I have never been a person to ride astride of  
  a fence.  I have been on one side or another, no two ways about it and everybody  
  know[s] which side it was.  Yet here I am giving a large share of my time to this  
  paper and the Social Democratic League, giving Manuel whatever help I can on  
  his policy articles, entering heart and soul into boosting this Mission … and all  
  the time voting the Republican ticket.  I had rather thought some time back that I  
  might run for our State Legislature this year and had I run I think I should   
  probably have made it, because for one thing I understand thoroughly the technic  
  of such a race. 
Haldeman-Julius actually downplays her political ambitions here.  Her intentions to run for 
office were, in fact, not just fantasies, but in her correspondence as early as 1915 with Jane 
Addams, she makes plain her intention to do so.  And it is her marriage to Emanuel Haldeman-
Julius that stands in the way.  As she writes to Addams in March of 1916,  
  If I should not marry Julius and wished to, … I could become a big woman  
  politically in this state.  It’s the truth, Aunt Jane, and I do know it.  But I doubt if,  
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  when I do marry Julius I can hold my own altogether.  People here are not   
  educated up to thinking of a husband and a wife as separate entities. 
While she may have held a valid point here, as the larger trajectory of her marriage will 
demonstrate, Haldeman-Julius’s ideological subjugation comes less at the hands of her 
community members and more at the hands of her husband.   
 By the time she writes to Euterpe in 1918, the particular challenges that running a 
socialist paper had begun to manifest in her correspondence.  Having given up her political 
ambitions and feeling her own politics chipped away, Haldeman-Julius writes, 
  [W]hen we bought the Appeal I kissed all my political ambitions good-bye for  
  ever and aye, for I should naturally never expect a favor from a party when I had  
  an interest in the organ of another party. … It is none the less dirty because … the 
  obligations are indirect. 
Indirection, by 1918, became a way of life for Haldeman-Julius, as she increasingly lived out her 
husband’s political obligations.  “Just at present,” she writes, “I am not very happy in that my 
mind is not on good terms with itself.  I am unsettled, more so that many a person would be, 
because I am so unsure of myself.”  Here, to her girlhood friend, in a letter otherwise filled with 
friendly braggadocio and banal reminiscences, Haldeman-Julius calls for help.  “With Manuel I 
am on the inside with the national group of pro-war socialists and I train with the inside group of 
Republicans of this country and I have reached the conclusion that it is an impossible 
situation.”18  She explains the difficulty: 
  Both Socialists and Republicans have accepted the fact that he is the former and I  
  am the latter.  None of them – except J. L. Shepard of the Executive Committee of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Italics added. 
79 
	  
  the S.D.L. [Social Democratic League] realize how much I work with Manuel or  
  that lately our lives have stopped being separate. … So here I am, Euterpe,  
  thinking one set of thoughts and living and working for another.  For the first time 
  in my life I have very little use for myself.  Always before I have been able to say  
  far more truly than many people, far more truly than most people, “I live abreast  
  of what I think.”  At the times when others may have had the least respect for me  
  was when I had the highest regard for myself.  But it is an old saying: Every man  
  has his price.  I guess it is pretty near the truth.  Mine is my love for Manuel. 
Because of her devotion to Emanuel and her emergence at the fore of socialist politics, 
Haldeman-Julius misses the irony of her situation: as her husband turns the Appeal against one of 
the truest American socialist truths (that socialists should oppose wars fought for corporate 
interests), Haldeman-Julius is hollowing herself out in the name of her husband’s bastard-
socialism, which has, at its core, a profit motive.  This movement is particularly difficult as 
Woodrow Wilson, the president behind America’s entrance into the war, was Haldeman-Julius’s 
political science professor at Bryn Mawr – and he reneged on his opposition to U.S. involvement 
in the war. 
 To deal with her inklings of discontent, Haldeman-Julius turns to what she knows best as 
a mechanism to help her deal with the ambivalence of her situation: performance.  She relates, 
“As myself I am one person and as his wife I am another – if you can understand what I mean[,] 
and it is a fact that I am absolutely sincere as both.”  Here, thanks to her training with Sargent in 
New York, Haldeman-Julius places herself, once again, in the position of the servant to her 
scripted character.  In this case, though, her husband and his interests act as the playwright.  She 
continues, achingly, 
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  You know,… I am first and last always an actress.  I don’t mean that in   
  a cheap way.  I mean my mind functions in that way.  It is my greatest strengths  
  and my greatest weakness that I can not only see the other fellows’s [sic] point of  
  view, but for the time being can assume it as my own.  Make it completely mine. 
Remarkably, here, Haldeman-Julius’s struggle comes in her editorial choices.  In the draft of the 
letter at the University of Illinois, Chicago’s Special Collections, the word “completely” is 
marked out.  Reassuring Euterpe – and perhaps herself – Haldeman-Julius shores up her earlier 
outpouring, explaining that “having accepted his point of view, everything I write and all the 
work I do, I write and do with real sincerity and real enthusiasm,” thanks to her performance 
training.  “But I can drop it all as one does any character in the wings and become entirely 
myself again.  I never mix the two because,” she continues, almost quoting Sargent verbatim, “if 
one accepts certain premises – either his or mine – the rest follows logically.”  
 Delsartean performance, the performance style linking gestures to motives, then, provides 
the crucial framework that allows Haldeman-Julius the flexibility and wherewithal to absorb her 
husband’s point of view and responsibilities without losing herself, though, in her confession to 
Euterpe, her struggles are laid bare, as is her adoption of the rhetorical space of performance.  “I 
am,” she explains, “as happy in the composing room as I used to be on the stage.”  And, lest 
Euterpe think her old friend unhappy, she continues, 
  And furthermore whatever of the artist there may be in me stands aside and take a  
  keen detached interest in all the subtle, dramatic nuances of my mental conflict.   
  Not one of these, you may be sure[,] is lost upon me.  Not one.  As a writer I  
  enjoy them all to the full. 
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“But underneath,” she hints, again with longing, “deep deep down in my innermost soul I am 
honestly troubled” by the need to “work my way out into a more consistent and tenable 
position.”     
Marriage and Domestic Space: 1919-1921 
 As the couple’s financial success increased and their family grew into the 1920s, 
Emanuel spent more and more time at his office in town, leaving his wife to care for their new 
daughter, Alice, at the couple’s new Bridleway Farm outside of Girard.  At the center of 
Bridleway was the main house, huge, white – set so radically apart from its surroundings – with 
such amenities as a swimming pool (in which Emanuel eventually and mysteriously drowned), 
guest house, and a built-in, fully operational stage (complete with lighting, trapdoors, etc.) to 
satisfy Marcet’s ongoing appreciation of theater.  Emanuel continued to expand the publishing 
empire along with the budding American economy in the late teens. The publishing house began 
to print Little Blue Books, 16,000 word consolidations of great philosophy, socialism, 
economics, and history, as well as contemporary works by authors like Clarence Darrow, Upton 
Sinclair, Havelock Ellis, and many others; the couple became extravagantly wealthy and 
extremely well-known.   
 Emanuel became a regular at the Algonquin Round Table in New York.  Sadly for his 
wife, though, as Emanuel’s income and publishing house grew, so too did his appetite for young 
women and his disdain for his wife, his propensity for affairs and emotional abuse increasing 
until everyone in the small town came to expect them.  Behavior such as this humiliated his wife.  
It was well known in the Girard community that Emanuel “relished sex the way [normal people] 
relished a good cup of coffee” (Potts par. 42).  
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 By 1920, when the couple’s first novel, Dust, was being written, Haldeman-Julius began 
to notice a divergence between her hopes for marriage and its actuality.  In only three years, her 
husband had built up the newspaper and was now becoming nationally known.  Eventually the 
Haldeman-Julius publishing company – of which Haldeman-Julius was still a partial and 
important owner – would publish over half a billion Little Blue Books, printing up to 40,000 per 
day (DeGruson, “Afterword” par. 8).  By 1920, Emanuel had tasted success.  His lifestyle 
changed.  He started keeping an apartment in town near his office.  He began to travel 
extensively, make extravagant purchases, and carry on sexual liaisons with young women in the 
local community, including his secretary.   
 Emanuel left his bride at home to care for Bridleway Farm and Alice.  To placate 
Haldeman-Julius, who bristled at his newfound liberties, Emanuel committed to writing a novel 
with her.  Though both names appear on the book, Haldeman-Julius, as her personal 
correspondence at the time suggests, was the principal author.  Her husband was brought in 
largely to offer plot suggestions and character psychology.   The fact that  his background was 
“almost antithetical to the rural Kansas society which Dust portrays” is one of many clues that 
Haldeman-Julius did most of the actual writing and thinking.  While her commitment to the 
novel was complete, his was not, as he was otherwise very busy running the newly purchased 
newspaper and publishing company.  Archivist Eugene DeGruson notes that the fact that the 
book is “deeply rooted in autobiography” suggests that it came more from Haldeman-Julius than 
Emanuel (DeGruson, “Afterword,” par. 1).  This was the case with all their novels.  As 
Haldeman-Julius explains to her daughter in a letter dated April 15, 1935, concerning the last 
novel on which she and Emanuel collaborated, The Best People, a novel that was never 
completed, 
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[I]t is not fair that I should be compelled to leave unwritten a novel on which I 
have already done so much and on which E.H-J has not written a word (although 
he outlined the entire story and gave his “O.K.” when I finished blocking it.) … I 
told him that I would do practically all the work if he would suggest and correct 
and write in here and there, but he said no, he didn’t care to; that I could have it. 
By the time she was writing this book, Haldeman-Julius was firmly ensnared in an unhappy 
marriage, and she knew that exiting the marriage with her inheritance was virtually impossible.  
Therefore, she wrote subversively from within it.  As another letter to Alice dated May 9, 1935, 
explains, Emanuel spent much of his marriage either aloof or “in a tirade.”  Emanuel’s traumatic 
behavior makes writing itself an act of struggle.  In another letter to Alice, dated May 1, 1935, 
she writes of the recurring feeling that “I shall never again write anything worth while.”   
Coming out in 1921, Dust was greeted with critical and commercial success, even 
outselling Sinclair Lewis’s finalist for the Pulitzer Prize, Main Street.  Dust sold out five 
printings in its first year and was translated into Russian, Swedish, French, and German 
(DeGruson, “Introduction” par. 12).  The New York Times review argued that the “pitiless skill 
with which the wretchedness of all their lives is set forth makes it at times actually epic in its 
powerful, unsoftened realism” (DeGruson, “Introduction” par. 12).      
The setting for Dust demonstrates what Taylor calls the “connection between place and 
identity” (Taylor 262).  The novel’s county and town, both named Fallon, were reproductions of 
Girard and Crawford County.  They were, like Marcet’s hometown, places invested heavily in 
agriculture and the mining of coal, lead, and zinc, “making the region an industrial center, not 
only of the state but of the nation;” for instance, by 1885, Crawford County was second behind 
Belgium as a producer of lead and zinc (DeGruson, “Introduction,” par. 15).  The mining 
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industry eventually pulled immigrants from over fifty nations into the state.  The Haldeman-
Juliuses chose the fictitious name Fallon from a Socialist colony they financially co-sponsored 
that was started in Nevada during the First World War (DeGruson, “Introduction” par. 1).  
According to DeGruson, the town’s name in the novel “served as a subtle memorial for the 
utopian Nevada community which had intrigued such well-known authors as Aldous Huxley and 
Carey McWilliams” (DeGruson, “Introduction” par. 1).       
 In addition to the physical and cultural geography, the protagonist of the novel, Rose, 
carries important aspects of her author, especially in regard to the debasement enforced upon her 
by her husband Martin, a relentlessly cruel, hard-working, and very successful farmer.  Both 
Martin and Emanuel were devoted to their work, and each of the families suffered for it.  Only 
Emanuel, though, twisted the knife further with his recurrent philandering and coldness toward 
his wife. 
 Dust demarcates, autobiographically, exactly where and how Haldeman-Julius’s hope 
failed, smothered by her husband, exactly the places, for a woman, where the horizon of 
expectation yawns over a great chasm of personal indignity and social inequality. 
In Dust, Rose Conroy, owner and editor of Fallon’s (read Girard’s) weekly newspaper, 
functions as Haldeman-Julius’s doppelganger and a site of autobiographical resistance.  Through 
Rose, Haldeman-Julius plays out her experience and critiques Emanuel’s psychic violence.  Rose 
fulfills two roles, having taken over her father’s newspaper upon his death just as “matter-of-
factly as she had filled her dead mother’s place in the home” (Haldeman-Julius, Dust 42).  She 
had not even missed an issue of the periodical and, according to Martin, had taken it over with 
deftness and precision.  “It even paid a little better than before … chiefly because she had made 
the Independent a livelier sheet with double the usual number of ‘Personals’” (42-43).  Like the 
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“rest of the community,” Martin “had supposed the Fallon Independent would be sold or 
suspended,” and he was impressed with the young woman’s leadership and independence (42).  
“Yes, decidedly, Rose had force and push.  Martin’s mind was made up”; he would propose (43), 
“and a house should be his bait” (32).  Like her authorial counterpart, Haldeman-Julius was 
chosen because she had talent and resources.  Ironically, these talents and resources were the first 
things to be sapped upon entering marriage.   
Martin entered the office of the Fallon Independent and proposed to Rose only minutes 
after considering her for a wife.  “Here was the very person for whom he was looking.  Rose 
Conroy, the editor of the better local weekly, a year or so younger than himself, pleasant, 
capable” (40).  Because Martin had never paid Rose any attention before, she found his proposal 
bewildering, and she asked him why he thought she could make him happy.  His response is the 
first of numerous insights into the mind of her husband, Emanuel, and it serves as Haldeman-
Julius’s own autobiographical warning about the bondage of unequal marriages:  “This was a 
new idea [for Martin,] – happiness” (46).  Not one to think about such trifles as love, Martin’s 
was “an elemental materialism, difficult to understand, but it was a language very clear” to him 
(36).  Martin, like Emanuel, was not a misogynist.  He was short-sighted and selfish.  The 
imminent torture of his wife was a product of his own cultural misunderstandings of women, his 
inherited devaluation of them.  Marriage had nothing to do with love for Martin because love had 
to occur between equals, and women and men were not equals.   
After he had left, she reviewed it a little sadly.  It wasn’t the kind of marriage of 
which she had always dreamed.  She realized that she was capable of profound 
devotion, of responding with her whole being to a deep love.  But was it probable 
that this love would ever come?  She thought over the men of Fallon and its 
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neighborhood.  There were few as handsome as Martin – not one with such 
generous plans.  She knew her own domestic talents.  She was a born housekeeper 
and home-maker.  It had been a curious destiny that had driven her into a 
newspaper office.  (Haldeman-Julius, Dust 47-48) 
Rose was a woman caught in a problematic historical place and time, a situation that 
resonated with Haldeman-Julius’s own.  Though capable, talented, and insightful (not to mention 
a writer and newspaper publisher), Rose, as the pages of Dust demonstrate, believes, like many 
women of her generation, that her “path of achievement lay from one door to another – from that 
of her father to that of her husband” (Haldeman-Julius, Generations 6).  Here, the home actually 
structures women’s path of acceptability and social efficacy.  The home is the delimiting factor, 
an ambivalent Rosetta stone standing between two otherwise incommensurate languages.   
Rose’s decision to marry is born of material motives.  She is tired of loneliness and does 
not think a “better” offer will come.  She is getting very close to the age limit for respectable 
proposals.  She knows that no other marriageable men in Fallon are as wealthy or handsome as 
Martin.  Besides, he promises her a dream home.  It is the home she cannot ignore.  It is the 
home she cannot decline.  In it her fantasies of fulfilled womanhood blossom, her proclivity for 
hospitality and warmth is exhibited.  Martin’s promise of a home is a decree, an impenetrable 
consolidation of patriarchy’s power.  It is a promised provision of calculated certainty on 
Martin’s behalf.  For Rose,    
It wasn’t as if she were younger or likely to start somewhere else.  She would live 
out her life in Fallon, that she knew.  There was little chance of her meeting new 
men, and those established enough to make marriage with them desirable were 
already married.  Candidly, she admitted that if she turned Martin Wade down 
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now, she might never have another such opportunity.  If only she could feel that 
he cared for her – loved her.  But wasn’t the fact that he was asking her to be his 
wife proof of that?  It was very strange.  She had never suspected that Martin had 
ever felt drawn to her.  With a sigh she pressed her large, capable hands to her 
heart.  Its deep piercing ache brought tears to her eyes.  She felt, bitterly, that she 
was being cheated of too much that was sweet and precious – it was all wrong – 
she would be making a mistake.  For a moment, she was overwhelmed.  Then the 
practical common sense that had been instilled into her from her earliest 
consciousness, even as it had been instilled into Martin, reasserted itself.  
(Haldeman-Julius, Dust  48)  
Why does Rose go through with the marriage?  Is she ignorant?  Uninformed?  For 
Haldeman-Julius, Rose’s choice represents the ideological strictures that women of her 
generation suffered under.  Haldeman-Julius argued in Generations that the “scheme of living 
was marked out for [women of her generation] with a rigidity that had never been the case with 
man except under systems of slavery and feudalism” (Haldeman-Julius, Generations 6).  Here, 
Rose negotiates marriage in the hopeful and naïve manner of Addams’ ideal woman, choosing 
not to listen to her more sensible inner voice.  Rose, Haldeman-Julius’s autobiographical face, 
enters into marriage knowing or at least suspecting that she would be trading her financial and 
emotional independence for a strange new currency that measured her “economic and social 
value” only in relation to her status as a “chaste wife” (Haldeman-Julius, Generations 7).   
After all, perhaps he was right – the busy people were the happy people.  Many 
couples who began marriage madly in love ended in the divorce courts.  Martin 
was kind and it would be wonderful to have the home he had described.  She 
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imagined herself mistress of it, thrilled with the warm hospitality she would 
radiate, entertained already at missionary meetings and at club.  At least, she 
would be less lonely.  It would be a fuller life than now.  What was she getting, 
really getting, alone, out of this world?   She and Martin would be good partners.  
(Haldeman-Julius, Dust 48-49) 
Rose’s ambivalence in this scene is evidence of good judgment.  She seems to intuitively 
understand the limitations of a domestic sphere centered on Martin.  The author colors the 
moment with such palpable reticence; it feels as though Rose is knowingly trading her whole 
existence as a person for this tragic farce, for this marriage to a man who does not love her and 
cannot respect her.  Her loss is dear.  “It was never granted,” after all, “that a mother and wife 
had, even within this restricted scope, rights as well as duties” (Haldeman-Julius, Generations 6).  
Men, as Haldeman-Julius came to acknowledge later, “dominated both [the public and private] 
spheres” (6).   
  Upon the promise that her dream house will be built soon, Martin invites Rose to move 
into his little shack immediately after their nuptials.  Martin’s shack is dirty, small, and unkempt, 
and it greets Rose like an open mouth, mocking, threatening to steal the joy she hoped for in 
marriage.  “[S]he told herself hotly that it was not the dirt nor even the desperate crassness that 
was smothering her joy.  It was the fact that there was nowhere a touch to suggest preparation for 
her home-coming” (Haldeman-Julius, Dust 56).  Rose is devastated, upon stepping into Martin’s 
cabin, because “Martin had made not even the crudest attempt to welcome her” (56).  Martin’s 
lack of preparation was a message for Rose, a sign of her lack of importance in his life; the lush 
promises of material comfort and womanly surroundings belied Martin’s obvious lack of love for 
Rose.  “Tears pushed against her eyelids,” on the first day of her marriage, on the day of her 
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homecoming; “[h]er new life was not going to be happy.  Of this she was suddenly, irrevocably, 
certain” (57).  Rose’s acknowledgement that her marriage was a mistake was immediate, and her 
husband’s response was equally clear.  When the author lets the reader inside Martin’s 
consciousness, we hear him admit that he  
had let the habit of obtaining whatever he started after get the better of him.  Even 
today he could have drawn back from this marriage.  But, he had sensed that Rose 
was about to do so herself, and this knowledge had pushed his determination to 
the final notch. (Haldeman-Julius, Dust 59) 
The bond that Rose thought held them together was immediately and clearly nonexistent.  
“Intuitively Rose understood that their first evening and night foreshadowed their whole lives” 
(Haldeman-Julius, Dust 65).  Rose’s hope for her home, a context in which she could be happy 
despite her husband’s coldness, maintained her.  She told herself that everything “would be so 
different … once they were in their pretty new home” (65). 
 Joshua Price argues correctly for the import of the home in identity formation.  The home 
is a place in which and through which “[s]ocial actors (husbands, wives, lovers, and so on) 
become enmeshed in deep ways in (depending on their social position) building a home, 
occupying it, providing it, having dominion over it” (Price 40).  In a sense, the home “reads” the 
characters for us.  It interpolates them.  For women, the home can provide solace and a matrix of 
social signification.  This is exemplified in Rose’s desire to play the hostess at the dream home 
Martin will build for her.  In Dust, the home fills a void in identity formation and consolidation 
that the husband, due to his unfeeling distance, simply cannot.  Regarding the creation of spaces 
as sites of meaning, Henri Lefebvre argues not “to embrace a representation that takes the effect 
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for the cause, and the goal for the reason why that goal is pursued,” as Rose clearly mistakes the 
house as a sign of Martin’s love (qtd. in Price: 51).  Despite its feminism, Dust does not free 
Rose from responsibility of her confusion and lack of options. 
 Haldeman-Julius used Rose’s putative dream house as a palate on which her own psychic 
and emotional violence played out.  Martin lures his wife to be into marriage with the promise of 
a huge, two-story country home with wide porches, cement floors, electricity, and all the finest 
furniture.  The house becomes a privileged topos in the novel and works out as a central 
metaphor of Rose’s own psychic demolition.  It becomes an effigy of Rose’s status as a woman, 
and it is dismantled piece by piece by Martin – even before it is built.  The house is literally a site 
of autobiographical resistance for the author because “the dream house described by Martin 
Wade in his proposal to Rose Conroy … is virtually identical to the Haldeman-Julius home,” and 
in so being it is a reflection of her own disintegration (DeGruson, “Introduction” par. 11).     
 Strangely, this site of dismantling is also a site of rebellion, of feminist protest.  In fact, as 
she (or rather, Martin) disassembles the home in front of Rose’s eyes, Haldeman-Julius is 
“‘speaking out,’ bearing witness … testifying to things that have happened” (Price 53).  She is 
laying bare her own marriage.  “Such a practice develops in the listener or reader a sense of the 
pervasiveness of violences not talked about …, describes their character, begins a discourse” and 
establishes a liberating and emancipatory “sociality to the experience” (Price 53).  The trauma 
enacted in the Haldeman-Julius marriage is represented in Martin’s destruction of the idea of 
Rose’s dream home, the context of her future identity, her future womanhood. 
 Martin trades the cement-floored cellar he promised Rose for a cement floor in his barn.  
“But when Martin began to discuss eliminating the whole upper story of the house, Rose 
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protested” (Haldeman-Julius, Dust 66).  “‘You won’t use it,’ he returned reasonably.  ‘I’ll keep 
my word, but when a body gets to figuring and sees all that can be built with the same money, it 
seems mighty foolish to put it into something that you don’t really need” (66).   
For Rose, Martin’s logic is difficult to argue with, but her loss is immeasurable.  The 
house “had become so real to her, that it was as if some dear possession were being torn to pieces 
before her eyes” (67).  Some of Haldeman-Julius’s own letters demonstrate a fear similar to 
Rose’s, a fear that her house and its identity-making capacity will simply disappear.  In an 
undated letter to her daughter Alice, Haldeman-Julius explains, 
I had the strangest dream that afternoon ….  I dreamed I was climbing, climbing, 
climbing until finally I … was very high up.  I could look way down on … all of 
Girard.  All the roofs were off and I could see right down into every church, store, 
and school house.  And [I could see] this room itself … . I went from [my sitting 
room] into my bedroom and it … had been touched with beauty.  Then into the 
bathroom.  It had a deep sunken tub, and the walls, and floor were of marble.  
“Oh, I thought … what has happened?”  But when I went to go into the hall – it 
wasn’t there.  Just these three rooms – high, high, high up.   
The house was a metaphor for all the happiness Rose hoped to have in her otherwise 
barren marriage; it was supposed to be her domain, her place.  Her possession of it transcended 
the immediacy of a domicile and promised an identity-making space.  Though couched in tactile 
terms of farm merchandise, the inventory of suppression echoes Rose’s internal state of 
consciousness.  The following excerpt represents the slippery slope of misogynistic psychic 
violence:   
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This principal concession obtained, other smaller ones followed logically and 
rapidly.  The running water and bath in the house were given up for piping to the 
barn, and stanchions – then novelties in southeastern Kansas.  The money for the 
hardwood floors went into lightning rods.  Built-in cupboards were dismissed as 
luxuries, and the saving paid for an implement shed which delighted Martin, who 
had figured how much expensive machinery would be saved from rust.  When it 
came to papering the walls he decided that the white plaster was attractive enough 
and could serve for years.  Instead, he bought a patented litter-carrier that made 
the job of removing manure from the barn an easy task.  The porches purchased 
everything from a brace and bit to a lathe from the new tool-room and put the 
finishing touches to the dairy.  The result was a four-room house that was the old 
one born again, and such well-equipped farm buildings that they were the pride of 
the township. (Haldeman-Julius, Dust 72).  
Dust inverts the relationship between the external world and the internal one.  Rose’s inner life is 
taken piece by piece as her dream home is continually gutted and her husband’s farm is outfitted 
with the newest equipment and buildings.  Rose is left in essentially the same shack that shook 
her on her first day of marriage.  She returns to the shack and its anxious truth of her 
unwelcomeness in Martin’s life.    
 Since domestic vocabularies and visions of domestic space have served to create 
“ideologized center[s] of intimacy,” the destruction of home-as-psychic-space reeks of emotional 
violence (Price 55).  There is no doubt that such violence existed between Emanuel and Marcet 
Haldeman-Julius and that Haldeman-Julius used Dust as a sounding board, as a location to speak 
out about the injustices heaped upon her in marriage.  Rose’s ambivalence in the novel, her 
93 
	  
refusal to leave Martin, for instance, reeks of a similar ambivalence that comes, often, when 
women invest in the home and see its failures as their own.  “The ideology of home works in 
another way” as well, for Price, who argues that, for some women, “[h]ome is supposed to be a 
safe place that women are able to construct.  Violence, then, in itself signals a failure – their 
failure – to construct a safe home” (Price 55).  As Rose denies Martin’s violence by staying, as 
Haldeman-Julius denies Emanuel’s violence by staying, Price argues, these denials “can be seen 
as [the] denial of failure, as a way of holding on to their identity as homemakers, as competent to 
their task” (Price 56). 
 In her nonfiction writing, Haldeman-Julius used space as a trope for psychic violence as 
well.  In her Little Blue Book Talks with Joseph McCabe and Other Confidential Sketches, 
Haldeman-Julius described the differences between her study and her husband’s.  The 
differences marked the fault lines of gendered inequality and the unfair burdens of sacrifice 
forced upon women that are very similar to the ones she writes about in Dust.  She began her 
spatial critique tepidly, by discussing the similarities of between their studies. 
EH-J’s library is exactly above my study.  The two rooms, which stretch the 
length of the house on its north side, are practically the same size, and the editor’s 
fireplace, which like mine, holds crackling four-foot logs all winter, is directly 
above my own. (Haldeman-Julius, Talks 93)  
“But there,” she told her readers, “all similarity ends,” seemingly calling readers attention to the 
need for, as Virginia Woolf would call it a few years later, A Room of One’s Own (1929).  
(Haldeman-Julius, Talks 93). 
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Instead of the scuffed, plain brown linoleum that adorns my floor, a beautiful 
oriental rug, that it took E.H.-J. hours to select in Chicago, receives his august 
footfalls.  Instead of my little portable Victrola to which the children dance … is 
the wonderful new combination Orthophonic Victrola and radio.  In place of the 
battered, folding bridge tables on which I write and from which my cherished 
manuscripts are swept ruthlessly to make way for games … or the literary 
inspirations of the juvenile members of the household, a massive, long, carved 
Old English table, awaits in spotless expectancy to receive on its flat top the 
editor’s apothegms and sparkling sentences.  Instead of my worn typewriter which 
so many little fingers constantly use, is a darling little Corona which must never, 
never, no absolutely never by touched by anyone by E. Haldeman-Julius himself 
… But the biggest difference of all this: that what is in the editor’s library is his, 
while what is in my study is everyone’s. (Haldeman-Julius, Talks 93) 
The wife becomes a substitution for the house itself.  She has no internal or sacred space.  She is 
up for grabs.  Everything that Emanuel owns, writes on, and operates around is the best, but 
more importantly, all that is Emanuel’s is only his, while all that belongs to Haldeman-Julius “is 
everyone’s.”  Like Rose, Haldeman-Julius’s space is gutted and circumvented by her husband 
and his desires, distance, and psychic violence.  “Intimacy is – or can be – a place of fear,” or in 
the case of Haldeman-Julius and Rose, a place of pain and loneliness (Price 57).   
Haldeman-Julius’s house is her husband’s house, despite the fact that her money bought 
it, and Rose’s house is her husband’s house, despite the fact that it was promised her as a marital 
incentive.  In both cases, the etymology of the domestic, “that place of man’s dominion,” casts a 
shadow over the women who occupy it.  By scripting space as she does, Haldeman-Julius  speaks 
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out, in 1921, in a way that questions the traditional production of the home as safe.  She speaks 
out strongly about the damage it does. 
[F]or months, after [Rose] was settled in the new little house, her eye never fell on 
the space where the fireplace should have been without a bitter feeling of revolt 
sweeping over her.  She never carried a heavy bucket in from the pump without 
thinking cynically of Martin’s promises for running water.  As she swept the dust 
out of her front and back doors to narrow steps, she remembered the spacious 
porches that were to have been; and as she wiped the floors she had painted 
herself, and polished her pine furniture, she was taunted by memories of the 
smooth boards and the golden oak to which she had once looked forward to 
happily.  This resentment was seldom expressed, but its flame scorched her soul. 
(Haldeman-Julius, Dust 74)             
As Rose conveys later, though, “It was not that alone which had crushed her.  It was his 
ceaseless domination over her, the utter subjugation of her will, her complete lack of freedom” 
(151).  Rose’s former hopefulness about marriage and domestic space colors her like a scar.   
The home as site and method of identity production and the violence of that stolen 
bespeaks a new way of seeing and heralding a feminist message, a framework produced by what 
Karyn Freedman calls the “epistemological significance … of traumatic experiences” and the 
importance of telling them (104).  Haldeman-Julius and Rose trace the way that shattered 
worldviews can create and foster a rebellion that synthesizes the recreation and maintenance of a 
surviving feminist worldview.  They both tiptoe between the falling rocks of the first sexual 
revolution, baring their bruises like messages.  This marriage is an assault, an assault that is 
96 
	  
conveyed via sexual difference in a space (the home) that is produced by the very function of 
that difference.  And, for Haldeman-Julius, Martin and Rose’s marriage is written against an 
implicit and highly oppositional ideal: the hope that “[m]arriage itself, instead of being a step 
into a closed room, is not an open door that may lead to all that is best and beautiful in life” 
(Haldeman-Julius, Generations 22). 
Performing Silence in “What the Editor’s Wife if Thinking About”: 1922-1924 
Emanuel’s behavior devastated his wife as he continued to break her at home, even as she 
worked tirelessly to assure his public success in The Haldeman-Julius Weekly.  Her status in the 
local Girard community, as well as the Haldeman-Julius’s reading public, demanded a 
proprietary public face that went beyond her novelistic avatars.  After Dust and despite its 
success, Marcet suffered increasing public humiliation.  The publicity and frequency with which 
Emanuel carried out his numerous affairs (at an apartment he kept in downtown Girard, near his 
factory) increased steadily until Haldeman-Julius was forced to confront her husband because as 
his escapades with other women increased, so did his verbal and financial abuse of Marcet.  In 
1924, the year of Haldeman-Julius’s cognitive break from her husband, Marcet wrote to 
Emanuel, who, by then, was spending only a small part of his time at home.  The letter stands out 
from the couple’s correspondence in its quality as an ultimatum: 
  You have your own life to live and must decide for yourself – as I must – 
  what is right or wrong.  I don’t want to hamper you or make you feel tied 
  in any way and if you want me to I am going to stay with you through 
  everything.  Bu[t] dear I think you will understand that I cannot keep my 
  own self-respect if I let you com[e] to me from other women or caress me 
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  with the thought in my mind that even so you caress young girls.  I should 
  be no better than the fast women themselves and by sanctioning the others 
  I should be truly culpable … .  I cannot & will not share you.  My 
  humiliation in my own eyes and in the eyes of A[lice] and H[enry] later, 
  would be too profound.  I could not bear it.  I am proud, and already I have 
  suffered past belief, I have burned & bled with the consciousness of insult 
  and outrage…  If you ever do come to me again it must be with a pledge in 
  your heart that never again will you be with another woman. (Cothran 132) 
Up until this point in the couple’s marriage, Haldeman-Julius had looked the other way as her 
husband’s infidelities increased.  Her struggle with her desire to offer the face of a successful 
(both domestically and politically) woman increased as her own domestic situation worsened, 
and this struggle was documented in a column that Haldeman-Julius had written for the Weekly.  
“What the Editor’s Wife is Thinking About” represents Marcet Haldeman-Julius’s first public 
critiques of Emanuel, and it also represents her first successful attempt at public self-avowal in 
the mode of indirect feminist rhetoric, a rhetoric inspired by her performance history and one that 
separates her from other feminists of her day, either those in her mother’s generation or the 
suffragettes in her own.  The column represented, importantly, Marcet’s attempt to co-opt her 
husband’s audience in order to offer a subtle, sly, and coded critique of him and his behavior 
toward his wife.   
  In “What the Editor’s Wife is Thinking About,” Haldeman-Julius addressed, among other 
things, female readers’ questions about her husband.  It was the perfect forum for her to launch a 
veiled yet powerful critique of her husband.  A Little Blue Book collection of Marcet’s “Editor’s 
Wife” columns was published in 1924 and sold well.  Emanuel would not have published the 
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Blue Book had it not promised a large audience.  He thought it innocent enough.  He did 
notknow his wife could manipulate language to transform her praise into critique, her description 
of her husband’s character evocative of his faults and the harm he commits.  Rhetorically, this 
book is fraught not just with notes directed toward the desire for liberation but normative 
declamations of her husband’s character and propensities; these critiques are severe, though 
coded, in her performance of the character called “the editor’s wife.”19  Haldeman-Julius’s 
character, undoubtedly, was created as a way to forward her husband’s celebrity cache, though 
she turns the character on its face when, isolated by her husband, she powerfully and covertly 
pursues his audience.  Here, Haldeman-Julius offers an example of how oppressed individuals 
negotiate the public and private elements of their worlds through symbolic means with the 
feminist rhetorician’s sensitivity to the emotional (private/public) terrain to recruit a 
counterpublic out of an audience.  It is, then, a germinal and potent feminist critique – exactly 
because it was designed to move beyond the passive reception of dull audiences to the activation 
of other audiences, audiences of which she certainly saw her very young daughter, Alice, being a 
part.   
 In his seminal work on the rhetorical situation, Lloyd Bitzer explains that “rhetoric is 
pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately 
to produce action or change in the world,” and what it attempts to change, the itch to rhetoric’s 
scratch, Bitzer calls the situation’s “exigence” (Bitzer 4).  What makes Haldeman-Julius’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Of the book  Emanuel reflected, almost wistfully, in his 1928 autobiography The First Hundred Million, that “a 
book by my wife, Marcet, which was first called What the Editor’s Wife Is Thinking About, and was reprinted from 
the Haldeman-Julius Weekly in response to numerous requests.  This book sold well only at first,” even when 
reprinted, to the Emanuel’s chagrin, even as it was reprinted as Intimate Notes on E. H.-J., with his wife totally 
removed.  Her presence, it seems, was necessary to his own iconic status, despite his reluctance to admit as much.  
Emanuel did, though, confess, though, that the book, which had sold well early on and dropped off under the 
aforementioned second title, picked up when categorized under “Famous Women” in their marketing catalog.  He 
explains, “As a last resort, during 1927, this book was listed under the classification Famous Women, as follows: 
Marcet Haldeman-Julius’s Intimate Notes on Her Husband.  This, amazing as it really is – I was quite flabbergasted 
when I learned it – sold 16,000 copies of this book in 1927” (Hundred Million 165). 
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situation intriguing, though, as I have argued elsewhere, is that she attempts to write against the 
one person who represented her chance at an audience.  In order to offer a critique of her 
husband without relinquishing her chance at an audience, Haldeman-Julius employed what 
Thomas Huckin and others have called “rhetorical silences.”  Following Michael Warner, I assert 
that writers like Marcet necessarily address “a public that does not yet [fully] exist, and finding 
their language can only circulate in channels that are hostile to it [which is, of course, the case 
for Haldeman-Julius], they write in a manner designed to be a placeholder for a future public” 
(Warner 130).    
In contrast with her mother’s indirect critique of Emanuel in the public sphere, 
Haldeman-Julius’s daughter Alice serves as her principal private interlocutor on issues of 
Emanuel’s domestic misanthropy through a long and sustained correspondence, where the 
discussion of the subject serves to strengthen the bond between mother and daughter.  The 
parallel between these two corpora is simple: the “Editor’s Wife” represents a public site of 
feminist resistance, and the correspondence represents a private site of feminist resistance (from 
mother to daughter).  Both pursue similar ends, consciousness-raising, but their different 
rhetorical situations demand different interpretive frames from the researcher.  My contention is 
simple: that writing through her husband (as gate-keeper of the public sphere) requires the use of 
rhetorical silence, while private epistolary does not.  However, her private writing lacks the 
potential exigence of her public writing.  Both are critical of her abusive husband, but one is 
more covert.  One addresses an actual audience (Alice).  One addresses a potential audience, a 
potential counterpublic, and performs it into being.      
 Recently, a handful of rhetoric scholars have begun to make strides in this direction 
(Farmer 2001, Glenn 2004, and Huckin 2010).  Because of its absent-presence, silence is 
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difficult to approach, especially when silences are read as a “simple passivit[ies]” (Glenn xi).  
For Cheryl Glenn, silence-as-strategy needs to be accounted for, “particularly in our talkative 
Western culture, where speech is synonymous with civilization itself” and where “silence-as-
obedience is frequently rewarded” (xii).  In my view, Haldeman-Julius’s silence functions as 
textured critique of patriarchal power.  A spoon full of sugar makes the medicine go down.  
 In “On Textual Silences, Large and Small,” Thomas Huckin elaborates six different kinds 
of rhetorical silences: Topical Silences, Conventional Silences, Discreet Silences, Lexical 
Silences, Implicational Silences, and Presuppositional Silences.  Topical Silences are both the 
simplest to understand and perhaps the most pervasive, as every text leaves some topics out.  
Topical Silences can be used in what Huckin calls “manipulative” ways when “some topic 
relevant to a larger issue is omitted” in a way “that surreptitiously disadvantages the listener or 
reader” (Huckin 5).  Conventional Silences are “genre-based,” like obituaries, which tend to 
“omit information unfavorable to the deceased” (6).  These, too, can be used in manipulative 
ways, as Huckin explains, as in the case of American history textbooks that “sanitize the 
Vietnam War” (7).  Huckin’s third type of silence is called a “Discreet Silence,” where 
information is omitted for proprietary or privacy reasons, or to “to avoid offending the reader” 
(7).  Huckin’s example of the manipulative use of this type of silence is the “Bush 
administration’s executive order prohibiting photos of the military coffins coming back from Iraq 
and Afganistan” (8).  Lexical Silences occur “at the most micro level of discourse” when “the 
choice of a word excludes other candidates,” as is the case with “hyponymy, where two words 
are similar in meaning but one is more general than the other, such as walk or stroll” (9).  Since 
strolling carries with it a qualitative difference from simply walking, using walking silences 
“those features of stroll that do not inhere in walk” (9).  Implicational silences, a very useful type 
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of silence for feminist critique, occur when one idea is used to create an inference in the reader’s 
or listener’s mind.  Huckin explains, “[I]f my wife and I were preparing for a dinner party and 
she said to me, ‘Are you sure you want to wear that jacket with those pants?,’ I would infer that 
she disapproved of my attire,” even though “she did not say so explicitly” (11).  The last type of 
textual silence is a Presuppositional Silence, where “the writer omits relevant information on the 
assumption that it is already known to the reader,” exploiting “syllogistic logic, sentence syntax, 
or cultural norms” (16).  In a chapter entitled “A Repertoire of Discernments: Hearing the Unsaid 
in Oral History Narrative,” Frank Farmer and Margaret Strain call these enthymematic silences, 
which, unlike Huckin’s lexicon, links this type of silence directly to the rhetorical tradition.  In 
either case, though, syntactically, “passive voice and nominalization” allow the “grammatical 
agent to be deleted” (Huckin 16).  Of most interest to this study, though, are those 
presuppositional silences that presuppose cultural norms (think gender roles).  Huckin uses the 
example of someone saying “I was here before you,” their implication being derived from the 
cultural norm of standing in queue (17). 
 “What the Editor’s Wife is Thinking About,” like all Little Blue Books, is 16,000 words 
long.  It is a consolidation (and editorial selection) of a multitude of columns written by the 
editor’s wife between 1919 and 1924, and the editor’s own hand in the canonization of these 
pieces is not to be forgotten.  This notion makes sense, when one remembers the feminized 
elements of her generic choice, the “gossip column.”  Of course, the genre choice creates the 
potential for generic silences; this is to be expected.    
 What is most interesting, in terms of normativity, is that Marcet Haldeman-Julius, 
speaking to an audience of (mostly but not all women), has determined not only the critical 
message she wants to send but the methods for sending them.  For her, the conventional silences 
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based on the genre itself provide a kind of entre into the question of her husband’s character (and 
his capacity for abuse), but after that stage has been set, she proceeds, mostly, via implicational 
silences, which is understandable when one remembers that “What the Editor’s Wife is Thinking 
About” was fashioned as a column but did not appear weekly, like a column in syndication.  
Instead, it appeared when Haldeman-Julius had something to say.  Sometimes, considering her 
situation, she had positive or at least neutral things to say about her husband – how he looks 
riding his horse or in his white button down shirt, for instance – but sometimes she had more 
pointed things to say.  In these situations, her evolving domestic situation provides context for 
the kinds of statements made and their exigencies.   
 Why are Conventional Silences important?  Simple: they demonstrate the indirect 
feminist rhetor’s ability to use written genres in tactical ways, operating on and underneath other 
kinds of silences and expressions.  Of course, conventional silences are born, fundamentally, out 
of the need to get things done out of certain rhetorical situations.  Like Haldeman-Julius’s 
undermining of her husband’s abuse through her descriptions of domestic space in Dust, this 
column again undermines her husband’s abuse while making use of a feminized, innocent 
rhetorical situation: that of wifely gossip.  Each genre (one literary, one rhetorical) allows for 
different modes of indirection, the first through characterization and emotional displacement and 
the second by taking advantage of the very expectations that define the feminized genre of the 
gossip column.  What each proliferation of indirection has in common, though, is that they each 
demonstrate that indirect feminist communication always has multiple exigencies.   
 The beauty of what Huckin has done in creating his analytic is that each category is (and 
has been) deserving of analysis, and their potential for application extend, it is important to note, 
far outside the bounds of feminism as well.  The first example of a conventional silence comes 
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early on.  Haldeman-Julius, who eventually sold hundreds of thousands of Blue Books, who 
recorded Russian Socialism and family life for The Haldeman-Julius Monthly, explains to her 
female readership – an audience whose mailed-in questions the column addresses – the 
intricacies of her husband and his personality.  This “feminized” (read innocent) genre works to 
cover certain kinds of silent assertions.  “By meeting Manuel (as he is known to all his 
intimates),” she explains, you will at once submit to “his engaging cordiality – that is, of course, 
providing he is in the mood to pay any attention at all to you” (Haldeman-Julius “Editor’s Wife” 
10).  She uses a small Presuppositional Silence here, that which presupposes (1) that she is one 
of its “intimates” and (2) that intimacy means what it is conventionally (as dictated by the genre) 
meant to be, that Emanuel lovingly dotes on his wife, that he pays  her attention in the sparse 
economy of emotional relationship. By itself, this assertion carries water, but in the context of a 
“feminized genre,” it gets strategically silenced.  It is a statement covered over by the voice that 
conveys it.  As she explains, letting herself off the hook, “I ask you, whenever was it in feminine 
nature to put ideas before individuals?  Not in mine, I willingly admit” (7).    
 Continuing the “dishing,” Haldeman-Julius explains, 
  Women, Jean Dean (since you ask), are invariably drawn to him and their interest  
  – at first at least – is as invariably reciprocated.  That is, if they are pretty or  
  charming.  Being very sure of himself and of my complete understanding, he  
  allows himself a good deal more liberty than does perhaps the average husband.  
  (Haldeman-Julius “Editor’s Wife” 14).     
Operating under the cultural rubrics available in advice columns, Haldeman-Julius’s assertion 
that her husband’s capacity for intimacy is challenged here and gets away with a subtle though 
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stinging critique.  The notion that this silence is conventional comes from the fact that the genre 
itself silences it.  It remains a speech act. 
 Haldeman-Julius’s response to Jean Dean that Emanuel allows himself “a good deal more 
liberty than does the average husband” is a call for help and a critique of her husband’s growing 
capacity for infidelity, though its status as nestled into a the feminized genre of gossip column 
“dishing” codes the radical publicity of this critique.  The genre conditions and colors Haldeman-
Julius’s language in ways that allow her feminist critique to hide in plain sight.  The genre allows 
Marcet to link Emanuel’s sexual proclivities to his general air of self-confidence and 
independence.  In another Conventional Silence, Haldeman-Julius explains: “Altogether I find 
him one of the most thoughtless, but most consolingly lovable, most exasperatingly ego-centric, 
but most pride-stirringly efficient of men” (Haldeman-Julius 14).  Here, she voices the truth, but 
the depth of her statement is covered over like a generic sleight-of-hand.   
 Continuing her pattern of conventional silences, Haldeman-Julius raises the stakes.  
Indeed, Emanuel’s liberties with members of the opposite sex are used instead to consecrate the 
love he must have for his wife.  Indeed, without that love, he would give in, ultimately, to his 
attraction to the opposite sex.  She writes,  
  Fortunately – providentially, I should say! – E. H.-J. has a delightful sense of  
  humor.  He certainly needs it.  If only you could see the letters – and poems –  
  which he receives week in and week out from the fair sex!  Every kind   
  imaginable, from readable, well-written – extraordinarily well-written ones –  
  motivated by feelings of authentic kinship to just as many mash notes that often  
  include offers of marriage.  I am sure Mrs. Rudolph Valentino, Mrs. Ben Hecht  
  and myself – not to mention numerous others – could have quaint sport, should  
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  chance throw us together, comparing notes on the eternal feminine as it is   
  portrayed before us in letters to our husbands.  Yet, on the whole, in the case of E. 
  H.-J. it is all rather forgivable for so much of his bubbling, alert and courageous  
  self does get into his editorials that most of those who meet him there are drawn  
  to him as irresistibly as those who meet him in the flesh. (6-7) 
The propensity Emanuel has to naturally create desire in the opposite sex has a special effect 
here.  By foregrounding his desirability, she has created a kind of alibi that covers over the plain 
fact that he has indeed responded to those who find him “irresistible” by not resisting them.  
Here, then, Haldeman-Julius has moved from a series of Conventional Silences to a more bold, 
Implicational Silence.   
 Implicational Silences, according to Huckin, induce inference in one’s audience and thus 
have special potential for coded feminist critique.  Because the audience must do the work of 
filling out an implication, the writer can offer bold yet oblique claims.  Implicational Silences as 
implicational claims abound in “What the Editor’s Wife is Thinking About.”   
 An early Implicational Silence in “Editor’s Wife” allows Haldeman-Julius to elide her 
own agential status as a feminist or as a critic.  She “innocently” asks her female audience 
“whenever was it in feminine nature to put ideas before individuals?  Not in mine, I fully admit” 
(7).  Of course, this admission foregrounding her own powerlessness, she implies the great 
potential Haldeman-Julius’s arguments possess.  Implicational Silences can often work in 
multiple directions or toward multiple exigencies at once, which makes them particularly 
powerful.   
 Returning to the power of the feminized genre of the gossip column, Haldeman-Julius 
capitalizes on the lowered expectations her editor/publisher has of her.  So when she explains 
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that Emanuel’s attention is “fleeting,” and “is never held long by any one person,” the 
implication of his disregard for her is clear, and the fact that this critique slips by his otherwise 
steady editorial marker is evidence of that (14).  Through Implicational Silences like these, 
Marcet builds in a double-edged critique.   
 Haldeman-Julius’s Implicational Silences tend to center on the theme of her husband’s 
selfishness and lack of awareness and attention for her.  To a question about her husband’s 
preferred mode of transportation, Marcet explains that 
  last year Emanuel bought for himself in addition a beautiful Cadillac coupe which 
  is the car he constantly uses.  Like his library and his books, his little typewriter  
  and pencil sharpener, his pen and his saddle-horse – it is his, strictly and   
  exclusively.  Never, under any circumstances, should I dream of using it – though  
  often I am invited to ride with him, but I assure you always and only in the  
  capacity of honored guest. (Haldeman-Julius 40) 
Indeed covered in the saccharine language of a wife doting on her husband’s love of fine things 
exists Marcet’s relatively straightforward Implicational Silence that escapes her husband’s 
editorial guise.  It creates a kind of stark picture of a woman who is an outsider in her own 
marriage.  Indeed, in her personal correspondence, as the years go by, she is constantly angered 
by Emanuel’s tendency to drive only his mistresses in the little Cadillac coupe.  She is an invited 
guest, existing on the periphery of her own life, not at the center of it (like her readers expect 
from her language and conventional decisions).   
 On the question of Emanuel’s take on religion, Haldeman-Julius marks another 
characteristic of her husband’s personality: his propensity to completely ignore things (or people) 
107 
	  
about which he “is just not interested” (45).  This section is immediately followed by what is 
perhaps the richest section in the book in terms of silences. 
 To the carefully-chosen reader question of whether Emanuel practices “free love,” his 
wife responds that “certainly as a young man – as most young men do, he approved and 
practiced (without any later regrets) complete [sexual] freedom” (48).  Here, her sly orientation 
to his younger days covers over the fact that, as she says later, he still maintains that “twinkle in 
his eye” and his tendency to believe that “man … is a natural-born varietist” (50).  The 
implications are everywhere in the section and they speak to a very interesting effort on 
Haldeman-Julius’s behalf to use exactly the tools her husband uses to dehumanize her to level 
critiques against him that are so subtly coded that even he misses them – and in so doing, she 
reclaims some semblance of her own agency and humanity. 
 Sex does not end “What the Editor’s Wife is Thinking About,” though.  And it seems 
rather clear through her final Implicational Silences that Haldeman-Julius wants to call out for 
companionship, to reach out into an unformed public for something or someone to grab hold of, 
to turn her audience into a supportive public of like-minded and similarly experienced 
individuals who have the potential for mutual solidarity and understanding.  She paints her 
marriage, in these last pages, as a barren landscape indeed.  To the question, “Are you charitable 
and how do you display it?” she writes, “Emanuel is constitutionally averse to people whose are 
broke [or I might say, broken],” covering her own isolation in Implicational Silences based on 
economic metaphors (50).  She goes on in this section, her argument crystallizing that sometimes 
she almost slips from Implicational Silences into direct accusations about her marital situation, 
but even so, the Implicational Silence stands. 
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  He will make almost unbelievable sacrifices for an idea in which he is interested,  
  but he has the most appalling, total lack of imagination when it is a matter of a  
  concrete individual in distress … Just as surely as Emanuel’s heart warms to the  
  working man and his problems, just as surely does it harden … to the man or  
  woman with a long tale of woe. … And often I find it … disconcerting. (51) 
Unwilling to position herself as one with a long tale of woe, Haldeman-Julius does something in 
“Editor’s Wife” of great strategic import and linguistic felicity – without disempowering herself, 
without structuring her own relation to her domineering, cold, and philandering husband as one 
of victim, she launches a coded critique, a critique written to an audience of women who want to 
know about her husband.  Through the use of these Implicational Silences, Haldeman-Julius 
makes her pain clear without ever having to own up to the kinds of failures wives whose 
husbands cheat on them are seen to have, failure to keep her man happy, etc.,.  In the guise of 
painting an accurate image of her famous and “supposedly” desired husband, a man “far too 
kaleidoscopic and illusive to be more than partially compressed into columns,” she instead 
paints, which much greater relief, the image of a marriage whose barren topography yields both a 
call for camaraderie and a warning to other women and thus functions as both feminist 
consciousness-raising and public or community-building.    
 Silence, of course, is not Haldeman-Julius’s only means of feminist critique.  Indeed, in 
her private letters (to her daughter, in particular) she often explains the situation in much greater 
and more explicit detail, detail that draws the purposive nature of her public writing into sharp 
contrast.  Her letters to Alice in the 1930s are full of clear and accurate descriptions of 
Emanuel’s behavior.  A May 9, 1935 letter documents Emanuel’s “tirade,” where Emanuel 
treated Marcet’s houseguests terribly, leading her to wonder why he gets into “such a flurry.”  
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“Does he,” she asks her daughter, “construe the fact that they go right on liking me and seeking 
me out, through everything, as an indirect slur on him?  Was Miss [Smith], perhaps, one of his 
flames?  Did she weary of him? … It was an amazing scene.”  In another letter to Alice dated 
April 15, 1935, Haldeman-Julius recounts a scene at the breakfast table: 
  He seemed actually to draw his lips back and bare his teeth. 
  “Why, you’re the stuff that Hitlers and Huey Longs are made of,” he sneered.   
  “You’re a tyrant, that’s what you are – a petty tyrant.  You want Alice to be your  
  little proxy. … You’re so dumb,” he raved on, positive venom in his tone, “that’s  
  what you are – dumb.” … 
  [She continues to Alice, in relation to Emanuel’s previous assertion, her own]  
  wish to guide you, to keep you, to sustain you in any effort that requires courage,  
  to comfort you in any defeat and to have you realize your best, your strongest and  
  most useful self.  This is what I conceive to be the duty and the joy of any parent. 
The Haldeman-Julius that comes through in her letters to Alice is the Haldeman-Julius in which I 
ground my prior arguments about silence.  She is a woman of voice, a woman (at least in her 
hometown, New York, and various other places across America) scorned, whose abusive 
husband worked for years to demolish and sweep aside.  As she explains in a letter dated 
February 17, 1935,  
  I am a proud, sensitive, passionate woman who worships truth, loyalty, and  
  justice.  As such I was humiliated and outraged by your father in every fibre of  
  my being so that I was driven almost frantic – until I reached the point of   
  cleansing, self-respect giving revolt. 
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It is part of this revolt that I have tried to capture using Huckin’s silence analytic.  Haldeman-
Julius’s pain and marital strife was not unique, but as a woman writer for the world’s largest 
publishing company, a writer who sold hundreds of thousands of books, her ability to reach a 
public audience was.  And that propensity to push turning an audience into a public, through 
whatever coded guises and rhetorical techniques, was also a push to consolidate her own self-
respect in relation to a husband and to a public.  Even the frame of her silhouette of her rhetorical 
feminism is one of a woman in revolt.  “Don’t forget,” she explains triumphantly to her daughter 
in that same letter, “I like to live [because this life] … is all my own.”          
 As Kohrs Campbell shows, the study of rhetorical women in history is so contoured and 
radical because, on occasion, in the specific folds of a rhetorical and life situation, paths are 
created by years of pressure, unique methods of revolt and interpretation are attempted (and, in 
our case, are recorded).  Responses to this oppression, for Haldeman-Julius anyway, manifest in 
specific situations only available through particular means, in dialects of silence and passivity 
that convey their plight only to those with ears tuned to listen for those soft grace notes between 
phrases, those opposing modalities at work in the dominant tune of an age.  This work represents 
one step, however, shaky, toward that kind of rhetorical listening to the performances of indirect 
feminist rhetoric that adhere to other, conventionalized structures of audience acquisition, 
functioning as a subtle, counterposed melodies might.  Marcet Haldeman-Julius’s performances 
of indirect feminist rhetoric, of her own covert and coded self-avowal, challenge us, as historians 
of rhetoric and writing, to pay attention to elements that work beneath face value, rhetorical 
elements employed by groups that lack overt access to public power.   
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Chapter 3 
A Twilight of Idols: Feminist Ambivalence, Self-Care, and the Spectacular Exploitation of Male 
Weakness in the Work of Anita Loos 
 
An ambiguity, in ordinary speech, means something very 
pronounced, and as a rule witty or deceitful[,] … but it is 
descriptive because it suggests the analytical mode of approach, 
and with that I am concerned. – William Empson, Seven Types of 
Ambiguity   
 
[H]ere, as it often happens, the jest betrays the seriousness of it. – 
Sigmund Freud, Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious   
 
  Anita never liked a fuss. – Gary Carey, Anita Loos 
 
 Anita Loos was, in addition to constructing and complicating American masculinity, a 
savvy mash-up artist of American modernity, combining a modern’s refined literary sensibility 
with bawdy, lowbrow humor, one with the power to affect America’s burgeoning audiences in 
the developing narratives of the early twentieth century, a time when, uniquely, “humor 
provid[ed] methods of concealment and disguise,” where “humor and its frequent comrade, 
irony, also derive[d] power from its relation, from the conceptual and critical potential of 
unmasking” (Keyser 3).  More than revolutionary rhetoric, she preferred subtly subversive 
gambits, moves meant to gain time, generate confusion, or create, hopefully, weaknesses in 
strategic opponents that would allow her to continue a trajectory that urged her toward the public 
sphere.  And these gambits, always, played out through the language of gender and sexuality in 
the early 20th century.  I read Anita Loos’s work for its rhetorical subtlety, how it stands out from 
most recent discussions of rhetoric’s role in an increasingly public culture, which have 
“acknowledged that if rhetoric is to serve the public good, it must involve the reciprocal 
exchange of views in a charitable context” (Couture and Kent 9).  Loos’s most strident critiques 
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not only avoid the reciprocal exchange of ideas, they fundamentally silence by cutting off her 
opponents’ abilities at counter-proposition.  And while the echoes of John Stuart Mill here 
maintain a pleasant timbre in liberal academe, the idea that positive and effective rhetoric takes 
place out in the open – in contexts that make possible, even encourage, reciprocity – denies the 
ever-present and insidious limitations of what James C. Scott calls the public transcript, the “on 
the record” material of history, shaped by elites and driven by the elision of counternarratives.  
This public transcript offers sharply limited geographies for subgroups or counterpublics whose 
language does not amend itself to flattery     
 Instead, certain types of radical critique (feminist critique in this instance) function more 
effectively in contexts that do not invite reciprocal exchange, in fact contexts that work to 
foreclose on the potential for reciprocal postulations from opposing positions.  These types of 
radical indirect rhetoric are typically the stuff of meta-critique, questioning not just the transcript 
itself but its medium, its style, its authors, etc.  In such cases – like the ones I review here – 
where women critique the limitations of male sexual power, of the entire matrix of patriarchic 
presumption, charitable contexts for public rhetoric are simply not available.  In this way, 
feminisms, in finite moments in cultural history, manage to put to use the constraining 
performances of liberal individualism, of identity politics – and of the methods of propositional 
discourse that underlie them.  In short, this chapter (and this dissertation, for that matter) is 
concerned with how a woman can be a feminist without performing one, how she can puncture 
and occupy the public transcript covertly through indirect-though-rhetorical writing for the 
screen.  Writers like Loos, according to Catherine Keyser, “accentuate the role of performance in 
everyday life and in print culture,” demonstrating a process that (Keyser draws from Walter 
113 
	  
Benjamin here), “could expose the artificial form not only of the artwork but indeed of modern 
society” (3).  
 This chapter will (1) locate Loos in feminist discourse, (2) consider Loos as a Metis-
figure, operating within and in-between traditional masculine power structures, (3) pay special 
attention to the mechanisms of hiding her feminist motives and effects, particularly her work 
titling early films for Douglas Fairbanks, (4) trace the development of her indirect feminist 
rhetoric out of screen genres and into the novel as she aims her critique and H.L. Mencken in 
Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, and (5) lastly, the chapter will consider indirect feminist rhetoric in 
Loos’s autobiographical writings of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly her negotiation of her 
marriage to the abusive director John Emerson.        
 Studying Loos as a feminist represents a challenge to feminist historiography in two 
ways.  First, she did not claim to be one – rather, she repeatedly and publicly declared that she 
detested feminists.  This information is easily accessible in her rendering of suffragettes in D.W. 
Griffith’s Intolerance (1916) and in Loos’s autobiographies.  Second, feminists (Loos knew them 
at the time as suffragettes) represented rhetorical technologies of propositionality that she did not 
respect – there was no art to it, no subtlety in placards and dour faces.  Anita Loos wanted the 
power to critique as well as the power to fit in.  This is what makes her a radical feminist, the 
throwing off of traditional definitions of how female power should be expressed and the 
assumption of quiet, mediatized (remember, film lacked the respect of Broadway in the middle to 
late teens), entertaining discourse.  Loos’s radicalism both suffered and benefitted from (much 
like John Stewart’s escapades on the Daily Show) the constraints of entertainment-as-activism.   
 The indirect form, as vehicle for social critique, then, is as strikingly ironic as the 
positions in which modern public women like Loos were put, where “the guise of the flapper 
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enabled them to emerge from their homes and into the business world” as part of a patriarchic 
taxonomy rather than against it (Keyser 3).  As Catherine Keyser argues, for Loos, literary fame 
meant slipping on the “smooth stockings of the chic feminine masquerade and pointing out 
where the runs were in the fabric” (78).  But her gender-critique did not stop with feminine 
performance.  In the following, I will elucidate how Loos was able to interrogate American 
masculinity and at the same time toss aside the standards and practices of American film up to 
1916, American literature 1925, and American autobiography in the 1960s and 1970s.  She, in 
her moment and her motive, was an important transitional figure in altering the discursive limits 
of gender-critique.   
 I attempt to add to the conversation of feminist rhetoric and power a historically specific 
analysis and provisional vocabulary of indirect rhetoric that represents and reflects access to the 
public sphere, to audiences, that at once delimit and capitalize on traditional limits of a female 
propositional ethos.  Like Cheryl Glenn, I believe that any approach to a “regendered history” is 
never finalizable, never anything but partial, provisional, hopeful.  “We all know,” after all, that 
despite the paucity of primary materials, “women’s rhetorical lives [and rhetorical forms of 
resistance] have always existed, among the innumerable, interminable, clear examples of public, 
political, agonistic, masculine discourse” (Retold 174).      
 Without a doubt, Loos had a life-long “affection for shady ladies, con men, and 
charlatans of both sexes” and doubted “politicians and do-gooders” and their sappy, 
straightforward modes of communication (Carey 3).  Though throughout her career Loos always 
went for the laughs (tempting poet William Empson to write a poem about her entitled “A Girl 
Can’t Go on Laughing All the Time”),20 Loos’s rhetorical personae often came with a dark side, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 In William Empson: prophet against sacrifice, Paul Fry argues that Loos’s ambiguous stance brought out 
Empson’s veiled feminist side: “He is also sensitive in some areas to what we would now call feminist themes … 
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a side that would offer critique hedged in comedy, critique that, however radical it might be, 
stopped just short of overt social commentary.  It’s no great surprise that Empson was interested 
in Loos, as she almost certainly served as an inspiration for his 1930 book Seven Different Types 
of Ambiguity.21  As an entertainer obsessed with larceny, stealing laughs, Loos implicitly 
understood the power of indirection, of never seeming too serious, never being too earnest.  Of 
course, that level of earnest propositionality would threaten Loos’s comedic persona, but also, 
down deep, Loos’s early experiences with her father made her “doubtful that the world would 
improve as it got older” (Carey 3).  She was even more doubtful as to what would need to be 
done to make it better.  What Loos had at her disposal was a mind for critique, irony, parody, 
satire.  She was not working toward a better world for women, overtly at least.  Instead, she was 
showing women the very limitations of male power, simmering male blindness (the unawareness 
of or lack of responsibility for sexual, social, and economic privilege) in its own juices, often to 
comedic ends.  
A Modern Metis 
 Loos’s mastery of indirection maintains, always, an importantly gendered element – it is 
this structure that winds itself helix-like around Loos’s work and links her to a long and complex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
There are feminist sympathies … in his “Reflection from Anita Loos” (Collected Poems, p. 68: “Gentlemen prefer 
bound feet and wasp waist./A girl can’t go on laughing all the time’” (51).  If anything, Empson’s critique of Loos 
here displays the discrepancy between her personal power and her public performance of subordination.   
21 Empson’s reading of Freud is, in Seven Kinds of Ambiguity, very telling, and it presents the closest link the book 
offers to Loos’s method: her propensity for dealing with oppositions in performative ways (he does this by linking 
opposition, Wit, and dreams).  He explains, “Opposites, again, are an important element in the Freudian analysis of 
dreams; and it is evidence that the Freudian terminology, particularly the word ‘condensation,’ could be employed 
with profit for the understanding of poety.  Now a Freudian opposite at least marks dissatisfaction; the notion of 
what you want involves the idea that you have not got it, and this again involves the ‘opposite defined by your 
context,’ which is what you have and cannot avoid.  In more serious cases, causing wider emotional reverberation, 
such as are likely to be reflected in language, in poetry, or in dreams, it marks a centre of conflict; the notion of what 
you want involves the notion that you must not take it, and this again involves the ‘opposite defined by your 
context,’ that you want something different in another part of your mind.  Of course, conflict need not be expressed 
overtly as contradiction” (193). 
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trickster history.  Michel de Certeau explains the historical character of this type of maneuver, in 
its ability to deliver 
  victories of the “weak” over the “strong” (whether the strength be that of   
  powerful people or the violence of things or of an imposed order, etc.), clever  
  tricks,  knowing how to get away with things, “hunter’s cunning,” maneuvers,  
  polymorphic simulations, joyful discoveries, poetic as well as warlike.  The  
  Greeks called these “ways of operating” metis. (xx) 
De Certeau goes further, though, arguing that even before the Greeks named metis, this tendency 
manifested itself in natural phenomena.  “They go much further back,” he argues, “to the 
immemorial intelligence displayed in the tricks and imitations of plants and fishes … [T]here is a 
continuity and permanence to these tactics” (xx).  One element that supplies continuity to what 
de Certeau calls “these tactics” is their continued association with bodies and embodiment.  
Metis, originally, is an embodied term.  Metis is the first feminist – and her power is, from the 
start, indirect.  Nonetheless, hers is real power – real enough to draw a violent response.       
 The figure of metis first appears in Hesiod’s Theogony in the 700s BCE as a troublesome 
spouse.  She was Zeus’s first wife, and her mythological lineage was born of her power and 
consequent status as a threat to Zeus, though it was not that fact that caused him to trick and then 
to swallow her (she did provide him, abdominally, the ability to determine good from bad).  In 
relaying this tale, “Hesiod is, of course, drawing on very old traditions of the mischief-making 
capacity of the trickster and culture-hero” (132).  Norman O. Brown explains, 
  Metis is not the Wisdom that Stoic allegorists and most modern commentators  
  take her to be.  Metis is an ambivalent concept: … she is a threat to Zeus and at  
  the same time an indispensable aid to Zeus[.  As] the mother of Zeus’s possible  
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  successor[, her most] dangerous aspect is her Promethean side. … Making the  
  necessary allowances for the inevitable imprecision of mythological concepts, we  
  may perhaps translate the abstraction Metis, in its dangerous aspect, as “creative   
  ingenuity,” as a force making for cultural renewal. (133-134) 
Renewal, for advanced cultures like Hesiod’s, often means technological recreation, reframing 
and recasting old stories from new perspectives, exactly Loos’s function.  My reading of metis 
takes cues from Karen Kopelson’s excellent work on gender performance, rhetoric, and cunning 
(Kopelson 2003).  Uniquely, in rhetoric and composition, Kopelson’s theorization of performing 
neutrality in the classroom underscores both the complexity of these acts and the need for more 
scholarship that takes performance seriously as a method for both offering information and 
garnering metacritical audience awareness.22         
 Loos’s performances of neutrality have, thus far, never been studied rhetorically, and 
when they are viewed at all, scholars tend to focus on very isolated segments of Loos’s writing 
career, virtually ignoring her ability to adapt her work to several different media: as Brooks 
Hefner argues, 
  she was the only major figure of this era to make the transition from writing for  
  successful films to writing successful fiction; she even moved back into film  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Kopelson’s take on cunning in the rhetoric and composition classroom is that it is best used as a performative tool 
to deal with “student resistance” to whom we teachers appear to be, resistance to what they perceive are our 
ideological concerns (116).  “Resistance,” she tells us, “is all the rage” (117).  Resistance in the classroom, for 
Kopelson carries with it “exigencies that call for” the simulation of our identities, the production of neutrality, 
particularly important for those in “marginalized constituencies,” people of color, gays and lesbians, etc.  Kopelson 
continues, citing Celeste Condit, who “has written of her experiences teaching at a Southern university that merely 
to walk into a classroom ‘in pants and short hair’ is to be ‘branded … a liberal, a feminist, a dyke’ and as such, 
rejected” (119).  This kind of resistance can, with contextual variations, be extrapolated into any number of 
situations where information and attention is being translated back and forth between speakers/addressees, 
parents/children, writers/audiences.  It is this notion of the benefits of “playing it straight,” of putting on a mask of 
neutrality, of performing normalcy so as to avoid threatening audience members’ potential reception of one’s work 
that got me started thinking about Anita Loos’s indirection.  I contend that Loos’s trick is similar to the one 
Kopelson espouses – portraying a go-with-the-flow comedienne while harboring some potentially radical viewpoints 
on gender relations and power at a time when traditional American gender/power relations were highly 
conventionalized and predictable. 
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  after the nature of screenwriting had been altered by the coming of sound as well  
  writing numerous Broadway plays and, when the 1960s-70s silent film-nostalgia  
  hit, several retrospective autobiographies. (108)   
Anita Loos shaped herself as seemingly a bit player in the public transcript, a humorist, 
interested in fun over art and certainly over social critique.  The Loos of these pages stands in 
sharp distinction to the Loos traditionally rendered by scholars as a comic presence and/or closet 
modernist, as this Loos demonstrates moments of a performative, rhetorical feminism that was at 
once subtly rendered and ahead of its time.23  Approaching Loos this way demands a revisionist, 
third-wave historiography, one that foregrounds motive and challenges traditional feminist 
ontologies of the late teens and twenties, focusing on the act of rhetorical subversion as a 
feminist endeavor over and beyond the more propositional feminisms of the suffrage movement.  
Loos did not demand rights for women; rather, she offered artful, witty critique wrapped in 
parody and delivered to massive popular audiences.  Like her idol Voltaire, Loos wrote in order 
to act.24  Almost exclusively, work on Loos has focused on her most successful endeavor, a 
novella – Gentlemen Prefer Blondes (1925).  Published by Boni and Liveright alongside 
Hemingway’s In Our Time, Dreiser’s An American Tragedy, O’Neill’s Desire Under the Elms, 
Sherwood Anderson’s Dark Laughter and several other modern classics, it was not only a best-
seller in its day but also, as Hefner explains, “lived more lives than had perhaps any other text in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23Reading Loos’s work as indirect feminist rhetoric challenges traditional feminist historiography of the teens and 
twenties that tends to filter socially progressive women into two general categories: the flapper and the suffragette.  
Female outliers (like Loos) indicate that this traditional historiographical vision lacks subtlety and indicates a need 
for an emphasis on the rhetorical elements of this work: motive, exigence, and technique.     
24 Voltaire’s work had a huge impact on Loos’s development, and readers may hear echoes of Cunegonde’s 
structured butchery in Loos’s treatment of Fairbanks, H.L. Mencken, and eventually her husband John Emerson.  
Though unlike Cunegonde, Loos’s butchery is metaphorical and structural, working to cut from the men the 
invisible sex power they seem to take so boldly for granted.   
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American popular culture.  Of twentieth-century texts, only L. Frank Baum’s The Wizard of Oz 
(1900) could claim presence in as many forms of media to that point” (107).25   
 Loos, like Voltaire, specialized in indirection and maintained consistently in her writing a 
dual desire, one erotic and one critical: she wished to bring pleasure to her audiences, laughter, 
but she did so by slowly eviscerating presumptions about male intellectual, physical, and sexual 
supremacy.  While her attempts at laughter are direct, her attempts at critique under that eros are 
quite the opposite.  By way of establishing a working definition of indirection, anthropologists 
Joy Hendry and C.W. Watson explain it as “the communication of thoughts not directly, 
straightforwardly, or unambiguously, but in a manner which to some degree or another 
deliberately obscures, hides or ‘wraps’ the message” (2).26  This type of “obscuring … can and 
often does occur in texts and in narrative discourse through, for example, metaphor, symbolism, 
allusion and of course irony … [as well as] actions and performances, the use of conventional 
symbols” (2).  This indirection, always, for Loos, anyway, evidences not only her own critical 
orientations but also the “profound situational ironies and cultural contradictions” women like 
Loos found themselves in (Keyser 3).  In the case of Anita Loos’s writing for silent cinema in 
1916 and popular magazines in the twenties, as well as autobiographies in the sixties and 
seventies, indirect feminist rhetoric consists of moments where Loos’s radical feminist critique 
gets coded in order to allow its author to “give offence with relative impunity,” to “entertain 
through the manipulation of disguise,” and to “exclude from discourse those not familiar with the 
conventions of its usage and thereby strengthen the solidarity of those who are” (2); in short: 
indirect feminist rhetorical critique allowed Loos to insert a stringent critique of blind and/or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 It was Blondes’ success that sounded the death-knell for Loos’s already embattled marriage to John Emerson, who 
struggled greatly with his wife’s success.  
26 This notion of “wrapping” a message is the closest definition available to Loos’s technique.  She does obscure the 
message but only insofar as it is wrapped in generic, contextual, and linguistic moves that hedge on audience 
expectation.   
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domineering masculinity – in the form of her star Douglas Fairbanks, her idol H.L. Mencken, 
and her husband, John Emerson – made possible the activation of certain audiences, subgroups, 
counterpublics, within the mass audiences her writings reached.27  Certainly, along with other 
“smart writers” of her generation (some others included Edna St. Vincent Millay, Dorothy 
Parker, Lois Long, Jessie Fauset, Nella Larsen, Dawn Powell, and Mary McCarthy), Loos sought 
access to the factions of the reading public who looked for coded critique; she also constructed 
texts that would, intentionally or not, call out to radically emergent future audiences.  These were 
funny women, and as Keyser explains, their humor was double-edged: it “can appear ingratiating 
even as it interrogates” (2).28     
 As Freud explains of wit’s wide potential: its “object of attack” may “equally be 
institutions, persons, in so far as they may act as agents of these” or even “philosophies of life 
which enjoy so much respect that they can be challenged in no other way than under the guise of 
a witticism” (160); it is, as it were, a historically specific, gendered, avenue of critique that not 
only reached popular audiences with force and humor, but through a coy cynicism, it also reveals 
the fragile structures at play under the knife’s edge of social privilege.     
 From her numerous magazine interviews in the teens and twenties, her interest in fashion, 
and her witty banter, it doesn’t take much effort to understand Loos as a modern woman, one 
who dressed like a flapper, who presented the face of someone much more interested in society 
than, say, sociology.  Though I argue that one thing Loos does is to make herself, or her critical 
stance as a writer anyway, invisible, she was very much seen – wealthy, liberated-but-not-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Michael Warner’s Public and Counterpublics (2005) for an in-depth discussion of this strategy.  
28 Kenneth Burke’s assertion in Permanence and Change that style is ingratiation underlies this analysis. 
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political as a modern woman.29  Recent work by Liz Conor on women and modernity has 
focused on the modern woman as an entity of appearance.  Despite her media-friendliness and 
courtship of the spotlight (Loos much preferred a spread in Vanity Fair or a write-up on Page Six 
than a placard), Loos was first a writer – more notable for manipulating the public’s gaze than 
being subject to it.  Liz Conor argues that the modern woman’s subjectivity was constructed by 
her very awareness of being seen, her ability “to appear,” a theme about which Loos was 
ambivalent, often noting the importance of appearance and its captivating potential.  Throughout 
her life, Loos maintained a weight of just under 100 pounds, clothes by the best designers (often 
Mainbacher), and a penchant for controlling her appearance.  In a May 11, 1965 letter to 
photographer Alix Jeffry, she writes, “Thanks for sending the blow-ups of the pictures, but now 
that I see them full size, I realize that I have reached the age when I should never have any more 
pictures taken.”  Loos continues, “In fact, I was so appalled by my appearance, that I hardly slept 
all night, and have now decided to spend the remainder of my life keeping out of the public eye.  
Thanks just the same,” she extends, “for your valiant efforts.”  Loos knew as well as any modern 
woman of the immense pressure “to appear,” and sought throughout her career to put it to use.  
Her indirect feminist rhetoric, though, at least in all but her autobiographical writing, focused 
less on herself and more on manipulating the appearances of others.  
 Loos’s penchant for being seen – and controlling how people saw her – began early.  
Before she was a writer for silent Hollywood, Loos was a stage performer, often even as a young 
girl, to bring in income for her family.  Appearing as little Lord Fauntleroy and playing in (what 
she claimed was) the first American performance of A Doll’s House.  Performance was also a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This artificial public persona caused film historian Cari Beauchamp to explain, “[t]he more  I learned about her 
personal life, the more frustrated I became with her for presenting to the world this picture of a passive fun lover just 
along for the ride” (5).   
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way for her to capture the attention of her rambunctious father, R. Beers Loos.  Cari Beauchamp 
explains, 
  She idolized her father and adored tagging along with him and his plethora of  
  friends to the saloons of the Barbary Coast, where lunch was free when you  
  bought beer for a nickel.  R. Beers Loos put his daughters on the stage at an early  
  age to help pay the rent, and Anita’s being the center of attention obviously  
  pleased her father.  Anita translated the applause she received into assurance that  
  she was special and different from other children.  At a very early age she found  
  her forte – she had a talent to amuse. … She continued to worship her father in  
  spite of or because of the fact that he was a scalawag, and all her life she would  
  find herself attracted to scoundrels.  She longed to grow up to be just like her  
  father. (Rediscovered 9, 10) 
R. Beers Loos was an extremely self-indulgent man, his very insolence leaving a kind of halo 
around him in the eyes of his young daughter (Carey16-20).  Soon, though, her father’s paper, 
The Dramatic Event, 
  went under because of poor supervision, and R. Beers took to managing stock  
  companies and, as a last resort, a carnival.  He didn’t bring home much money,  
  and often Anita was the family’s main means of support.  Out of necessity, she  
  continued to act in a touring company playing one-night stands throughout  
  northern California.  Each time she returned home, home was a different   
  apartment, each grubbier than the last. (Carey 16)    
Nonetheless, Anita kept acting until her graduation from high school freed her up for other 
things, particularly writing.  She said of herself, “I was always standing on the sidelines, making 
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impudent comments. . . .  I was destined to be an outsider, too much the observer to ever be 
deeply involved in anything but my work” (Carey 20).  This early Anita, whose deep connection 
with her larcenous father and his own outsider ways works toward our current understanding of 
Loos the rhetor – eliciting audience awareness, again from offstage, eliding her motives the 
whole time.   
 Admittedly, writing this kind of rhetorical history is, as Janet Steiger explains, 
“contingent, subjective, evaluative, and judgmental” not to mention driven by a third-wave 
performance feminist impulse to read female rhetorical subjects  through the very lens of 
performance rather than assumed ontological reality (xiii).  Steiger’s method of rhetorical 
listening is similar to Glenn’s call to listen for the “production of silence as a rhetoric,” as 
Loos’s purposive elision draws attention away from her and away from the critique she’s 
making, as though her critique functions in a kind of rhetorically silent space (Silence xi).  
Loos’s rhetorical indirection is, like Glenn explains of many women, part of a silent past of 
“gestures, conversations, and original manuscripts,” as well as motives, intentions, and an 
indirect rhetor’s visions of the promise of their critique (Silence 1).  Silence, or in my case, 
spaces of rhetorical elision or misdirection may very well be, as Glenn writes, “the most 
undervalued and under-studied traditionally feminine site and concomitant rhetorical art” (2).  
And Loos’s silences weren’t full silences in the sense of, for instance, Spivak’s subaltern woman 
– Loos’s silences were purposive.   
 Loos works both through performative silences and performative language, and a 
perennial complication in studying her type of rhetorical indirection comes in the abrupt 
interpretive leap the researcher must take to venture beyond the realm of propositional truth and 
into the world of performative indirection, rhetoric that “make so obvious the performative 
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nature of both gender and sexual identity that it may be read as highlighting the performative 
nature of being in general” (Brummett 26).  But performative rhetoric can be explicit or implicit, 
and the two differ significantly.  In How to Do Things with Words, J.L. Austen explains the 
difference.  The former “begin with or include some highly significant and unambiguous 
expressions such as ‘I bet’, ‘I promise’, ‘I bequeath’ – an expression very commonly also used in 
naming the act” (32), while implicit performative utterances hide their very performative gesture 
whereby “there may be nothing in the circumstances by which we can decide whether or not the 
utterance is performative at all,” when read as simple analytic statement (33).  This type of 
implicit performative has often been relegated to the trash bin of misunderstandings and 
incomplete locutions, but implicit performatives also create a space for radical (because 
unanticipated) critique, a kind of space where consciousness-raising as a feminist method is 
portentous.  Unlike propositionally oriented rhetorical approaches, it does not ask its audience 
for a response, for the explicit performative: “I am feminist; I swear.”  This use of implicit 
consciousness-raising is a character of indirect feminist rhetoric insofar as it does “not ‘describe’ 
or ‘report’” anything; it is not, indeed cannot be “‘true or false’ [and the] uttering of the sentence 
is, or is part of, the doing of an action” (Austin 5).   
 My work also employs performative language to articulate and demonstrate those 
moments in the history of feminist rhetoric where radical feminist critique lived and even 
prospered under the auspices of some other, diverting, external medium (in this case, film).  The 
call to this level of messy complexity is one that feminist researchers encourage, emphasizing the 
role of the scholar in the fuzzy acts of reconstitution of a rhetorical situation.  Glenn argues, 
  Those of us employing feminism in the history of rhetoric share the same deep  
  sense of common purpose: we are working with various openings that provide  
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  opportunities to recover, claim, and articulate women’s and men’s contributions  
  to and participation in the ever-expanding histories of rhetoric. … [W]ith each of  
  our rewritings, we are reseeding and unsettling rhetorical histories – at the same  
  time that we (re)compose and reconstitute our scholarly focus, or professions, our  
  selves. (Retold 174)  
In the case of Loos’s writing for Fairbanks, her rhetorical life was not lost by its elision from the 
public sphere but by its very integration into the public sphere, which, in 1916 anyway, assumed 
a kind of gendered rhetorical propriety: if it was public, it had to be propositional.  Even Dorothy 
Parker’s quasi-feminist jokes often took the form of propositions, even her poetry in Enough 
Rope (1926), published the year after Blondes by Boni and Liveright.  Anita Loos’s counter-
propositional feminist rhetoric doubtlessly reached film audiences in the teens and twenties, but 
in most cases, it was lost in the laughs.  Loos wanted it that way.       
 Indirect feminist rhetoric is problematic from a historian’s point of view because its 
technologies work against traditional notions of rhetoric and feminism – both of which have 
historically functioned out in the open, with the reciprocal trading of propositions.  Feminist 
indirect rhetoric, in almost every case, avoids this and aims to raise the consciousness of an 
audience, to sensitize its members without evoking reflexive awareness of the persuasive or 
identificational process, that is, without evoking a counter-proposition.  In the best cases, indirect 
consciousness-raising results in the audience members’ sense that the new awareness was self-
generated.  It is a techne all its own – its presence in the feminist rhetorical canon just barely 
beginning to be fleshed out.  Among its numbers are those feminists who eschew claims to 
identity categories and political agendas (such as “feminist”); they are feminists embedded in 
other lines of work, feminists who seek other types of audiences than those prepared for 
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politicization.  They are the feminists whose work under and around the public transcript resisted 
historicization until the lens of third-wave performance feminism allowed scholars to silhouette 
their movements and techniques by downplaying identity and emphasizing motive and 
performance in written rhetoric.     
Titling Films and Creating the Fairbanks-Man 
 In her earliest work for silent film – as a writer for D.W. Griffith, Loos emerged as an 
important force in early Hollywood behind the rather conventional “woman’s film” (films 
featuring female protagonists and related to women’s experience that were not feminist films – 
succumbing to traditional/conventional definitions of male/female relationships).  Her work in 
these films had few of the radical rhetorical elements that would emerge in Loos’s writing for 
Douglas Fairbanks in 1916’s His Picture in the Papers.  But, importantly, Loos’s radicalism was 
secreted, not injected into the public sphere, making her methods as importantly radical as her 
messages in certain, contextually bound instances.  As Loos, an avid reader of philosophy, knew 
from Kantian deontology, subversion had to be an extraordinary maneuver, not a regular one – 
just as lying is presumption that most of us tell the truth.     
 What follows traces Loos’s particular use of rhetorical indirection in Papers and its 
embedding in the cinematic spectacle, a location that creates a particularly thick generic frame 
(Frow 2005) in and through which indirect feminist critique can function unassumingly and 
effectively.  In addition, this chapter historicizes a moment in the development of Loos’s indirect 
art, demonstrating the Fairbanks period as a transitional moment between her more conventional 
work in the woman’s films and her most famous and most radical piece, 1925’s Gentlemen 
Prefer Blondes (as well as her transition from filmic to literary spectacular contexts).  Loos’s 
indirect rhetoric parodies Fairbanks’s masculine power (and his representative status as an icon 
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of American masculinity) and co-opts parts of the star’s audience that are sensitized to gender 
critique without disturbing the more conventional audience expectations.    
 Particularly important to this study is Loos’s work for Douglas Fairbanks, a period in the 
middle teens in which Loos created (or helped create) the Fairbanks-man, a physically agile but 
mentally unaware man-child, whose very lack of the capacity for irony made him the perfect 
canvas for Loos’s critique of male blindness in what Beauchamp calls “the sizzle … in witty title 
cards” (Rediscovered 41).  In a way – for a limited moment in 1916 – Loos’s writing for 
Fairbanks, one of the world’s biggest stars in the teens, makes her a kind of fitful rhetorical 
architect of American masculinity, one who, as it turns out, had a keen eye for gendered social 
critique.  Loos often joked publicly (though slyly) about her work for Fairbanks, saying that her 
“stories for Fairbanks were hardly written at all – rather she simply had to come up with things 
for the actor to jump over or leap from because his acting was less important than his athletic 
ability” (Beauchamp Rediscovered  41).30   
 Loos’s work with Fairbanks, especially in her earliest work for him (His Picture in the 
Papers) demonstrated her radical approach.  She had nothing to lose.  She was a reliable and 
well-paid contracted writer for Triangle, working under Griffith, and he was preoccupied with 
Intolerance (1916).  Loos’s first endeavor with Fairbanks was a spoof – on the actor (who was 
soon to be let go, as he had failed to impress Griffith), on the medium, on the notion of American 
masculinity.  That Fairbanks was able to massage Loos’s product into a career is a testament to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Fairbanks, reflecting on his work in the teens in a 1922 article for the Ladies Home Journal, disagrees, with a 
caveat.  Perhaps, he commits, “I lost sight of the purpose of these stunts and may have overdone the effect” 
(Fairbanks 13).  He continues, weaving his own alibi: “Never were these things intended  for an exhibition of 
physical process or as feats attractive in themselves.  Just as a smile reflects good nature from within, these things 
reflect the indomitable spirit of youth” (13).  That Fairbanks was 39 when he made this claim demonstrates his own 
proclivity to align himself and to an extent hide behind the burgeoning culture of youthful masculinity that so 
fervently supported his career.  Gaylyn Studlar explains, for instance, that in a 1917 interview, James Smith 
described “Doug” as “athletically rugged and distinctly masculine. When he talks you get the impression of a boy 
who hasn’t grown up” (Studlar 21).  While Loos’s Fairbanks-man was a witless boob, Fairbanks’s own self-concept 
was distinctly different, particularly as his career changed trajectory in the 1920s.   
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his own spectacular nature.31  The studio wanted Fairbanks to succeed, but since he worked for 
Griffith and not Mack Sennett (also at Triangle), his athletic talents went largely unnoticed.  
Loos worshipped Griffith, who gave her her start, and, to catch his eye, intended to make great 
fun of him while showcasing her own skills, even if that meant significantly changing the 
medium.  As Laura Frost argues in “Blondes Have More Fun: Anita Loos and the Language of 
Silent Cinema,” 
  Film historians have presented the main story of early cinema as the controversy  
  about the coming of sound, but there was also a passionate debate about titling,  
  and Loos was an important part of this.  Challenging the separation of literature  
  and cinema as high and low culture, Loos develops a mode of writing in which  
  literature and cinema together unmoor the conventional relationship of the image  
  to the word. (293) 
Frost understands Loos’s titling style as a radical shift in the production of titles; she calls it the 
cross-pollination of the literary and the cinematic.  Frost’s assertion is undoubtedly true, but 
Loos’s contributions go far beyond mixing and matching modernist high culture with lowbrow 
humor; Loos’s wordy titles in Papers evoked a powerful-though-subtle critique of male sex-
power, a critique in the form of indirect feminist rhetoric that at once elided Loos’s critical 
motives and co-opted Fairbanks’s audience.  Though Loos has been much heralded of late for 
her work in Gentlemen Prefer Blondes (Frost 2010, Hefner 2010, Keyser 2010, Barrett-Fox 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Fairbanks remembers his beginnings very differently in his 1922 article “Let Me Say This for the Films” in the 
Ladies Home Journal.  In this case, as in others, Fairbanks elides his early work with Loos altogether.  He explains, 
“the night I saw The Birth of a Nation I knew that I wanted to be in the pictures.  I had much the same sort of 
vibration or thrill that I had when I saw the Grand Cañon, nor that it impressed me so mightily, but both left me 
wordless.  Accordingly, when D.W. Griffith offered me a ten weeks’ contract I was quite willing to leave the stage 
for a while” (13).  Fairbanks not only fails to mention the importance of Loos’s ironic titles, but he also fails to 
mention the fact that Griffith planned on firing the actor.     
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2012), very little time or attention has been focused on analysis of her earliest films.  Hefner 
explains, 
  For Loos and her “school,” subtitles become modernist spaces where text can  
  intentionally create conflicts of meaning with the images they accompany, and the 
  artistry they represent is a function of the subversive power of language.  These  
  spaces isolate language as an object of aesthetic interest, straining its purely  
  mimetic function while acknowledging its inability to capture every aspect of  
  human experience. … [T]hese titles undercut any sense of wholeness or   
  completeness, highlighting the jagged edges of the narrative. (110) 
Her self-effacing rhetorical technique and effusive manner, characteristics that allowed Loos to 
be a master-critic at the same time she wrote films that audiences loved, have lain rather dormant 
in the critical literature.  Hefner’s assertion that Loos’s techniques of indirection were modernist 
misses almost completely her vast set of literary and philosophical influences (whom she read 
and reread), from Voltaire to Schopenhauer, who had tackled the topic if indirect critique 
centuries before.  In his Art of Controversy, Schopenhauer argues, 
  The simple Philistine believes that life is something infinite and unconditioned,  
  and tries to look upon it and live it as through it left nothing to be desired.  By  
  method and principle the learned Philistine does the same: he believes that his  
  methods and his principles are unconditionally perfect and objectively valid; so  
  that as soon as he has found them, he has nothing to do but to apply them to  
  circumstances, and then approve or condemn.  But happiness and truth are not to  
  be seized in this fashion.  It is phantoms of them along that are sent to us here, to  
  stir us into motion. (76)  
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Schopenhauer, often viewed as an arch-pessimist, was an author to whom Loos returned often.   
His critique appealed to Loos, both philosophically and stylistically.  In his chapter in 
Controversy on aphorisms, he goes on to elaborate a theme Loos takes up again and again. 
  What makes us almost inevitably ridiculous is our serious way of treating the  
  passing moment, as though it necessarily had all the importance which it seems to 
  have.  It is only a few great minds that are above this weakness, and, instead of  
  being laughed at, have come to laugh themselves. (78)  
In Folk Women and Indirection in Morrison, Ni Dhuibhne, Huston, and Savin, Jacqueline 
Fulmer makes much the same point, though in a more contemporary way and a slightly different 
context.  She explains, 
  The operation of humor in folk speech, in rhetorical figures, depends on reader  
  recognition as much as strategies of indirection do.  Whether readers figure out  
  the allusion tied to an indirect point, or whether they comprehend the punch line  
  of a joke, laughter may come in either case from the pleasure and shock of  
  recognition.  Sometimes the punch line and the indirect point become one and the  
  same. (31) 
Even scholars as astute as Hefner have miscategorized Loos’s motive in her pursuit of changing 
the nature of film titles, her desire for exactly the convergence of the methods of indirection and 
the punch line itself.  In addition to the genre-coding titles provided her, Loos, “the rhetor[,] at 
no time directly contradicts the hegemonic assumption under scrutiny [in this case, that 
Fairbanks is a great-American man], hence the strategy is indirect” (Fulmer 28).  In 1916, titles 
were simply not respectable literary writing, thus could never carry in them the sophisticated 
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methods and critique that Loos offered.  Initially, even the most sophisticated critics missed their 
radical potential.     
 As early at 1916, Münsterberg wrote, in what was the first and only theorization of silent 
films of that period, that “intertitles should be regarded as ‘extraneous to the original character of 
the photoplay;’ they are ‘accessory, while the primary power must lie in the content of the 
pictures themselves’” (Frost 295).  Münsterberg, who had been brought to Harvard in the early 
1890s to lead the psychological laboratory William James was then setting up in the style of 
Wundt (Münsterberg’s mentor), downplays the importance of titles but accurately assesses the 
function of cinematic spectacle to activate audiences; he notices that cinematic spectacle is a 
process of stimulating audience imagination as a response to what is seen (and I would argue 
what is read, as well) on the screen.  According to Richard Griffith’s introduction to 
Münsterberg’s work, “[t]he model of the film experience which it shows us stresses imaginative 
participation far above visual perception.  The whole is greater than and different from the sum 
of its parts because we make it so” (xiii).  Though he never uses this language, Münsterberg’s 
emphasis on the activation of audience demonstrates the rhetorical elements of the filmic 
spectacle, its dialogical interplay with audience members consciousnesses, levels of awareness, 
and potential future action.     
 In Anita Loos’s early work for Douglas Fairbanks, for instance, work that overlaps 
Münsterberg’s book, her methods of indirect rhetorical critique are noteworthy for not only her 
deft touch at pleasing audiences with humor but also for a hard-to-detect undercurrent of social 
critique, ranging from class-based satire to more cutting appropriations of American masculinity.     
  Speaking of her earliest scenarios, Loos writes 
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  The plots I wrote in the beginning were pretty contrived, but as my experience  
  with life broadened I began to dredge real situations and real people from it.   
  Inspired by memories of my Detroit beau, I wrote a picture for Douglas   
  Fairbanks called American Aristocracy, which was a satire on the big names of  
  United States industry such as the Fords, the Heinzes, so important to the world of 
  pickles, and the Chalmerses, who were touchingly proud of the underwear they  
  manufactured.  Eventually every experience became grist to my movie mill; I  
  dished up Pop’s cronies and my brother’s increasingly important friends, and even 
  began to make fun of the rich who had so overawed me on first acquaintance.  
  (Girl 74)  
Rhetorical indirection was, for Loos, a targeted strategy, and not all her work enlisted its 
techniques.  In order to discern it, to sense its presence, one must pay attention to history, 
technologies of spectacle, and, perhaps most important, the author’s motive.  Once those three 
elements are brought together, Anita Loos’s techniques of indirection-via-cinematic spectacle 
begin to take shape.  Rhetoric itself, as Amy Koerber reminds us, is a “technology” (25), a tool 
that helps its users (speakers and writers) accomplish the task of constructing meaning,” 
invoking audiences, and raising consciousness (59).   She continues, 
  feminist scholars should ask questions that attempt to account for the complex  
  relationships that exist between technology and conceptions of gender in society.   
  Such questions should attempt to determine what we can learn about the political  
  effects and consequences of technology. (Koerber 66) 
What follows is an attempt to reconstruct, provisionally, feminist rhetorical machinery in the 
medium of American cinema at the very dawn of the Hollywood star system, a time when 
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celebrity was emergent and malleable, a time when American culture “was being transformed”  
and conditioned by “standardization, mass production, and by the very thrust of cultural 
uniformity” (Sklar 2).  Fairbanks was the prototypical action star, cold-blooded, unsympathetic, 
one that Vachel Lindsay describes in his 1915 book The Art of the Moving Picture,  as “a variety 
of amiable or violent ghost” (42).    
 These evolving cinematic technologies are crucial to Loos’s creation and use of cinematic 
spectacle, a construction she alludes to in her 1919 short story “The Moving Pictures of 
Blinkville,” a commentary on the magical effects of cinema on audiences in those early days.32  
In “Blinkville,” Curley, an unemployed young man who had been sleeping in a small town’s 
picture palace for want of a room of his own decides to do the theater’s owner a favor by way of 
creating community interest in films and filling the theater’s seats.  Curley explains, “We’re 
going to do some special advertizin’ for this here joint that will put that other honkey tonk outa 
business” (Loos, Rediscovered 107).  His plan, based upon the average person’s lack of 
knowledge in the filmmaking process, involves taking the theater’s projector outside one day and 
pretending that he is filming something on the town’s streets.  “I’ll stand there an’ turn the little 
old crank, [and] all the boobs [will] think we’re takin’ moving pictures and the house’ll be 
jammed, just from the talk that’ll get around” (107).  Summing up his audience, Curley 
announces to his makeshift partner in crime, Frank, that “compared to the rube in this town an 
idiot would be a college professor, so we’re perfectly safe.  You haul ’er down” (107). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For Loos, cinema had a particularly powerful spectacular effect: the effect to confuse and ultimately reverse 
traditional power structures, structures that existed both on screen and between the writer, the actors, and the 
audience.  These manipulations of spectacle take years to perfect, according to a 1918 article by Loos and Emerson 
in the June edition of Photoplay Magazine.  She explains: “It is always hard for the outsider in any art to realize the 
importance of technical knowledge and the necessity of form.  Now art is of necessity a thing of form.  Form is its 
first essential.  There is a skeleton under every great work of art; a skeleton of perfect proportions” (78).  Most 
importantly, though, for Loos, “the height of art is to so cover it that it is not apparent to the casual observer” (78).  
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 Loos’s meditation on the power of cinematic spectacle comes in the form of the ease of 
access one has to audiences through even the implication of film.  She continues,  
  Curley ducked under his black flannel and grabbed the crank.  By this time about  
  ten people had stopped to watch the proceedings.  As the little girls came into the  
  bogus camera’s imaginary focus, Curley slowly turned the crank.  The girls  
  stopped, made as if to turn back, giggled and finally walked kittenishly past the  
  “camera.” … The crowd grew and became more and more mysterious and  
  formidable.  Finally a policeman attracted by the mob showed up in the distance.  
  (108-109) 
Having wooed the crowd, Curley begins to field requests that he show the film he’s just “shot” 
on the town’s streets, and still hoping to fill the theater’s seats as a gesture to the owner, he 
agrees, though he hasn’t recorded a single frame with the projector.  The first step in cinematic 
spectacle comes in the magnetism the new medium emits, its very ability to gather a crowd, to 
create expectation, to consolidate audiences.33   
  After the matinee, he and Frank went over the film of a parade of the Hudson- 
  Fulton celebration which was booked for the next week.  The picture was almost  
  hopelessly metropolitan, but by long and labored work at scratching and clouding  
  the film the effect was produced that the most keen eyed observer would fail to  
  understand.  The scene projected on the curtain was not a picture – it was a series  
  of blurs and blotches, with here and there a human form indicated amid the  
  surging storm of scratches.  Williams, on the theory that he might as well be dead  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 I imagine this could be said about any new technologies.  One thinks of the iPad.  So the very newness and 
mystery of a technology creates the first layer of spectacle. 
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  as the way he was, finally decided to … run the film as “Scenes from Blinkville.”  
  (110) 
Curley shows the film, which is notably impossible to make out, to an audience that is 
inexplicably in the throes of cinematic bliss.  Williams, the theater’s owner and the target of 
Curley’s misguided philanthropic gesture, was terrified.  “When the fateful film at last arrived on 
the program he was too unnerved even to glance in the door at what was sure to be his ruin,” so 
he tried to slip out the back door, where a mysterious stranger stopped him: 
  “Say,” said the stranger, “do you own this house?” 
  “Yes,” Williams managed to gasp weakly. 
  “Well,” said the stranger, “I’ve been looking the place over for a couple of days  
  and seeing your packed houses.  How much would you sell for?” 
  “What?” 
  “I’ll give you four thousand for it just as it stands.” (111) 
Called back into the theater to make a speech to the ebullient crowd, Williams is taken aside by 
the town’s mayor. 
  “Mr. Williams,” he said.  “I – in fact we all – want to thank you.  Your   
  photographic efforts – ahem – were perhaps a little clouded and indistinct, but it  
  give you – ah – all the more honor for undertaking the – er – enterprise of having  
  the pictures made under the great difficulties of light and development which your 
  esteemed photographer has just explained to me.”  He nodded to Curley and  
  Curley nodded back with a smile. 
  Williams bowed idiotically. 
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  “And,” the mayor lowered his voice, “I have just made arrangements to purchase  
  the film for $500 after you are through with it.  I shall send it back for exhibition  
  in my hometown in Ohio.” (111) 
Loos’s meditation in “Blinkville” is less on the Curley’s cleverness or the vapidity of the town’s 
audience.  Rather, it is a meditation on the content-neutral force with which this newly emergent 
spectacular technology could fascinate, obscure, and ultimately enact substantive reversals of 
power.  That this story is written in 1919, two years after the star sent her packing, implies a kind 
of dig at Fairbanks’ spectacular status, stature, and popularity.    
 During Fairbanks’s heyday, America found itself at the apex of a crisis of masculinity, as 
the country transitioned to an urban nation and the nature of men’s work changed radically, from 
field-work to white or blue collar labor.  Men and women, for the first time, held the same jobs, 
and men were in need of a star that could salvage their collective masculine identity.  As Gaylyn 
Studlar explains, “In concert with the obvious kinetic appeal of Fairbanks’s films, the star’s 
popularity was crucially dependent upon his textual alignment with this culturally pervasive 
discourse focused on reform and the future of American masculinity” (24).  Studlar continues 
that “Fairbanks films of the 1910s almost all had at their core an imminently recognizable and 
important lesson to contemporary audiences: a lesson in the attainment of manhood in modern 
American society,” Papers is an important exception (25).  If Loos was indeed providing 
“lessons” about masculinity, Loos scripted them carefully, paying particular attention to her own 
effacement, allowing her own “subordination … a credible performance of humility and 
deference” and constructing for Fairbanks “a credible performance of haughtiness and mastery” 
(Scott 10).    Before Loos was scripting the banal attainment of manhood, though, she was 
critiquing it.  Further, though she would tailor her brand of gender-parody to fit Fairbanks’s 
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rising star and Rooseveltean image as his popularity (and her paychecks) increased, this first 
film’s rhetorical situation offered her different critical potential; Fairbanks’ contract was about to 
expire, and Loos knew that Griffith detested the actor’s lack of talent, so she could monkey with 
him.  In addition, America was changing.  The 1920 census would show it, for the first time, as 
an urban nation, a momentous transition from agrarian pre-Civil War days (Studlar 13).     
 In the earliest days of American cinematic production, the medium lacked the cultural 
cache of Broadway, or even of dog shows and horse racing (Studlar 10).  In the early teens, 
Harry Aitken of the newly merged Triangle Company, began following the lead of Adolph 
Zukor by bringing Broadway talent to Hollywood in order to garner attention and respect.  One 
of the people Aitken brought in was a mildly famous Broadway comedian named Douglas 
Fairbanks.  While Fairbanks had enjoyed moderate success in New York, the need to increase 
cinema’s public stature and pedigree was such that Aitken brought the not-so-young New Yorker 
out to California for $2000 a week, a hefty paycheck for an actor that Aitken and his 
collaborator, David Wark Griffith, would soon find out had some interesting limitations.  
Griffith, to whom Fairbanks was assigned, did not like Fairbanks’s style, having famously told 
director John Emerson, another Broadway transplant, “‘Don’t waste your time on him, Emerson, 
because he can’t act’” (Schickel 42).   
 With Griffith busy on his epic Intolerance (1916), his answer to public criticism garnered 
from the palpable racism of Birth of a Nation (1915), Emerson undertook making a picture with 
Fairbanks, whose option at Triangle was about to expire – his face was failing.  Fairbanks had to 
defy the close-up, a shot pioneered by Griffith; he had to move.  Emerson set his sights on a 
scenario called His Picture in the Papers by Anita Loos, a staff writer who happened to be a tiny, 
witty, radiant brunette, fourteen years his junior.  Emerson encouraged Loos, who was always 
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game for a challenge, to write a new style of intertitles, filling in plot and jokes where the wispy-
though-kinetically-functional character Fairbanks assembled, fails to.  Loos, immediately smitten 
by Emerson’s aloofness and reputation for womanizing (and aware that Griffith, so busy proving 
to the world that he was not a racist, would not pay any attention to their little experiment), 
undertook a joke-turned-revolution: she wrote the story – prolix, witty, ironic, everything the 
Fairbanks-man was not.  She wrote around him.  The product boiled with potential. 
 When the film was finished, Loos had impressed Emerson, for whom by this point she 
had developed a strange kind of longing, only exacerbated by his New York attitude and 
Broadway pedigree.   
 The film did not impress Griffith.  Griffith trashed the project, alluding to the fact that 
people did not come to the movies to read – he saw no future for Fairbanks or for the wordy titles 
that Loos had written and remained wary that most of Loos’s humor lay trapped in the text, 
unable to be translated into moving images.  According to Hollywood lore, after Griffith shelves 
the film, it accidentally gets sent to New York anyway and winds up a handy substitute for 
another film lost in transport.  In her autobiography, Kiss Hollywood Good-by, Loos recalls, 
  It wasn’t easy to get D.W.’s okay to film my story, but he finally agreed and at the 
  same time warned Emerson to finish the picture before Doug’s option came due,  
  because the studio was going to let him go.  Following Emerson’s instructions, I  
  wrote my plot in full detail, and included a lot of subtitles. …Not until our movie  
  was cut and titled were we able to snare Griffith into a projection room to see  
  what we’d done.  D.W. viewed those subtitles with grudging attention, and at the  
  end, he made one shattering comment.  “Your idea doesn’t work, Mr. Emerson.   
  We’ll have to shelve the picture. (6-7)      
139 
	  
Loos continues, carefully rendering herself the storyteller, the seer and not the object seen, 
characteristically keeping herself out of the picture, recalling the “accidental” New York 
premiere. 
  His Picture in the Papers started to unroll, beginning with a long subtitle, which  
  was a highly unusual procedure.  Movie titles up to that time had been strictly  
  informative and very brief: “The Next Day,” “That Same Evening,” or at their  
  most literate, “Came the Dawn.”  Roxy [the theater manager] was both surprised  
  and relieved when the opening title brought forth a heavy laugh.  Then, as one  
  subtitle after another flashed on the screen, the laughter mounted until the   
  audience was roaring with gusty approval.  And Roxy, standing at the back of the  
  house, realized he was present at a startling innovation.  It is difficult to imagine  
  the impact those written words had on the early-day audience.  And next morning  
  the movie critic of The New York Times said, in essence, “satire has invaded the  
  screen; the movies are growing out of their infancy.” (8) 
Anita Loos’s spectacular potential was unveiled.  Reflecting in a July 1918 article in Photoplay 
Magazine, Loos recalls a time when the ideal film needed no titles.  But, the “pursuit of this 
ideal,” she explains, “soon reduced the motion picture to mere pantomime, and greatly narrowed 
the range of subjects with which the motion picture could deal” (Loos and Emerson 88).  “[A]s 
much care should be taken in writing the titles,” she offers, “as in producing the picture itself” 
(Loos and Emerson 89).   
 Loos, both in her earliest work for Fairbanks and in her later autobiographical renderings 
of it, was a master at indirection.  For instance, no historians of film have questioned her retelling 
that Papers was accidentally shipped to New York, and no one has otherwise explained how it is 
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that Loos happened to be in the theater that night in New York (though, perhaps she received a 
note from Roxy), the culmination of a week-long train ride from California.  This small 
ambiguity is indicative of Loos’s style: she is a master at eliding her own rhetorical exigence.  It 
is, autobiographically, a much more powerful story if her film is shelved and “accidentally” 
winds up on the New York screen, providing a crucial element of what Ann Douglas refers to as 
the “opportunities for democratization and pluralism that culminated in the early modern era in 
the development of the media” and its subsequent grasp on “the American psyche” (3).  Loos, in 
her retelling, wants to grasp the American psyche without appearing to.  
 Absolutely no language in her otherwise perspicuous autobiographical retelling in Good-
by goes to Fairbanks’s performance in the film.  Loos, without ever saying it, makes clear to her 
readers who the real heavyweight is in these early days with Fairbanks.  She explains half-
facetiously, “working with Doug continued to seem like child’s play, and, at the same time, it 
was making us rich” (9).  That sentiment is repeated and sometimes amplified as Loos developed 
a taste for aiming rhetoric (rhetoric that denies the potential for a response, counter-propositional 
rhetoric) at powerful men; her rhetoric is defined by its formal elements.  To be more specific, in 
the case of the retelling of her creation of the Fairbanks-man, Loos employs what Tom Huckin 
calls implicational and presuppositional silences, which demonstrate, in both cases, an activation 
of audience (consciousness-raising) as well as an elision of exigence.  Implicational and 
presuppositional silences, for Huckin, are “collaborative silences, because they induce the reader 
to provide the appropriate information desired by the writer” (4).  Huckin further divides these 
kinds of silences into their “benign” and “manipulative” functions, language I do not care for.  
Rather than benign and manipulative, these silences could be read as intentional and 
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unintentional, in terms of exigence.  What Huckin calls manipulative silences are those that are 
implicitly rhetorical, those that are used to get something done.  
 Joseph Janangelo articulates the need for studies such as this one, studies of celebrity 
rhetoric.  Rhetorical analysis of celebrities entails the continued interrogation of the relation 
between what is said and what is meant, what is honesty and what is showmanship.  Janangelo 
explains, 
  The idea that fans expect honesty from celebrities finds purchase in star studies.   
  Samantha Barbas writes that “the history of film fandom between 1910 and 1950  
  is a story of passion, admiration, and intense curiosity” (185).  The public surely  
  valued talent and beauty, yet “none of these [things] could compare with the  
  highest compliment that a fan could give a star –that of being sincere” (115).   
  Barbas writes that the search for “reality and authenticity” (162) fueled fans’  
  literate activities: “[B]y reading about their idol’s offscreen experiences, fans  
  reassured themselves that there was a human behind the image.  Underneath the  
  makeup and bright lights, there was a living, breathing person who seemed as  
  honest and genuine as the worshiping fans” (125). (166) 
Without a doubt by 1916 the star system in Hollywood was incipiently available (indeed it was 
being formed), and Anita Loos’s first adaptation of the Fairbanks-man played with the culture in 
which she worked. 
 Loos both used and circumvented honesty’s emergent cultural value, where the 
expectation of honesty became quickly the tone of banal politics as well as the subtext for tell-all 
magazines and a modus operandi for the literary moderns who, as Ann Douglas explains, held up 
honesty as a cultural totem.   
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 What was Loos’s exigency, then, in that first creation of the Fairbanks-man?  On a 
personal note, Loos had every reason to lampoon Fairbanks for Griffith, whose distaste for the 
actor was palpable, and since Loos was close with Griffith and respected him much, not to 
mention craved his attention, the best medium for criticizing Fairbanks was a filmic surprise, one 
that would lighten Griffith’s load after the fallout from Birth of a Nation.  Secondly, Loos 
wanted to impress Emerson, whom she considered much more in the know than Fairbanks, and 
having caught Loos’s scent early, he encouraged it.  Lastly, though, and of much more import for 
this study, putting His Picture in the Papers represented a way for Loos to construct and 
comment upon an empty vehicle of spectacular American masculinity right on the cusp of its 
crisis moment just before the First World War, a critique whose signifying power came in 
exactly the discrepancy between the body-on-film’s vivacity and the character’s complete lack of 
self-awareness or agency.   
 Loos used Fairbanks as a masculinity-minstrel, and her rhetoric demonstrated an 
interesting attempt at (what looks suspiciously like) feminist consciousness-raising through 
implicational and presuppositional silences.  By overtly leaving out Fairbanks’s character, Loos 
collaborated with her audience on the limits of masculine potential through a meta-meditation on 
the role of men in the public sphere.34  Both onscreen and in real life, Loos knew she was putting 
His Picture in the Papers – was making Fairbanks a famous buffoon – and she reveled in the 
behind-the-scenes power that entailed.  She was doing so at a moment in American culture where 
the question of defining masculinity was particularly important, “an era marked by fears of 
national and masculine enfeeblement,” a “transitional period that led to” what Studlar calls “a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ironically, Loos’s manipulation of the absent Fairbanks-man was, for her, at least to a degree, an accurate 
rendering of the star’s own lack of self-awareness.  As she says in Photoplay Magazine’s July 1918 article, 
“Speeches should always be written in the language that the character himself would use, and a brilliant or sarcastic 
speech should never be put into the mouth of a character whose method of expression in real life would be 
commonplace” (Loos and Emerson 89).  
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veritable obsession with the attainment of masculinity” (13).  Loos’s rhetoric lingered on the 
precipice of a cultural vacuum.   
 Papers begins with a wordy and sophisticated subtitle, which is immediately juxtaposed 
with the Fairbanks-man, who seems to signify only lack,35 an abject puppet, highlighting the 
complex rhetorical distance between our ever-present but hidden writer and her protagonist.  Her 
titles were the real star of the show, as hinted in her autobiographical retelling.  Loos employed a 
new rhetorical technology.  Laura Frost, who tends to read her as tap dancing on the peripheries 
of the moderns, explains, 
  Captions and intertitles were understood as an “intrusion of the literary into what  
  should be an essentially pictorial realm.”  They were not, in the early 1910s,  
  considered an artistic form for individual authorship, but were anonymous and  
  banal placeholders.  Loos changed this. (296)    
While I question Frost’s implication that Loos saw this opportunity as a place to demonstrate her 
“art,” I do agree that Loos saw Papers as an opportunity to demonstrate her talent for humor, for 
mastery of this wild and newly emergent medium.  Loos shied away from the modernist crowd 
as much as she shied away from the feminist crowd – she did not carry a message; rather, she 
was a master of a medium – someone Marshall McLuhan might have noticed.  Loos, in many 
ways, saw herself as a provider of perspective, not its victim.  Frost goes on to argue, rightfully, 
that this film “[f]undamentally change[d] the concept of cinematic pleasure as passive vision” by 
“creating an active audience to whom” it “offered a new kind of pleasure,” what Frost calls 
“literary visual pleasure” (297).  Yes and no; Frost’s interesting analysis misses the radical 
import of Loos’s exigence, focusing only on the modalities of her titles and not their critical end.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This is, highly likely, Loos’s nod to Freud. 
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 On the other hand, Frost astutely points out the activating (activist?) capacity of Loos’s 
work in Papers. The first screen title suggests: 
  Publicity at any price has become the predominant passion of the American  
  people.  May we beg leave to introduce to you as a shining disciple of this modern 
  art of “three-sheeting’, Proteus Prindle, producer of Prindle’s 27 Vegetarian  
  Varieties [which include Gluten Globules, Macerated Morsels, Predigested  
  Prunes, Perforated Peas, Dessicated Dumplings, etc.] 
Proteus Prindle is not the star of Papers, though.  His son is.  Fairbanks plays Pete Prindle, “who 
prefers pugilism to pushing Prindle’s products,” and is introduced early as lazy, decadent, and 
completely unaware of himself or the position of privilege he is born into – the result is a 
flamboyant witlessness, one with less delicacy and charm than his pal Chaplin’s.  He proves this 
over and over.  In order to win the hand of his love interest, Peter Prindle attempts time and 
again (one gets the feeling that this algorithm could go on forever) to get his picture in the papers 
to provide publicity for his father’s company, despite the fact that he prefers steak and martinis 
over his father’s vegetarian fare.   
 Pete’s problems proliferate in a scene in which his father asks him to fill in for a sick 
employee.  “The pay-roll clerk is sick.  See if, for once in your life, you can do some work.”  
Pete agrees and then immediately vacates the premises to pursue his own mindless agenda of 
time-wasting and womanizing.  Furious with Pete’s lack of responsibility, his father offers him 
an ultimatum.  “What have you ever done for Prindle’s Products?  Look at how your sisters are 
boosting them!” (He shows Pete his sisters’ picture in the Vegetarian Gazette).  “Huh!” Pete 
replies, “The Vegetarian Gazette?  Why if I wanted to cut loose, I could get my picture into 
every regular paper in New-York!”  “Well,” his father goads, … Go and do it.  And don’t come 
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near me till you’ve made good.”  Pete calls his love interest and explains, “It’s easy!  All I’ve got 
to do is get my picture in the papers.” 
 Loos’s titles clearly convey a critique of masculinity as it is packaged in celebrity.  Her 
question is, “What is a man?”  And behind that question is the question, “What is work?”  Other 
questions hovering over the text include “What is the public?”, “What is fame?”, and “What does 
it say about a culture if we answer the crisis of masculinity with its spectacularization?” Papers 
is anything but a peon to American industriousness.  It is a commentary on the absolute vacuity 
of (a) celebrity, the instability of American masculinity, and the Fairbanks-man’s lack of (the 
performance of) intelligent will.  In his pursuit of achieving public notoriety, the Fairbanks-man, 
among other things, sends his car off a cliff and pretends to be injured in the wreck, engages in 
fights with police, attempt to visit a psychic, Vera Crewes, but gets drunk first at which time his 
inebriated friends send him on a ship to Vera Cruz, engages in several boxing matches, and 
ultimately accidentally stops a train wreck, just by being at the right place at the right time.  Loos 
doesn’t give the Fairbanks-man agency, even in his moment of victory.  He simply happens to 
arrive at the site of a train wreck planned by the “Weasels,” an evil gang out to rob the rich.  In 
the end, then, the Fairbanks-man does get his picture in the papers and gets the girl, but he 
remains unaware and unchanged from the ne’er-do-well he began as, even as he watches the 
papers exaggerate algorithmically the numbers of people he saved, to his great pleasure.   
 As the film ends, the audience is left with a meditation on masculine power, the limits of 
fame, and a kind of backward recognition that Douglas Fairbanks was somehow absent the 
whole time.  In this way, Loos’s early work on the Fairbanks-Man serves as both a prelude and 
an inversion of her later work on Lorelei Lee.  As Catherine Keyser explains in Playing Smart, 
Loos (along with Dorothy Parker and Lois Long) “exaggerate the presence of the flesh … and 
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then project it elsewhere (onto another character, for example) to achieve dual aims” (17).  For 
Keyser, who looks mainly at Loos’s work in Blondes, this tendency to use bodies to “point out 
distortions” allowed Loos, Parker, and Long to “access ironic sensibilities and professional status 
typically denied to the sexualized woman” (17).  If Loos, as Keyser argues, successfully 
“undermines the potency of the gaze by establishing the primacy of narrative voice” in Blondes, 
she is able to accomplish this, mainly, because of her work for Fairbanks where, due to the visual 
aspects of the filmic medium, the body-on-screen is much harder to force into submission to 
narrative (65).  If “Loos’s representation of Lorelei’s excessive sexuality establishes the uneasy 
status of the career woman,” her depiction of the Fairbanks-Man undermines the validity and 
prowess of the masculine (75).  In particular, Loos’s portrayal of “this doubleness of character” 
(Keyser 63) demonstrates the opposite of what analyst Joan Riviere calls in her famous 1929 
essay “Womanliness as Masquerade,” that “women who wish for masculinity may put on a mask 
of womanliness to avert anxiety and the retribution feared from men” (35).  In Loos’s case, the 
Fairbanks-Man exemplifies the very constructedness of masculinity-as-masquerade, especially in 
Papers, where all the definitive characteristics of masculinity (libido, desire, agency, power)36 
removed from the protagonist, defamiliarizing the masculine and undercutting its rhetorical 
power.  As a powerful woman, Loos, as Keyser (following Riviere) suggests, may have donned 
“feminine” characteristics, they only serve to cover over a crucial element of gendered, indirect 
rhetoric (as well as facilitating her own move into the public sphere).  But the removal of agency 
and desire from Fairbanks’ otherwise frenetic on-screen image works to denaturalize his own, 
gendered status, undermining his physical potency through the draining of desire-power, the 
most fundamental of masculine characteristics.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 These characteristics indicate Loos’s  
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 As “womanliness therefore could be assumed as worn as a mask,” the mask of manliness 
could be removed (Riveire 38).  Ever the devout Freudian, Riveire goes so far as to call 
“womanliness and the ‘masquerade’” one and “the same thing,” Loos demonstrates much the 
same for masculinity, and masculinized modern culture’s seemingly aimless pursuit of conquest 
without content (38).  Riviere’s notion, though, that women who wield powerful critique such as 
this need be wary of popular retribution applies very nicely to Loos’s situation, hence her 
indirect critique-as-humor approach to scenario and title writing: humor was both the medium 
for critique and its balm.  Riveire goes on, speaking of a power-though-anxious female analysand 
of hers: “She has to treat the situation of displaying her masculinity to men as a ‘game,’ as 
something not real, as a ‘joke,’” a technique that probably less describes the woman’s particular 
unconscious pathologies and more describes the structure of patriarchic public power (39).  
Noteworthy, too, is the fact that Riveire, herself an analysand of Freud, was subject to much the 
same diagnosis as the one she foists upon her patient.  In “Joan Riviere and the Masquerade,” 
Stephen Heath unveils a 1921 letter in which Ernest Jones recommends Riviere to Freud for 
analysis: 
  It is a case of typical hysteria, almost the only symptoms being sexual anesthesia  
  and unorganized Angst, with a few inhibitions of a general nature. … She has a  
  most colossal narcissism imaginable, to a great extent secondary to the refusal of  
  her father to give her a baby and her subsequent masculine identification with  
  him. (Heath 45) 
Not only does this unfortunate letter exhibit exactly the type of largely invisible masculine power 
structures to which powerful women were subject, it creates a messy and complex lens through 
which Riviere can be read: she is the woman who creates a mask of femininity to deal with 
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powerful men, as, I think, is Loos.  The difference, though, is that what Riviere sees as Freud’s 
truth, Loos sees as gendered spectacle.  
 The Fairbanks-man, a cultural elite, gives “a credible performance of authority” only 
insofar as “elites are likely to subscribe to the values that underwrite their privilege,” and Pete 
Prindle’s privilege – along with his moral ambiguity and intellectual vacuity – is his only 
defining characteristic (Scott 66).  He is, as it were, privilege-in-motion.  Loos’s radical though 
coded message via Fairbanks is that systems of “domination” are “stable, effective, and here to 
stay,” though her elision of her exigence makes it clear that this radical message is coded through 
Loos’s own (in 1916 and later in her autobiographical writings about this event) investment in 
the production of herself as involved in a kind of ritual subservience, a hedge that what she is 
doing is not radical at all.  As in her Fairbanks-man critique, Loos cultivates subservience to her 
audience’s expectations of traditional gender roles through rituals of elision while at the same 
time radically activating audiences to messages about gender and power that would never find 
publics had they come in traditionally propositional format, hence her revulsion of feminists.  
For Loos, the creation of the Fairbanks-man is a powerful pre-propositional nudge designed to 
bring about the audience’s own assertions about gender, power, and the role of the spectacle.   
 To be fair to Fairbanks, this critique is most stringent in Papers, though it does rear its 
head occasionally in the other films that Loos writes for him between 1916 and 1919.  In Papers, 
Loos had the occasion to push her satirical talents as far as they could go with nothing to lose, as 
she anticipated the film would be her first and last for Fairbanks.  Things became more 
complicated, though, when Fairbanks, almost overnight, became one of the most popular men on 
the planet.  According to Richard Schickel, 
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  [W]hat Fairbanks and the entire first generation of stars had to do, besides play  
  their roles, was to serve as transitional figures in an era of revolutionary change in 
  media, change that was both creator and creation of a similar revolution in mass  
  sensibility. … What happened in this period was that the public ceased to insist  
  that there be an obvious correlation between achievement and fame. (7)     
While Loos’s invention of the Fairbanks-man of Papers is clearly an indictment of this kind of 
mass-sensibility, particularly as it lauded the kind of empty-masculinity Fairbanks performed 
onscreen.  If Loos saw Fairbanks as transparent in Papers, she utilized this transparency, this 
vacuity of Prindle’s privilege, to break into the consciousness of mass audience, an audience for 
whom (for the first time in American cinema’s history)  
  the stars and celebrities – were as familiar to us as our friends and neighbors.  In  
  many respects we were – and are – more profoundly involved with their fates than 
  we are with those of most of the people we know personally.  They command  
  enormous amounts of psychic energy and attention. (8) 
One of the most surprising byproducts of Loos’s invention of the clearly spectacularized (i.e., 
depthless) Fairbanks-man is that though she saw putting his picture in the papers, literally, as a 
subversive act, saw it as demonstrating that the Fairbanks-man was a function of an American 
crisis of masculinity, not a response to it; he instead helped to transition the culture into a 
spectacularized one that eschews depth for surface, though despite (or because of this) it was not 
long until Fairbanks had “followings at home and abroad that a president might envy” (Douglas 
19). 
 For French Situationalist Guy Debord, the cinematic spectacle that created such 
enormous audiences and mass-adoration for Fairbanks, “proclaims the predominance of 
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appearances and asserts that all human life, which is to say all social life … is mere appearance,” 
becoming a “negation of life that has invented a visual form of itself” (14).  Indeed, one thing 
that Conor’s take on the spectacularization of the modern woman tells us is that the spectacle 
also carries with it a dependence on appearance, an ominous dimension.  Stars like Fairbanks, 
particularly at this cultural moment defined by the rise of cinematic spectacle, the imminence of 
World War I, and the collective insecurity surrounding cultural definitions of masculinity, 
become for Debord “the opposite of … individual[s]” (39).  Loos’s Fairbanks-man demonstrated 
and parodied the fact that  
  entering the spectacle as a model to be identified with, he renounces all autonomy 
  in order himself to identify with the general law of obedience to the course of  
  things.  Stars of consumption, though outwardly representing different personality 
  types, actually show each of these types enjoying an equal access to the whole  
  realm of consumption and deriving exactly the same satisfaction therefrom. …  
  The admirable people who personify the system are indeed well known for not  
  being what they seem to be; they have achieved greatness by embracing a level of 
  reality lower than that of the most insignificant individual life. … [They conceal]  
  the unity of poverty. (Debord39-41) 
For Loos, whose love of larceny was often proclaimed, the tautology of the spectacle (and the 
Fairbanks-man) is clear: “its means and ends are identical” (15).  Rhetoric becomes reality, the 
visual a red herring.  Loos, a scenarist by trade, saw potential in the very inhumanity of the 
spectacle, of film.  Loos often recalls that she had only seen film as a dodge, a fluke, a hustle.   
 The emptiness embodied by the Fairbanks-man became a rhetoric-machine that is 
impossible to answer except in its own abstracted, parodic, imagined space and according to the 
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logics of implicational and pre-propositional assertions.  Loos’s place in relation to Fairbanks 
gave her full access to the public sphere, a platform from which she could create or critique 
public ethos, making male blindness occupy humorous space, making it do tricks, not to 
mention, Loos was getting famous doing this (something Fairbanks would take issue with).  “By 
the end of Loos’s series of Fairbanks films, the trade paper mentioned her title writing nearly 
every time they discussed a film on which she had worked” (Hefner 111).  Consequently, Loos 
maintained a coy prostration to the star, outwardly at least.  In my view, Loos used the 
Fairbanks-man to isolate and critique male power.  Eventually, Fairbanks caught on.  As she 
explains in A Girl Like I, 
  After I had written all Doug’s movies for the first exciting two years of his career, 
  things began to go badly between him and me.  Doug had developed a fierce self- 
  sufficiency that made him dislike depending on anyone but himself for anything.   
  The situation reached a climax when the Ladies’ Home Journal published a  
  picture of me seated on a movie set in the type of camp chair always reserved for  
  the privileged; the underlying capture called me, in effect, the little girl   
  responsible for making Douglas Fairbanks a star. (178) 
In an unusually brusque moment, Loos recalls that she felt “Doug had an honest basis for 
resentment” (178).  However, she quickly backs up:  
  That I was the first to write his own personality into film was true enough, and  
  that he was no actor Doug freely admitted.  But he didn’t need me; his unusual  
  talents would have come to the fore in either the theater or the films without  
  outside help from anyone. (178) 
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Thinking autobiographically, this construction of presuppositional silence is a noteworthy move 
for Loos to make.  This is what Janangelo calls “reparative rhetoric” in celebrity life-writing.  
What is Loos repairing?  Here, even late in life, Loos is constructing her own self image as 
unaware, lucky, more the product of serendipity than cunning and focus.  Loos was a pivotal 
player in the construction of spectacular masculinity in a time when “women’s throwing off of 
traditional social and sexual strictures” effected on men a crisis of national proportions (Studlar 
22).   
 Loos would bristle at the notion that she was a harbinger of radical, if coded, feminist 
critique, I am sure.  The persona put forth in her autobiographies makes it very clear both how 
she remembered and how she wanted to be remembered.  In Kiss Hollywood Good-by, she 
recalls, 
  I also find those old datebooks useful in exposing some event I once considered to 
  be earth-shaking.  One night I kept a rendezvous with a sophisticated European  
  film director which I, as a Hollywood novice, found so unforgettable it only  
  needed to be recorded with a fingerprint in lipstick.  Had I written that occasion  
  up “in depth” when it took place, it would have been a pack of lies because today  
  I can’t remember his name to give him a belated screen credit. (2)   
Here, characteristically, Loos drops hints about the way she wants history to read her.  She 
explains, “I’m against diaries and all for datebooks, because memory is more indelible than ink” 
(2).  So, Anita Loos at once underscores and problematizes the notion of the spectacular modern 
woman insofar as the legacy of her work survives not so much in her explicit self-apprehension 
but self-denial, her unique ability to apprehend others’ performances of gendered identity and to 
activate publics in response to the implicit questions those performances raise.  Anita Loos’s 
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radical feminism is that of a gadfly, an irritant, a force prone to disrupt the seemingly smooth 
surfaces of gender and spectacle, to plant in her audiences, in some cases at least, the ability to 
unearth the hidden discontinuities of the public transcript, that written, unalterable tome on the 
nature and location of public domination, remaining an unknown and unknowable presence to all 
but a very few. 
From Fairbanks to Mencken, From Film Titles to Literature 
 Loos’s rhetorical performances above, around, and through Fairbanks are the first of a 
series of dramas of rhetorical indirection in her life, each one associated with a different man.  
After Fairbanks, Loos tackles her friend and idol H.L. Mencken in Gentlemen Prefer Blondes 
(1925). Loos’s protagonist, as Blondes shows early on, is a product of larceny; she is named by 
it.  Early in the book, Lorelei relates to her diary that, having been called to the house of her 
boss, Mr. Jennings, who has recently hired her as a secretary (despite her complete inability to 
type or take dictation), much to her chagrin she 
  found a girl there who really was famous all over Little Rock for not being nice.   
  So when I found out that girls like that paid calls on Mr. Jennings I had quite a  
  bad case of histerics and my mind was really a blank and when I came out of it, it  
  seems that I had a revolver in my hand and it seems that the revolver had shot Mr. 
  Jennings. … [During the trial, the District Attorney] was quite harsh and called  
  me names that I would not even put in my diary.  Because everyone at the trial  
  except the District Attorney was really lovely to me and all the gentlemen in the  
  jury all cried when my lawyer pointed at me and told them that they practically all 
  had either a mother or a sister.  So the jury was only out three minutes and then  
  they came back and acquitted me and they were all so lovely that I really had to  
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  kiss all of them and when I kissed the judge he had tears in his eyes and he took  
  me right home to his sister.  I mean it was when Mr. Jennings became shot that I  
  got the idea to go into the cinema, so Judge Hibbard got me a ticket to   
  Hollywood.  So it was judge Hibbard who really gave me my name because he  
  did not like the name I had because he said a girl ought to have a name that ought  
  to express her personality.  So, he said my name ought to be Lorelei which is the  
  name of a girl who became famous for sitting on a rock in Germany. (Loos,  
  Blondes 26) 
Lorelei slides in and out of perilous situations because of and through her liquid sex appeal, her 
femininity somehow salving the disparities apparent to the audience but not to Lorelei.  For 
instance, she was the kind of girl who paid visits to men like Mr. Jennings.  Again, when Mr. 
Jennings, in a strange and automatic way, “becomes shot,” the reader again is taken through this 
euphoric periphery of Lorelei’s absence of self-knowledge or responsibility (a delicious critique 
of the liberal-individualist fantasy).  Susan Hegeman argues, 
  Remade into the siren who lures men to their deaths, Lorelei’s problematic  
  relationship to agency is made explicit: is she a sexual predator, or is she an  
  innocent party; does she coax men into recklessness, or is she the passive object  
  of their dangerous passions?  Is she or is she not a ‘professional lady’ as the  
  book’s subtitle suggests?  This question of Lorelei’s agency, and the related one  
  of her actual intelligence, hovers over the text. (534) 
Rather than being punished and imprisoned for her deed, Lorelei is renamed, reborn to the world 
and sent to Hollywood.  Hollywood itself becomes a kind of rhetorical space.  In what is perhaps 
the most radical of all subversive approaches, Blondes and its protagonist become all things to all 
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people, a projection screen for male fantasy.  The courtroom scene is critical to this analysis 
because in it, one set of generic expectations (the scene, language, and behavior of the 
courtroom) are all subverted by Lorelei’s ability to allow herself to be used; she is shrewd but 
her shrewdness comes often in her graceful manipulation of the genres of expectation embedded 
in each rhetorical scene.    
 Though Loos often commented that she was far closer to Dorothy, Lorelei’s best friend in 
the book, Lorelei represents her author in at least one way: without vocalizing it, she 
demonstrates evidence of being code and genre-savvy.  Because her radical status is never 
explicit, she is subject to a frame of objectification that both the author and her protagonist 
exploit.  Indeed, as Loos famously asked, in regard to her first marriage, “Did I feel no guilt over 
deserting my husband without even a note of explanation?  I’m afraid my compulsion to get 
away from home was too strong for me to give Frankie much thought” (Girl 90).  Both women 
are propelled by mechanical forces that provide potential but (at least in Lorelei’s case) never 
explicit alibis.  As Regina Barreca puts it, “[t]he strength behind Loos’s heroines lies not in their 
sexuality per se but in the fact that they remain on the periphery of social and cultural 
structures;” indeed, Lorelei and Dorothy “embrace, and thereby simultaneously parody and 
undermine, the rituals of the powerful” (xiii).  Unlike her first marriage, Loos’s second was 
enmeshed in emotional machinery that she could not escape.  Therefore, her creation of Lorelei 
is half a fantasy and half an accusation, Lorelei becoming the vehicle by which masculine 
limitations are explicated, a walking exegesis of male weakness/blindness/expectation.    
 Lorelei walks innocently through the middle of a murder trial unscathed, despite her clear 
responsibility for the crime; she offers no explanation or excuses and only allows herself to be 
spoken for and about, demonstrating superiority without ever acknowledging complicity.  Here, 
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she functions as an analogue of Loos’s rhetorical strategy.  Lorelei’s character evades direct 
confrontation with male power: femininity is used to camouflage her as she allows herself to be 
named, objectified, and externalized – her intension/intention rendered impossible and (largely) 
unnecessary.  On Loos’s part, this move demonstrates an implicit acknowledgment that since 
dominant discourses are “rarely naked and never monolithic,” neither should their rejection be 
(Pare 60).  To take Audre Lorde’s famous metaphor, Lorelei doesn’t use the master’s tools to 
tear down the master’s house; she uses the master’s tools to occupy the master’s house, while he 
cheerfully sets up a tent on the lawn.  That said, Loos’s very technique of indirection has made 
her work and its critique subject to a kind of co-optation that Lorde herself would, I am sure, not 
feel comfortable with.  Here, Loos’s Metis-like quality is operationalized.      
 To Loos’s credit as a code smith, the general public has not read Blondes as radical 
feminism and did not see it as a coded uptake aimed at undermining patriarchy and the 
objectification of women.  To most readers, it was light fare, fun, simple, perhaps ironic.  In my 
view, though, Lorelei becomes the exemplar of a culture fraught with blind male privilege 
(perhaps somewhat the result of the 1920s’ burgeoning speculative economy), the market-
oriented approach to men’s fantasies about women’s bodies and minds, and an instrument of 
their delegitimation; she is a figure of the feminist apocalypse, the end of overt male power and 
the beginning of covert female power, a power enhanced by its evasion of overt proclamations.   
 Loos’s late distaste for the women’s liberation movement in the 1970s was framed in 
much the same way.  As noted, she considered feminists who wanted to “out” women’s 
superiority simplistic because that approach created a stage for an unanswerable male 
counterpoint.  By contrast, the Lorelei-approach circumvented the potential for retribution (or 
even discussion) through the guerilla occupation of male stereotypes as handed down, 
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generically speaking, from the woman’s film – a protective, even palliative disarmament of 
potential response.  To fight Lorelei, men would need to fight their own expectations, their own 
visions of female potential – and, ultimately, their self-definition.  As the young, unnamed 
protagonist of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man is told by his dying grandfather, a man who had 
seemed timid his entire life, “Live with your head in the lion’s mouth … let ’em swoller you till 
they vomit or bust wide open” (16).   
 A few notable contemporaries picked up on something special in Loos’s novella -- 
though most did not define or name the vehicle for Loos’s radical vision.  Harvard philosopher 
George Santayana, for instance, called Blondes a “great work of philosophy” (qtd. in Carey 98).  
Lorelei’s lack of “awareness” is functionally similar to Charlie Chaplin’s tramp in Modern 
Times, who, according to Roland Barthes, demonstrates that “[t]o see someone who does not see 
is the best way to be intensely aware of what he does not see” (40).  That Loos and Chaplin 
could potentially (and unconsciously?) share strategies is not impossible, considering that the 
two spent considerable time together (through Chaplin’s third wife Paulette Goddard, one of 
Loos’s closest friends in the 1920s and 1930s).   Modern Times was released in 1936, 11 years 
after Blondes.    
 In addition to Santayana’s praise, Loos’s novella received positive accolades from a 
surprising set of literary elites.  “James Joyce, whose failing eyesight made him highly selective 
about what he read” spent three days on the book, and Edith Wharton called Blondes “the great 
American novel (at last)” (Carey 98, 108).  Aldous Huxley, living in England at the time of 
Blondes’ publication, requested a meeting with Loos upon his next trip to the U.S., eventually 
becoming her close friend and confidante, replacing H.L. Mencken as her “intellectual idol.”  
Even William Faulkner expressed his wish that he “had created Dorothy first” (Carey 108).  
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These luminaries of literary accomplishment noticed what the more banal literary critics of the 
day did not.     
 Most critics of the day were largely put off by the book.  For instance, Wyndham Lewis, 
a modernist critic, was unimpressed by what he read as Lorelei’s “illiteracy, hypocrisy, and 
business instinct,” and he faulted Loos’s readers for supporting a work that so shamelessly 
adapted itself to the market (Hegeman 528).  But what Lewis and most others have missed is 
what John Frow calls the thickness of Loos’s generic frame: Blondes works as “a narrative about 
sex, work, and economic exchange; and as an object of exchange in its own right,” in addition to 
the personal rhetorical exigency it created for Loos in her own life (Hegeman 527).   What makes 
scholarship about Blondes difficult, though, is that Loos, like Lorelei, never admits her 
complicity on any of the levels of critique on which this book functions.  For her, at least 
explicitly, this book was simply a witty response to her friend and unrequited love, H.L. 
Mencken. 
 The famous anecdote concerning the origin of Blondes was often retold by Loos, and it 
took a few different forms in her autobiographical writing.  In “Biography of a Book,” she writes  
  There was a time a number of years ago when I found myself on a train, the de  
  luxe Santa Fe Chief, traveling from New York to Los Angeles.  We were a party  
  of co-workers in the movies, in route to our studio after a cherished holiday in  
  New York, for we belonged to the elite of cinema which has never been fond of  
  Hollywood.  There were Douglas Fairbanks, Sr., then at the beginning of his  
  career in films but already a nation’s idol, my husband, John Emerson, who  
  directed the scenarios I wrote for Doug and a number of others. … Also among us 
  was a blonde who was being imported to Hollywood to be Doug’s leading lady in  
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  his forthcoming picture.  Now this girl, although she towered over me (I weighed  
  about ninety pounds) and was of rather a hearty type, was being waited on,  
  catered to and cajoled by the entire male assemblage.  If she happened to drop the  
  novel she was reading, several men jumped to retrieve it; whereas I was allowed  
  to lug heavy suitcases from their racks while men sat about and failed to notice  
  my efforts. … We were both in the pristine years of early youth; we were of about 
  the same degree of comeliness; as to our mental acumen, there was nothing to  
  discuss. … Then why did that girl so far outdistance me in feminine allure?   
  Could her strength possibly be rooted (like that of Sampson) in her hair? … I  
  proceeded to go over the various blondes I knew.  They were a very special  
  group, for my lot had fallen in with the beauties of the films and the girls of the  
  Ziegfeld Follies from which movies starlets were constantly recruited.  And, in  
  going over the list, I presently singled out the dumbest blonde of all, a girl who  
  had bewitched one of the keenest minds of our era – H.L. Mencken.  Menck was  
  my idol and a good friend also. … Menck liked me very much indeed; but in the  
  matter of sentiment, he preferred a witless blonde. … [I wanted] to give Menck a  
  laugh at his own expense. (xxxviii) 
Like her protagonist, Loos was “innocent” of a murder(ous critique), despite a smoking gun.  
But, over and above Loos’s romantic and intellectual crush on Mencken and her unrequited 
feelings, Blondes was less a response to his falling for “witless” blondes and more significantly 
an uptake of Mencken’s 1918 book In Defense of Women, in which the central claim is that 
women are superior to men.  As the adversaries of a physically and institutionally superior 
opposition, women had to become smarter and more subversive in order to survive.   
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 In Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche, Mencken’s own idol, put it this way. 
  They walk among us as embodied reproaches, as warnings to us – as if health,  
  well-constitutedness, strength, pride, and the sense of power were in themselves  
  necessarily vicious things for which one must pay some day, and they pay   
  bitterly: how ready they themselves are at bottom to make one pay; how they  
  crave to be hangmen. (123) 
As is her style, Loos never admits to acting as a hangman; nor does she admit having read 
Mencken’s book at all, though Blondes is most certainly a response to it:  Lorelei is an imprint 
(at some points) of Mencken’s hyper-intelligent women, though Loos gives her a lack of 
awareness that creates an extra layer to Lorelei’s frame and generic complexity.  As with 
Mencken’s typical style, Women was full of pithy aphorisms, a particularly masculine style (of 
course, Nietzsche had his own issues with women, especially Lou Salome).  If Loos was going to 
offer a reasonable response to this, she could not attain to Mencken’s stylistic or rhetorical 
persona, his ability to wield weighty propositions; she had to disguise her intentions in genre and 
further embed them in a protagonist completely unaware of (in fact immune to) her own 
implications.  Coding her difference with Mencken, Loos ironically underscores Mencken’s 
claim in In Defense of Women that a “man’s women folk, whatever their outward show of 
respect for his merit and authority, always regard him secretly as an ass, and with something akin 
to pity” (1).   
 Loos’s protagonist embodies Mencken’s proclamation that in “whatever calls for no more 
than an invariable technic and a feeble chicanery she usually fails; in whatever calls for 
independent thought and resourcefulness she usually succeeds” while at the same time relegating 
that same proclamation (generically) to the pile of shoddy male machinery Mencken alludes to 
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(Mencken 13).  Lorelei embodies the truth that if “the work of the average man required half the 
mental agility and readiness of resource of the work of the average prostitute, the average man 
would be constantly on the verge of starvation,” a truth from which Mencken himself seemed 
exempt (Mencken 15).  Loos sees the misogyny embedded in Mencken’s use of Nietzsche.  For 
Nietzsche, “woman especially: no one can excel her in the wiles to dominate, oppress, and 
tyrannize” (123).  As Nietzsche argues, her power is “physiologically unfortunate and worm-
eaten, a whole tremulous realm of subterranean revenge” that succeeds most by “poisoning the 
consciousnesses of the fortunate with [its] own misery” (124).  With only a degree more subtlety 
Mencken expands, “it is precisely this physical frailty that has given women their peculiar 
nimbleness and effectiveness on the intellectual side” (39).       
 Loos’s genius is that she turns Mencken’s (and Nietzsche’s) superiority back upon itself, 
demonstrating a feedback loop of male blindness/arrogance/assumption (one that works even at 
the highest levels of male “awareness”).  It is the same feedback loop that Lorelei repeatedly 
takes advantage of.  According to Barreca, 
  Perhaps most tellingly, Lorelei [and Dorothy do] not pretend to helplessness or  
  innocence, those twinned weapons for the traditional passive-aggressive feminine  
  script.  Unlike more ordinary heroines, they do not offer up a gooey reservoir of  
  sympathy, vulnerability, and virginity, but instead offer a sense of savvy, skill,  
  and shamelessness.  Yet Lorelei and Dorothy always remain ladies (even when  
  they are under arrest or getting drunk with the boys) because they are, more or  
  less, in control of their destinies.  They are closer to con artists37 than to whores:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Again, here Loos’s Metis-streak is emphasized. 
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  they dazzle, they confuse, they indulge in the willingness of their audience to  
  suspend disbelief. (xvii)  
Lorelei demonstrates what Mencken misses: that genres, situations, and their boundaries as 
Anthony Pare argues, “cloak vested interests or imbalances in power” that may not be apparent 
to those in power, may not be manifest even to those who employ them (60).   
 It comes as no surprise that Loos codes deep critique in simplistic – even misspelled – 
language and cadence, while Mencken argues that the “vanity of man” has “caused him to attach 
a concept of attractiveness to feminine weakness, so that he has come to esteem in his woman, 
not in proportion as she is self-sufficient as a social animal but in proportion as she is dependent” 
(38).  That women already know this according to Mencken does not change the bilious nature of 
his In Defense of Women, a book he wrote because Europe was cut off to him due to the first 
World War.  Tellingly, for Mencken, Women was a pastime, a challenge to his own self-
awareness posed only by himself and directed at a small audience he largely disdained -- 
Americans.  “I wrote it in war-time, with all foreign markets cut off, and so my only possible 
customers were Americans,” he notes in the introduction of the text, a particularly problematic 
position considering Mencken’s explicit love of all things German (xix).  Referring to his 
American audience, he continues, 
  Of their unprecedented dislike for novelty in the domain of the intellect I have  
  often discoursed in the past, and so there is no need to go into the matter again.   
  All I need do here is to recall the fact that, in the United States … there is a right  
  way to think and a wrong way to think in everything. (Mencken xix)  
He saw this project laying laymen on the pavement, exposing masculine weakness and, 
consequently, his own intellectual superiority.  Though purportedly focused on the “weaker sex,” 
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this book proclaimed, mainly, Mencken’s own prowess.  Loos anticipates his dictum that men  
“must be attacked without any formal challenge, and even without any suspicion of challenge,” 
taking as truth his recommendation of the “concealment of egoistic purpose, a code of ethics 
having for its foremost character a bold denial of its actual aim” (Mencken 51).   
A Girl Can’t Go on Laughing All the Time – Autobiography and John Emerson 
 What makes possible Anita Loos’s critiques of both Fairbanks and Mencken is what 
Kenneth Burke would have called a crafty manipulation of the scene-agent ratio.  This ratio 
corresponds to genre camouflage, the propensity that Loos has to wrap her serious critiques in 
cavalierly humorous or “unserious” texts.  For instance, in Loos’s writing of the “Fairbanks-
man,” neither Fairbanks at that point in time nor film carried much critical or artistic weight.   
For her critique of Mencken in Blondes, Loos wraps Lorelei’s critique in seemingly 
unselfconscious language and then wraps it again in a feminized genre.  In both cases Loos’s 
work adheres to what Burke calls “the synechdochic relation … between person and place,” one 
that depicts a continuous relation of similar character or quality between “the nature of the 
inhabitants” of a space and the “terms of their habitation” (Burke Grammar 9).  Such thickness 
of generic frame is much tougher to produce, though, when Loos attempts to critique her own 
husband, John Emerson, in a series of tell-all autobiographies written in the sixties and seventies 
during a period of cultural reminiscence and interest in early Hollywood.  In both A Girl Like I 
and Kiss Hollywood Good-by, Loos’s critique of Emerson loses some power, though, because for 
the first time, Loos herself becomes a character in the stories she tells and becomes, 
consequently, entangled in a battle between truth-telling (revealing her lonely and abusive 
domestic situation) and alibi-structuring (convincing her readers that throughout it all she either 
chose it or maintained a guise of aloofness).  She attempts, then, in her critique of Emerson, what 
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Sharon Halavi calls the attempts by women to “repair” their “life stor[ies]” (95), a move similar 
to Joseph Janangelo’s understanding of reparative rhetorics in celebrity life-writing (2010).  In 
Loos’s case, we see a complex attempt to “compos[e] publicly to counter potentially credible and 
damaging discourse, and to redirect the conversation” (157).  For Loos, the desire to remain 
humorous and relevant belied an inner turmoil tied directly to her relationship with Emerson.  As 
her niece, Mary Anita Loos, explains, Loos clung to humor, which “spilled out of her writing to 
create laughter for the world, in spite of the secret sadness of her lonely life,” in particular her  
  sadness about her marriage to a man who always clung to her talent, who   
  ostensibly had married her to be her collaborator when, in fact, she did all the  
  work.  He had numerous affairs.  He also squandered her enormous fortune from  
  Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, lost everything in the stock market, and left her with a  
  loneliness she tried to forget with her ever-moving pen while he retired on a large  
  annuity [with money he had shifted out of Loos’s accounts without her knowing].  
  (xii) 
The picture of Loos offered here works strongly against the simple, whimsical, and disinterested 
character she hoped history would accept.  Biographer Cari Beauchamp explains that scholars 
interested in Loos are bound to discover a much more “complex, caring” person than they might 
expect to, as well as one who had, “at times,” a “conflicted personal life” (2).   
 It is this conflictedness that abounds in any careful reading of Loos’s autobiographies, 
and it indicates not only the complexity of her early rhetorical situations, situations that balanced 
precariously the power of public writing with the nonchalance of a dilettante.  It is also this 
conflictedness that emerges in William Empson’s Loos-inspired poem.  He writes, 
  No man is sure he does not need to climb 
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  It is not human to feel safely placed. 
  ‘A girl can’t go on laughing all the time.’ 
  Wrecked by their games and jeering at their prime 
  There are who can, but who can praise their prime 
  No man is sure he does not need to climb. 
  Christ stinks of torture who was caught in lime. 
  No star he aimed at is entirely waste. 
  No man is sure he does not need to climb. 
  It is too weak to speak of right and crime. 
  Gentlemen prefer bound feet and the wasp waist. 
  A girl can’t go on laughing all the time. 
  It gives a million gambits for a mime 
  On which a social system can be based: 
  No man is sure he does not need to climb, 
  A girl can’t go on laughing all the time. (66) 
Emerson was altogether a different subject to critique, then, because unlike both Fairbanks and 
Mencken, who courted the public more than they courted Loos, Emerson’s betrothal to Loos 
implicated her in her own mistreatment.  As   Loos both suffered this and used it as cover for her 
critical edge, leading even her biographer Gary Cary to comment that “while occasionally 
concerned with feminist issues,” most of Loos’s work “ended by confirming male supremacy” 
(73).  What better evidence that one is not a feminist than to perform the role of subservient 
spouse, especially if married to a cad?  According to Cary, 
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  She believed what she was joking about.  Intellectual voluptuaries like Aspasia or  
  Mesdames de Pompadour and de Staël were smarter and ended up happier than a  
  Joan of Arc, who got burned for doing a man’s job.  Let men keep their illusions  
  about being the stronger sex! (74) 
To the degree that Loos was ambivalent about her feminist-critical orientation, Cary is right here, 
but his reading takes Loos too much at her own word, denying the great power of her critical 
renderings of powerful men.  Loos’s power always avoided overt propositional assertions and 
dealt with weighty issues with a light, ironic touch, often keeping her interiority completely 
invisible.  In this way, Loos’s indirection – particularly in her autobiographies of the 1960s and 
1970s – demonstrate another instantiation of performative indirection, working against the very 
“sense of self as identity” that other autobiographies aim toward (Smith 108).  Loos’s 
autobiographical renderings, however, create the self not as self-identical interiority but rather as 
detached filter or casual witness.   
 After the duo parted ways with Fairbanks, they continued to make successful films, 
largely because the economics and feminized audience demographics of the 1920s were ripe for 
material, which Loos gladly admitted.  After a few years in New York, though, particularly after 
the publication and vast success of Blondes, Loos’s relationship with Emerson began to sour.  
She explains,  
  The day finally came when I discovered a letter from one of John’s fellow  
  socialists, expressing her joy over being able to compensate his unfulfilled  
  marriage.  When faced with that evidence, John disarmed me by bursting into  
  tears.  He bitterly regretted that he wasn’t the marrying type; that he had never  
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  wanted children; that his nerves were shattered by such a binding arrangement.  
  (12) 
For her husband’s vice, Loos takes the blame, continuing, 
  Tremulous with guilt over having made a great big grown man weep, I asked if he 
  wanted a divorce.  He grasped me in agitation.  “No, no, no, Buggie!  I’ll never  
  leave you; you’re so gullible you might fall into the hands of some crook, who’d  
  get hold of your money!”  As an upshot, John worked out a friendly separation  
  and granted me an allowance.  “This arrangement will be much better for you,  
  Buggie,” he explained.  “Because in the past you’ve always had to ask me for  
  money.  But now I’m giving my Bug some of her very own. (12)  
The joke here is that though Loos accepts an allowance from her philandering husband, she is a 
rich woman.  Her caustic irony in this rendering demonstrates how effectively Loos has figured 
her husband.   
 Rather than allowing this depressing moment to characterize her as a victim of Emerson’s 
choices, as beholden to a man as cruel and larcenous as her father, Loos immediately turns it on 
its head, asking readers not to weep for her.  She, a woman of means, prefers men like Emerson, 
laughs at his games.  “Mr. E.,” she explains, “was actually the forerunner of a type that was 
beginning to emerge in our country” (16).   
  From early Colonial days, sex life in America had been based on the custom of  
  men supporting women.  That situation reached its heyday in the Twenties when  
  it was easy for any dabbler in stocks to flaunt his manhood by lavishing an  
  unearned income on girls.  But with the stock-market crash, men were hard put  
  even to keep their wives, let along spend money on sex outside the home.  The  
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  adjustment was much easier on women than on men, who jumped out of windows 
  in droves, whereas I can’t recall a single headline that read: KEPT GIRL LEAPS  
  FROM LOVE NEST. (16) 
 As for Loos’s autobiographical rendering of her marriage, it sets the stage for what is 
perhaps the most prominent of all her public effacements – her justification for Emerson’s 
philandering, thieving, and violence.  In her desire to tell a coherent narrative, one in which she 
is not victimized but somehow stands above the game, she remains unfazed and amused.  In an 
unfinished manuscript (published after her death, titled after Empson’s poem about her “A Girl 
Can’t Go on Laughing All the Time”), she observes that “along came Freud, bent on destroying 
the virility of man; trumping up the notion that everyone was sick; turning people into 
hypochondriacs and claiming illness as an alibi” (Loos Fate 62).  She continues, reminiscing 
about the 1920s, “But when the trend of economics forced women to compete with men, they 
found out that, in the aggregate, women are smarter than they are and, as far as tenderness was 
concerned, the jig was up” (63). 
   Similar to Paul John Eakin’s argument in Thinking Autobiographically, Loos’s desire to 
create such a narrative differs little from other autobiographers who need to construct a narrative 
identity, which, in Loos’s case, allows her a kind of last grasp at historiographical power and 
control over her own vocational history.  Eakin: 
  [Charlotte] Linde discovered that when she investigated a particular form of “life  
  story,” the vocational accounts offered by white middle-class professionals in  
  answer to the question, “What do you do?” [that] the notion of narrative identity  
  is so deeply rooted in our culture that it functions as a criterion for normality: “In  
  order to exist in the social world with a comfortable sense of being a good,  
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  socially proper, and stable person,” she comments, “an individual  needs to have a 
  coherent, acceptable, and constantly revised life story” (3). (29) 
Without a doubt, Loos’s version of her marriage in Kiss Hollywood Good-by is a major revision, 
if not of facts than of perspective, where she inverts the power-arrangement in the marriage in 
most cases, and in the cases where that is impossible due to certain facts (in the case of attempted 
murder, for instance), Loos makes light of things.  Near the end of Good-by, she recalls 
Sherwood Anderson, author of Winesburg, Ohio (1919) and a friend of Emerson, urging Loos to 
be careful with Emerson.  As she recalls, Anderson explained, “John has a psychopathic 
resentment of you! … He’ll always belittle you, find mistakes in your work, put more and more 
commas into those manuscripts of yours.  Take my word for it, Nita, John might even try to kill 
you” (187).  And when the event occurs, as the reader is primed to believe it will, Loos, 
characteristically takes the blame.  She explains, 
  My own experience in sex turned a strong-willed  character I had adored into a  
  sick man.  If only we’d remained sympathetic co-workers without the   
  complication of marriage, no stranger would ever have addressed Mr. E. as “Mr.  
  Loos,” which made him try to kill me. (Good-by 196) 
In this case, Emerson’s responsibility for violence is elided, as Loos casts him both as a victim of 
circumstance and also potentially mentally ill. 
  One evening we were alone together in our living room when, without warning,  
  he clutched my throat and started to choke me.  He justified himself by the same  
  type of argument that Scott Fitzgerald had pulled on Zelda and me, “My little Bug 
  is too good to live in a terrible world like this!” which wasn’t much comfort.  Mr.  
  E. was strong and wiry, while I weighed in at ninety pounds.  Luckily our butler  
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  came into the room that time just as Scott’s had done.  Mr. E. released me. (Good- 
  by 176) 
Without a doubt, because of his proximity to Loos and her strong and ambivalent feelings for 
him, Emerson’s characterizations in her autobiographies are more complex and are thus less 
clearly feminist than her previous depictions of Fairbanks and Mencken.  In many ways, the 
lengths to which Loos goes to deliver her particular characterization of Emerson as somehow 
without agency works against her critical ethos, much more than with either Fairbanks or 
Mencken.  Loos’s critical distance and thickness of frame are imperiled a bit in her 
autobiographical work, by the tragic treatment she receives at Emerson’s hands.  Loos wants to 
obviate the clear tragedy of her domestic circumstance, thus disrupting what Kenneth Burke calls 
the dialectic of tragedy in A Rhetoric of Motives. 
  This is the process embodied in tragedy, where the agent’s action involves a  
  corresponding passion, and from the sufferance of the passion there arises an  
  understanding of the act, an understanding that transcends the act.  The act, in  
  being an assertion, has called forth a counter-assertion in the elements that  
  compose its context.  And when the agent is enabled to see in terms of this  
  counter-assertion, he has transcended the state that characterized him at the start.   
  In this final state of tragic vision, intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are merged.   
  That is, although purely circumstantial factors participate in his tragic destiny,  
  these are not felt as exclusively external, or scenic; for they bring about a   
  representative kind of accident, the kind of accident that belongs with the agent’s  
  particular kind of character. … It is deplorable [on the other hand], but not tragic,  
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  simply to be a victim of circumstance … [as s]heer victimization is not an   
  assertion. (38-39)   
In her later autobiographical renderings, Loos clearly struggles with the meaning of her 
victimhood and bravely attempts her usual brazen style when describing her relationship with 
Emerson, painting him as a kind of kept man:  “[A]s a connoisseur of that species I would like to 
come to its defense. … Only in this crude culture of the New World was the kept man considered 
decadent” (17).  Here, Loos’s indirection fails, uniquely in her writing, to keep buoyant the 
weight of the personal loneliness she experienced in the later third of her life.  Rather than 
exploring the complexities of her intimacy issues with Emerson, Loos merely laughs him off, 
with less artistry than she practiced earlier in her career.  She recalls,   
  I remembered back to the old Doug Fairbanks days when Mr. E.’s “collaboration” 
  consisted of glancing over my morning’s work while he was eating breakfast in  
  bed.  From time to time he’d say, “But, Buggie, this will never do!” “What’s  
  wrong, Mr. E.?” Shaking his head in despair he’d answer, “You’ve left out  
  another comma, as usual!” (59)   
What Loos does, in her memoirs, is to render Emerson not just a sad fool, a kept man, but she 
actually renders him voiceless.  Not long after Blondes, Emerson suffers a bout of hysterial 
disphonia.  In her depiction of Emerson by way of critique, the most powerful thing that Loos 
can do is to produce an image of castration in her husband.  She explains,  
   But, back in 1926, my opportunities for service had been further increased, for I  
  was able to take on the duties of a practical nurse.  Mr. E. had been stricken with a 
  dread form of laryngitis that prevented him speaking above a whisper.  Following  
  the instructions of his throat specialist, I applied ice packs and hot fomentations,  
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  sprayed his throat, regulated his diet, and provided him with massage.  But, for all 
  my ministrations, Mr. E.’s voice only got weaker and, without daring to breathe  
  the awful word, I began to think of … cancer. (61) 
After being advised to take her ailing husband to see Dr. Jeliffe, a throat specialist:  
  I kept that appointment in an agony of fear.  The doctor began by saying it was  
  urgent for me to know the truth about my husband and as I turned rigid with  
  fright, he added, “There’s nothing at all wrong with his throat.  His loss of voice  
  is the result of some sort of neurosis that can only be brought to light through  
  psychotherapy. (62) 
The poor man, suffering agonies over the success of Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, had invented a 
disease as a means of attracting attention.  Loos continues,   
 Dr. Jeliffe proceeded to quote from H.L. Mencken that a husband may survive the 
 fact of a wife having more money than he, but if she earns more, it can destroy 
 his very essence.  
 Overcome with guilt that I, myself, was the cause of Mr. E.’s distress, I asked 
 how I could undo the harm I’d done.  “The only possible cure for your husband,” 
 answered Dr. Jeliffe, “is to give up your career.” (63) 
After reporting that, though she did indeed give up her career, until the crashing stock market of 
the late 1920s created the need for her to return to Hollywood, her husband continued, once in a 
while, to occasionally forget his conceit of his lost voice and talk normally.  Out of respect for 
the audacity of Emerson’s affectation, Loos never called him on it.  Finally, it took a visit to the 
world’s most famous specialist, a Viennese, to cure the ailing Emerson.   
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   Finally, at long last came a day when Mr. E. was cured.  The specialist concerned 
  was Professor Emil Glas of Vienna. … One day Professor Glas called for me in  
  private, just as Dr. Jackson had done in Philadelphia, but his plan was to perform  
  an “operation.”  During the process the Professor intended to scratch Mr. E.’s  
  throat so severely that it would be quite painful for a few days.  Following the  
  “operation,” Mr. E. would be presented with a vial of alcohol in which some  
  flecks of white membrane were floating.  The Professor would explain them as  
  “nodes” which he’d removed from Mr. E.’s vocal chords and, as soon as his  
  throat healed, he would be able to speak again. (86-87) 
The ploy worked, and Emerson, as Loos recalls, carried the nodes proudly with him for several 
months.  And though the image rendered of Emerson here is tragicomic, Loos never blames the 
man.  Indeed, her own unfinished essay (published after her death, titled after Empson’s poem 
about her “A Girl Can’t Go on Laughing All the Time”), she blames another Viennese: “[A]long 
came Freud, bent on destroying the virility of man; trumping up the notion that everyone was 
sick; turning people into hypochondriacs and claiming illness as an alibi” (Loos Fate 62).   
 Also in Kiss Hollywood Good-by, Loos permits herself a strange moment of explicit 
ambivalence, one that moves in directly the opposite path of her earlier, more liberating and 
feminist critiques.  On staying with the violent embezzler, Loos attributes this to her adoration of 
larcenous men, as well as an “atavistic hunger for that sort of mistreatment,” one, she argues, she 
shares with all American women (18).  She explains that this type of relationship creates a new 
type of “sex experience” for women: “the thrill of ‘giving’ rather than ‘taking’” (18).  She says, 
after all, placing her own authorial and gendered position in much the same place as Lorelei’s 
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ambivalent stance, that “[p]leasure that isn’t paid for is as insipid as everything else that’s free” 
(17).   
 Whether it is an atavistic or economic masochism, Loos’s autobiographical position is 
somewhat unsatisfying compared to her masterful earlier critiques of the likes of Fairbanks and 
Mencken.  That is not surprising, though, as autobiographical writing forces Loos into the 
spotlight in a very different way than script or even novel writing.  She becomes a character, and 
not only does she become responsible for making everyone around her characters as well, she 
has to anchor them in some way, with some sense of an internal self or core.  That core, though, 
is not funny; it is too real for Loos to feel comfortable using.  She is neither comfortable 
“constructing” subordination like she does with Lorelei nor with constructing herself as 
fundamentally dominant either.  As James C. Scott argues, any analogies about subordination 
and domination become “more strained in contemporary settings where choice of marriage 
partner is possible and where women have civil and political rights” (22).  In short, as Empson 
seems to suggest, Loos is partially “wrecked by [her] games,” is implicated, which creates a very 
difficult authorial and critical dilemma. 
 In the end, just as she does with the Fairbanks-man and with Lorelei’s 
counterpropositional rhetoric aimed toward Mencken, Loos, for the third time removes a man’s 
voice from the conversation.  Even in its most problematic form, as it comes in her 
autobiographical work, Loos’s version of indirection, when employed, works against the 
potential for a counter-assertion and becomes, if only situationally, rhetoric that is not only 
indirect in its conveyance but is also subversive of the potential for any response.  This is 
feminist indirect rhetoric par excellence.  The spectacle, finally, fails Loos (as its lack of 
verisimilitude always eventually breaks down), who struggles between earnest constructions of 
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self and defending the life to which she acquiesced.  Along the way, though, her unique abilities 
and positions in relation to public audiences provided her platforms and avenues to demonstrate 
what she knew all along: that women are smarter than men (an impression that remains 
dangerously close to Mencken’s, Nietzsche’s, and Schopenhauer’s), that women can write more 
effectively (at least, that she can), and that the actualization of those truths is so bound up in the 
personal elements of lives, relationships, that, perhaps, the risk of indirection, the risk of being 
unheard, is still too great.  Our job is to listen.  In the end, as well, Loos, like Parker, is a 
humorist.  She codes her critique in an erotic shell, like a dream.  The exact content or meaning 
of Loos’s dream remains lost to history, but its methods are clearer, as are the limits and 
functions of spectacular rhetoric, the spectacle functioning less as a means of disinformation and 
more as an invitation to closer analysis. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Affective Feminist Indirection in the Writings of Mae West: Trauma, Testimony, and the 
Rhetoric of Exadversion 
 
[W]hat will have followed the orgy – the orgy of meaning, truth, 
and representation – is seduction, and what will have preceded the 
orgiast – the philosopher – is Woman.  Woman and/as seduction is 
what will have survived/resisted the modernist assault on the 
enchanted world and its denial of the play of appearances – an 
assault and denial accomplished via the tyranny of truth, 
subjectivity, and communication. – Michelle Ballif, Seduction, 
Sophistry, and the Woman with the Rhetorical Figure 
 
She alone, out of an enormous and dull catalogue of heroines, does 
not get married at the end of the film, does not die, does not take 
the road to exile, does not gaze sadly at her declining youth in a 
silver-framed mirror in the worst possible taste; and she alone does 
not experience the bitterness of the abandoned “older woman.”  
She alone has no parents, no children, no husband.  This impudent 
woman is, in her style, as solitary as Chaplin used to be. – Sidonie-
Gabrielle Collette, Collette at the Movies 
 
 This chapter explores the ways in which Mae West, as writer, rhetor, and performer, 
strategically deployed indirect feminist rhetoric in order to (1) create a rhetorical character space 
and a rhetorical character, making use of ekphrasis and exadversion that underscored and fed her 
status as celebrity while subsequently erasing the traces of herself as a biographical person, (2) 
operationalize this sexualized character space to negotiate and come to terms with early sexual 
trauma, physical abuse, men, and power, (3) achieve Broadway success and fame, all the while 
retheorizing and complicating traditional views of homosexual desire and affect, particularly 
complicating early twentieth century notions of sexual inversion, and,  (4), taking a third-wave 
revisionist lens influenced in part by Diane Davis, Michele Ballif, Kenneth Burke, and Judith 
Butler, as well as West’s contemporaries Sigmund Freud and Havelock Ellis, reread West as a 
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kind of covert (and perhaps unwitting) feminist agent, one whose own pursuit of fame and glory 
altered the landscape of gender and power, not to mention sex and celebrity, forever.       
Mae West, Rhetorical Character Space, and The Ruby Ring 
 If, as Diane Davis argues, Kenneth Burke’s largest contribution to rhetoric comes in his 
redirecting conversations about rhetoric from warlike metaphors of persuasion-as-domination to 
romantic metaphors of identification-as-courtship, that Mae West (1893-1980) and her work are 
not already represented in a brimming body of scholarship in rhetorical studies is surprising.  A 
noteworthy exception to this dearth of scholarship on the rhetorical West is Helene Shugart and 
Catherine Waggoner’s excellent Making Camp, which places West as a gauche, pioneering 
foremother of such contemporary camp icons as Gwen Stefani, Karen Walker, Macy Gray, and 
Xena: Warrior Princess.  Shugart and Waggoner examine these women as producers of “logics 
and rhetorics of resistance,” especially as their oeuvres relate to and challenge traditional 
conceptions of heteronormative desire, sexual power, and gendered identity (5).  Not limited to 
camp in particular, this study focuses on how West, through irony, parody, and audience 
cooptation, creates a rhetorical character space that (in)directly confronts and complicates what 
A. Cronin refers to as female “compulsory individuality” (277), which exists as both a “right and 
a duty” for women who are “paradoxically produced through interpretive choice and a 
redoubling  of the terms of women’s …  exclusion from the social, cultural and epistemological 
status of ‘the individual’” (285).  West’s rhetorical character space effects a kind of explosion of 
individuality into a vacuum of desire: the audience’s, the character’s, her own.  She desires and 
is desired, but beyond lust, beyond the carnal exuberance of coitus and the pursuit of its objects 
(men), West’s characters are always rhetorically empty, living and dying in the repetitive act of 
jouissance over and over again.  Simply put, in this rhetorical character space, West’s identity is 
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never identical with itself, is never selfsame, never rooted in place and time, never fleshed out 
with any but the meanest biographical detail.  It provides a viewing experience of seeing 
something/someone fully open but without content, exposed but not naked.  She is a metonym 
for desire, linked to her particular dramatic situations only by contiguity.  Exploding 
individuality, West’s entire strategy of rhetorical indirection is rightfully characterizable as 
feminist because its resistive, transgressive, and subversive performances challenge traditional 
notions of gender-power (Shugart and Waggoner 7) and because, according to Keith Miller, it 
“valorizes puzzles,” “prompts laughter,” and “assails” rigid structures of knowing and being by 
“circling, bouncing” (71).  Like Anita Loos’s work for Douglas Fairbanks, West reverses and 
metaphorizes the space of gender performance in her writing, creating “male characters that 
serve as props to enhance her stage appearance”; these men, formerly so powerful, become 
“‘suckers’ who fall prey to their own egos” (Ward 11).  In the end, West becomes her own 
leading man.38 
 West borrows, perhaps exemplifies, Michelle Ballif’s book’s moniker, becoming the 
woman with (or, better, woman as) the rhetorical figure.  She exists in body, gesture, and 
language but is irreducible to any of them, and her subversions of sex, gender, and power remain 
unique puzzles of rhetorical history and method, puzzles in need of some attempt at solution – 
which, admittedly, will never fully come.  Mae West’s rhetoric invites, indeed demands, a close 
analysis of her methods and manners of expression, not to mention her motives and ends 
(McQuarrie and Mick 424).  Any work in this direction, though, is necessarily (and joyfully) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 This becomes more and more true for West as her career progresses.  She often took credit for “discovering” Cary 
Grant (who had, by the time of her initial work with him in the early 1930s, appeared in several films).  West 
worked with Grant twice in 1933 for Paramount, in I’m No Angel and She Done Him Wrong.  The latter film 
resulted in huge box office and an Academy Award nomination for Best Picture.  West often bragged that She Done 
Him Wrong singlehandedly saved Paramount from bankruptcy.  As West’s star rose, her desire to take all a film’s 
laughs became known, and most A-list leading men in Hollywood avoided her. 
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complicated by “West’s insistence on merging her public and private persona[s] into an 
inseparable entity” (Ward ix).  As Carol Ward explains, 
  Since irony was her mode of communication and theatrical artifice was her  
  method of presentation of that irony, West’s true personality is difficult to   
  perceive through the layers of façade.  Like the glittering diamonds with which  
  she adorned herself, West seems all surface and no substance. …  Because of all  
  this deliberate obfuscation, the ultimate “truth” about West’s life may never be  
  known.  We have to settle for the many little truths that together form a composite 
  portrait of this amazingly complex or extraordinarily simple woman. (ix-x)   
Considering West as a rhetorical figure becomes particularly useful when one works from the 
definition of a rhetorical figure as “an artful deviation” from propositional norms, a deviation 
meant to draw attention to its status and technique as a performative gesture (McQuarrie and 
Mick 425), a definition largely agreed upon by leading theorists for most of the twentieth 
century, from Jakobson and Halle in 1956, to Burke in 1950, to Leech in 1960, to Corbett in 
1968.  West’s character and performances consist of her palimpsestic violations of norms and 
meanings, her multiple, vertical deviations “from expectation” at “the level of form rather than 
content” as well as her continuing subversion of that very distinction (425). 
 West’s expertise at manipulations of form defined her character and her public perception 
from the beginning.  In his 1934 portrait Face of Mae West Which Can Be Used as An 
Apartment, Salvador Dali appropriates West’s visage in a most appropriately critical way: Dali 
spatialized his subject and conflated, exactly as West herself did, the difference between her 
internal and external elements (though he does imbed an important, shadowy line to her mouth – 
the line cuts through the painting if as to indicate the importance of her voice, her words, in the 
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complication of inner and outer worlds), a key component of her ongoing destabilization of 
traditional western notions of gendered, not to mention humanist identity. 
 
Figure 1. Salvador Dali’s Face of Mae West Which Can Be Used as An Apartment, (1934).  
Dali’s portrait of West is an important framing element for this study, one that allows West to be 
considered as, herself, a rhetorical figure, a figure that exists both in language and space, an 
ekphrastic figure.  Ekphrasis, as W.J.T. Mitchell reminds us, began as a little-known ancient 
Greek literary genre of poems that describe works of visual art but has become more generally 
useful to scholars of both classical and modern by focusing on a central problem:  “the verbal 
representation of visual representation” (152).  Ekphrasis functions in this analysis of Mae West 
as that space of transference between her body-as-spectacle and her language as both indicative 
of and contained within that body-as-spectacle, allowing her to operate, as I will explain, 
exadversively, inside and outside the diagetic lines around which other “characters” (but not the 
West character) would be constrained.  Westian ekphrasis functions not only to describe but, 
more often and more subversively, to characterize a particular space of Westian indirection.  As 
we will see in Dali’s Visage, Mae West’s spatialized rhetoric, her ekphrasic excess creates what 
Simon Goldhill calls in his description of ekphrastic epigrams in classical Greece, “a critical 
gaze” that “is committed to a value-laden view of things,” not purely a description, which 
“creates and regulates the viewing subject – both by a selection of what to look at and how to 
look,” setting up the reader/viewer for a “discrete, pointed, witty surprise” (2). 
 In his introduction to John Tuska’s The Complete Films of Mae West, Parker Tyler 
describes the Dali piece nicely. 
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  Dali doubtless used a photograph for its basis and what he did was to interpret her 
  face, seen frontally in a familiar expression, in terms of a rather grand room on  
  two levels.  Instantly recognizing her, one perceives her chin defined by four  
  rounding steps leading to the second, or main, level of the “room.”  Her lips, just  
  as neatly illusioned, are a sumptuous violent-red sofa, her nose (only its blunt  
  uplifted tip and wide nostrils visible) a fireplace against a solid red wall opposite  
  us, and her eyes two gold-framed pictures made to look like dark cityscapes as  
  much as eyes.  Two jeweled pendants serve as realistic earrings while divided,  
  voluptuously billowing drapes (making a stagelike proscenium for the “room”)  
  constitute a marvelous illusion of Mae’s wavy, white-blond hair.  Strangely, the  
  red wall serves as a sort of half-mask, but this seems to add to, rather than detract  
  from, the utter conviction of this portrait. (9)         
Like Dali’s portrait, the West character mastered the double-negative of the fluid and dynamic 
inversion of the internal and external worlds, her specific ekphrastic function, which she poses 
(and Dali here, in her stead, poses) as a radical subversion of traditional feminine closedness, 
silence, and opacity.  First, the spaciousness of West’s persona is demonstrated as an entity 
divided by multiple dyads: her body and head break off into two rooms, one elevated and 
emphasized, her headspace clearly represented as the purpose of the painting.  The room’s 
division as well as the heavy-hanging, platinum curls/curtains on each side of West’s head 
suggest that this particular room is not just a living space but, as Tyler suggests, a stage, a 
performative space as well, again challenging the traditional dichotomy between the interior and 
exterior of the self, the stage and the audience.  The top room is divided again within itself 
between the skin-tones of the floor and West’s red mask, suggesting that within the performative 
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space West carves out yet another division.  We are invited to rest on West’s lips and peer into 
the street-scenes that are her eyes, a final challenge invited by West and posed by Dali to the 
traditionally idealized woman, one who, as Cheryl Glenn explains, “has been disciplined by 
cultural codes that require a closed mouth (silence), a closed body (chastity), and an enclosed life 
(domestic confinement)” (Rhetoric Retold 1).  Based on the metaphor of West-as-space, Dali 
attempts to approach not just the content of West’s sexual subversiveness but also her own 
continued performance approach of juxtaposing opposites, her own status as a living figure of 
speech who “is tied up with the topic of dissimilarity” (Corbett 426).  Here, West’s very persona 
not only brings her stage with her but remains, while upon that stage, half hidden, half exposed.39   
  Rhetorically, Dali’s assessment of West through spatial metaphor provides a foundation 
for this analysis, which attempts to present West as an even more encompassing, more complex 
feminist rhetorical figure.  Spatial metaphor, of course, derives from the semantic-figural 
category that also includes antithesis, conciliation, gradation, hyperbole, synecdoche, and 
metonymy (Bonsiepe 38).  In my view, though, West’s central rhetorical figure moves beyond 
metaphor to yet another figure, one that Gui Bonsiepe calls “exadversion,” or “assertion by a 
double negative” (38).40  Westian exadversion remains fixed to and dependent upon spatial 
metaphor, but the metaphor in question becomes the inside and outside of a film or play’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The question of West’s actual shallowness seems to be indirectly refuted by her ability at once to be uniquely 
popular with mass audiences (in the 1930s she bragged of being the second highest earner in the country, after W.R. 
Hearst) as well as being hugely threatening to traditional standards of “decency.”  It is well known that West 
“served as a primary motivation for increased industry self-regulation after 1934” (Curry, “Censored” 57).  
Rhetorically speaking, West’s work focuses on the subversive creation of spaces of identification (hence her 
enormous threat to “the moral tenor of movies” (Curry, “Censored 57). 
40 In West’s case, exadversion as a semantic exadversion is a pragmatic figure based on her character’s extra-
diegetical commentary.  In a Brechtian way, almost, West asserts the double-negative of a character commenting on 
the constructedness of that character’s situation as well as that character commenting on the nature of the author of 
that construction.  It functions as a double-negative, then, in its violation of diegetic norms: the character of the 
biographical West asserts itself through the filmic West’s own extra-diegetic moves; the “real” West (also a 
character, of course) becomes defined as that which comments upon the artificial nature of the “characterized” 
West’s situation.  
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diegesis,41 a narrative work of art’s internal sense of space-time.  The simplest way to explain 
West’s exadversion comes in her extra-diegetical asides, a commonplace of any Westian film or 
play (“Is that a pistol in your pocket, or are you pleased to see me?”).  These quips, usually of a 
sexual nature, are redirected back onto West’s status as a real-life character.  Consequently, then, 
Westian exadversion does not occur on the sentence-level; it only exists on the boundaries of the 
film-space and bases itself upon the violation of the diegetical membrane.  In so doing, West’s 
exadversion also functions as a particular type of rhetorical indirection able to be wielded only 
within the parameters of celebrity.    
 In West’s case, exadversion typically draws from other members of the tropological-
figural category, particularly metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and antithesis.  Very 
importantly, exadversion in West’s case operates on the lexical level, the gestural level, and the 
performative level.  Additionally, West’s exadversion almost always draws from metaphor and 
metonymy.  For her, the appropriation of multiple, often juxtaposed meanings works far above 
the textual level (though it works there, too).  As Hayden White reminds us, it is this type of 
study, “the study of the figurative element” in a given moment or discourse, like the one Mae 
West offers, that “permits us to characterize the instrumental, pragmatic, or conative 
dimensions” of a given rhetorical act or text (105).  Any study of Westian rhetoric has to come to 
grips her with constant rejection of denotation, her implicit acknowledgement that, as Michael 
Bernard-Donals explains, all history, indeed, all truth, derives not from the structure of the 
history or truth but from the figures (“metaphor, metonymy, synechodoche, and irony”) out of 
which “history itself originates” (419).  Reading West through this lens, a lens also inspired by 
Burke’s theory of synecdoche in Grammar of Motives, her absence of self is similar to “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The diegesis includes objects, events, spaces and the characters that inhabit them, including things, actions, and 
attitudes not explicitly presented in the film but inferred by the audience. That audience constructs a diegetic world 
from the material presented in a narrative film. 
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absence of the event, the whole,” which places “its emphasis on the chain of associations among 
the various parts without reference to whatever event or object we might think of as ‘anchoring’ 
the chain of associations” (Bernard-Donals 420).  Westian exadversion asserts self by its 
removal, and in the process of ex adversio it undermines patriarchal power, a power rooted deep 
in Western ways of knowing.      
 Hence, West’s work has larger, philosophical implications as well as implications for the 
history and politics of gender. Her exadversive, extradiagetical figurations challenge the very 
structures of Western humanist identity-making, including its most fundamental proposition: I = 
I, for which she substitutes her ironic, confounding, and oft-repeated dictum “Mae West is 
always Mae West” (Ward ix).42  Here she exists on both sides of equivalency, exactly what or 
who she is remains unclear and most certainly dynamic. West alters the semantic possibility of 
the selfsame, humanist individual, creating a particular and important space for rhetorical, 
historical, and cultural analysis.  Traditional subjectivity, Michelle Ballif argues, 
  (which has been historically constructed in terms of a phallic logic of   
  noncontradiction, presence, and selfsame identity) has effectively (and yet  
  dubiously) privileged – economically, politically, and rhetorically – a particular  
  few, while effectively marginalizing all others. (6) 
Following Ballif’s lead, I present Mae West as a radical challenge to that phallogocentric history 
of “stable, self-identical, self-representing subject[s],” a reminder that it represents “a powerful 
fantasy of the Enlightenment – a fantasy prefaced by Parmenides and Plato” (Ballif 7).  Not one 
to let the limits of self be defined by others, true or not, West teased in 1934, “I have given six 
life-stories, but I can always give one more” (Ward 103).     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 With this sleight of hand, West transforms the very act of identity into a performance.  
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 West’s appropriation of these semantic structures runs through her characterization and 
indeed her self-view, and its roots exist in a deep, metonymic chain of substitutions: substitutions 
of language for sex, of innuendo for forceful persuasion, of indirection for propositionality, of 
telling for showing, of wealth for poverty, of substance for sheen.  West’s storied sex appeal 
nearly never comes from the show of skin or actual seduction, and her storied immorality covers 
over a relatively tame and mundane personal and social life.  Though she did court perhaps 
hundreds of male lovers, West rarely drank nor did drugs, and the limits of her Hollywood 
debauchery extended, largely, to her great love of sweets.         
 Sugar, though, was not the only thing Mae West coveted: she was enamored early on 
with jewelry as well.  In her first attempt at writing, a short play entitled The Ruby Ring, West 
demonstrates this desire as well as an early example of her rhetorical figuration of the reversals 
of outside and inside, reversals that remain challenging to western cultural notions of identity.  
The Ruby Ring, West biographer Jill Watts reveals, 
  took place at a grand ball where the enchanting Gloria (West’s role) instructs two  
  female friends on the art of flirtation.  Gloria bets her bracelet against a ruby ring  
  that she can get five men to propose to her, each in less than five minutes.  By  
  assuming a different personality tailored to the unique qualities of each man,  
  Gloria successfully seduces a college boy, businessman, rich elderly gentleman,  
  cowboy, and psychology professor.  All return at the same moment to whisk her  
  to the altar but discover that Gloria has duped them.  Not only has she accepted  
  proposals from all of them, but she is already married.  She collects on her bet  
  and, as the skit closes, remarks to her unwitting husband, “Look dear – how do  
  you like my new ruby ring?” … [This play] allowed West to channel her   
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  tricksterism by adopting the role of a shapeshifter.  For Gloria’s collegiate beau,  
  she became a well-read society maiden.  To the powerful businessman, she  
  appeared as a devotee of “pep” and “ambition.”  She insisted on her fondness for  
  gingham to the cowboy, and her youthful innocence bewitched the wealthy older  
  man.  In the end, she transformed into a deadly temptress to ensnare the bookish  
  psychology professor. (57-58)  
West’s work in The Ruby Ring represents her first serious attempt at writing and entry into the 
adult phase of her career, a phase marked by West’s growing interest in “wordplay.”  Gloria’s 
masquerades all rest on conversation; “she makes no costume changes” (59).  The strategies 
represented here, though, go beyond mere wordplay and denote the kind of rhetorical figuration 
that West will spend the rest of her career developing.  In each of the cases of seduction, West 
creates in, on, and around her own body and mind an idealized space in which each potential 
suitor can exist.  Her body and voice are relieved of any of their specific connections to local 
conditions or exigencies.  Rather, she becomes (a body-in-space) spatialized rhetoric, a resting 
place and feedback loop for male desire, an energy-generator appropriating male power by 
undermining the desiring mechanism and the social mores that make the pursuit of women-as-
objects permissible.   
 Where my analysis diverges from Watts’s, though, comes in my assertion of the ethical 
quality of West’s reversals.  West attains to – though perhaps she does not fully achieve here, 
especially in this earliest written venture – an ethics of irony and reversal.  Irony as an ethical 
device plays a significant role in Kenneth Burke’s “Four Master Tropes,” an appendix to his 
1969 work A Grammar of Motives insofar as it trumps the others.  As Jeffrey W. Murray 
explains,  
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  Irony is dialogical.  Whereas metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche offer   
  particular perspectives for viewing and knowing the world, irony offers a   
  “perspective of perspectives” (1969a, 512).  Ultimately irony depends upon the  
  perspectives of Others – of other symbol users – and is thus an explicitly   
  dialogical rather than rhetorical trope.  Moreover, this inclusion of the voices of  
  Others in the construction of “truth” distinguishes irony as ethical.  Irony may, in  
  fact, offer the clearest view of Burke’s own incipient theory of ethics … [as well  
  as] a tacit synthesis of his dramatistic accounts of epistemology, ontology, and  
  ethics. (22)       
As Murray points out, irony becomes ethical for Burke because in its dialogism it not only 
recognizes the intractable presence of Others, but it incorporates not just the fact of the Other but 
the very point of view of the Other into its own perspective.  Irony, then, trumps the other master 
tropes in its multi-perspectival lens, and it links – through dramatism – the ways we know things 
with what we know as well as how we should approach both subjects.  The negotiation of the 
intractable Other foments in ironic discourse, particularly discourse like that produced by the 
character Mae West, a kind multi-layered meaning-machine, where each cog functions across 
semiotic, semantic, and somatic dimensions and where the final products of this machine remain 
open to interpretation, restructuring, and continual renegotiation.  For Mae West, irony provides 
the cheap joke as well as an ontological critique.  She, as a creator of rhetorical space and a 
progenitor of indirectly gendered critique, lies somewhere in the middle of those poles, between 
the onscreen West and her extradiagetical self.  
 Mae West is never caught “laying bare the truth, the truth of one’s sexuality, and 
inscribing it within a particular narrative” (Ballif 143).    In fact, the very rhetorical character of 
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West’s technique tends toward the opposite of what Michelle Ballif calls the orgiastic production 
of truth: seduction.  West’s seduction begins with her variously-signifying occupation of 
feminine space, which, according to Ballif (and Baudrillard) 
  is not a representation of gender, sex, or sexuality.  It is not a “marked” term; and  
  it would certainly not lay claim to any truth of its own, specifically a sexual truth.  
  The feminine does not exist in “nature” … but, rather, exists (if it can be said that  
  is) in the space of simulation, artifice (Baudrillard, Seduction 2, 11).  The   
  feminine is nothing, Gorgias’s apatē, but, this is her strength, just as it is apatē’s  
  strength to answer to kairos and disrupt the dialectic stronghold (Baudrillard,  
  Seduction 14). (Ballif 144) 
The feminine as it remains embodied and performed by Mae West “is not a gender; it is a 
challenge, a challenge to the comfortable binaries which sustain truth, a challenge to our social, 
gender coding” (Ballif 145).   
 The seduction to which Ballif alludes, one she borrows from Baudrillard, is a process of 
designification, one that challenges the very notion and production of truth, and in this manner 
remains somewhat tied to Judith Butler’s theory of performativity.  For Butler, though, the 
performance of gender in drag, particularly, indicates the very instability and performed-nature 
of gender’s (previously considered) ontological status.  The only difference between Butler and 
Baudrillard/Ballif here is that the latter sees seduction as dissolving the very ontological 
strictures that hold all truth together – not just the “truth” of gender.  The difference between 
Butler’s critique and that of Baudrillard/Ballif, here, is not a question of differing content; rather, 
it is a question of scope.  “This,” Ballif argues, “is where epistemology has failed us” (145).  It 
has “produced knowledge and, by extension, has produced us as subjects, insofar as we strip the 
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veils of appearance, of style, of illusion, in order to reveal the truth,” a dire mistake as the 
spectacle, as discussed in previous chapters, it itself tautologically true (146).      
 As a philosophical/rhetorical harbinger of the performative, public selves that emerge in 
the twentieth century, West compares nicely with Ballif’s prototype of Western female 
ambivalence, a master of multiple veils: Helen.  Like West, “[w]e have,” Ballif explains, “no 
desire to vindicate her as object of desire” (146). 
  To do so would be to assume the woman-as-victim subject position, a popular  
  position but, nevertheless, a reactive one.  Further, we have no desire to vindicate  
  her as subject of desire.  To do so would be to assume the woman-as-humanist  
  subject position, an ethical dead end. (146) 
As seen in Dali’s portrait of West as Baudrillard explains, “[t]here is no active or passive mode 
in seduction, no subject or object, no interior or exterior; seduction plays on both sides, and there 
is no frontier separating them.  One cannot seduce others, if one has not oneself been seduced” 
(qtd in Ballif 147).   
 Mae West as a rhetorical figure, then, asserts the will to seduce and be seduced, and she 
operates on the levels of overt and covert seduction, a seduction that opens the spaces necessary 
for questioning the seemingly inert power structures behind and within gender; her covert 
seduction is a critical seduction.  Overt seduction, however, her seemingly insatiable appetite for 
men (boxers, athletes, bodybuilders, actors – all young, handsome, muscled) has been interpreted 
in several different ways (generally negative ones) by those around her.  Musgrove and Eells 
spend a great deal of time in their rendering of West’s sexual narcissism and “unrelenting 
vanity” (19) pointing to her mirrored-ceiling and the seemingly countless backs of perfect men 
she avoids seeing as she gazes into her own eyes.  When confronted with the notion that her 
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mirror-fixation made her a sexual narcissist, she claimed, simply, “I like to see how I’m doin’” 
(131).  In director Henry Hathaway’s notion, though, “lovers” did not represent “the peak of 
Mae’s aspirations” (Eells and Musgrove 163). 
  “Power.  That’s what interested her,” he observed.  “The power she got from  
  making a picture was more important even than money.  Her requirements  
  demanded that she have authority, not material things.  She never needed a Rolls- 
  Royce [though she had at least one].  She never bought an elaborate estate or a  
  Beverly Hills mansion.  She had a modest house in the Valley and a fairly big  
  place at the beach – in Santa Monica, not Malibu Colony.  But think about where  
  she spent most of her time – in that little apartment [the one with the mirrored  
  bedroom ceiling] on Rossmore.  And she liked it there because that was a place  
  where she could create the illusion of being in complete control. (Eells and  
  Musgrove 163)   
Indeed, the star’s self-met-gaze, her reflected communion with her own coital body through the 
mirror, contained much more than sexual narcissism (though, I do agree that it was sprinkled 
with it): perhaps West holds herself in her own gaze in this moment as a way to remain a witness 
to her radical existence, her radical subversion of the truths of production, her “revolutionary 
critique without a revolutionary subject” (Ballif 151).  Ballif explains eloquently that such 
encounters, such moments of rhetorical complexity offer us “a pathos of distance, that is, the 
feminine that is the ‘irony of the community’” (151).  West’s pursuit of power as well as her 
pursuit of her own captured image represent evidence of her particular struggles.  Indeed, West 
was not so much interested in the accuracy of her reflected self, as evidenced by the fact that the 
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mirror in her apartment’s entryway was “slightly curved,” and “produced the illusion of added 
height and reduced weight” (Eells and Musgrove 131).       
 The feminine as embodied seduction exadversively embodies what Burke pushes toward 
in his Appendix on master tropes: Mae West’s performance of rhetorical (and, indeed, 
ontological) indirection is ethical in its interrogation of gender’s constraining assumptions, its 
limits and its overt rejection of traditional modes of policing those boundaries; it is the 
performance as well as the release of the dialogue with the intractable other, an other that exists, 
though not in the realm of production (which, of course, is a radical shift away from Burke’s 
more modern approach to ethics and dialogics).  West’s rhetorical figuring invites us to 
“radically rethink the conception of ‘liberty’ and ‘empowerment’” as well as its antecedents: 
identity, self-production, and linguistic reference.  In this way and at this time, West is better 
known as a radical philosopher of rhetoric than a camp performer, though camp certainly falls 
softly under the purview of this study.  Camp alone, though, does not provide us with the 
realization of “new, ethical ways of being – beyond the dialectic, beyond production and 
representation”; for that, “our epistemology must be seduced” (Ballif 151).    
Virgin to Vamp: Childhood Trauma and Early Performance Modalities 
 As an adult, Mae West often retold the story of the loss of her virginity as a defining 
moment in her girlhood.  Already a seasoned performer in her native Brooklyn, little, blond, 
outspoken Mamie West, originally Mary Jane West, enjoyed being tutored rather than attending 
school regularly.  This approach, thought her devoted and adoring mother, Tillie, prevented her 
education from interfering with performance schedules, which, even at that early age tended 
toward recurring monthly highlights in amateur contests with constant rehearsals and late-night 
rendezvous with rowdy New Yorkers hungry for laughter, song, and a little Rabelaisian humor 
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after a hard day’s work.  West’s tutor was a young, handsome and, as she tells it, naïve scholar in 
his twenties who never receives a name, even as his mythic status grows through West’s 
innumerable retellings.  Walking home from the theater after one day’s lesson, the story goes, 
West pinned her tutor down on the steps leading up to the family’s brownstone and, under the 
cover of her large, fur coat, rather forced the teacher to make love to her.  As West often 
explained, as her interest in sex increased, she became more and more drawn to the notion of 
experimentation before she was menstruating (according to all accounts, West’s earliest sexual 
experiences probably occurred when she was 11 or 12), before, she wistfully recalled, sex had 
consequences.  This version of the story was not the whole truth; it was, in fact, according to 
former agent and biographer Stanley Musgrove, reworked “for public consumption” (25).  Here, 
he alludes obliquely to West’s more private tale of her first time being with “a handsome ex-
actor who had no idea of her true age, only her assurance about her previous experience.  He 
guessed the truth only when she bled profusely” (25).   
 West’s renegotiation of her traumatic early encounters defines her career, saturates her 
very character.  “[A]fter the first couple of times,” Musgrove recalled West explaining in a 
fashion exemplary of her reclaiming her memory, her dignity, and her body, that after a few 
times “it felt good” (25).  She continued, “I wanted to find what all this sex stuff was about 
without any risk” (24).  Watts disagrees, 
  Despite her later insistence that she was the aggressor in these affairs, she also  
  indicated that she felt exploited.  She related her earliest sexual encounters  
  dispassionately, with a curious detachment that would always mark her attitude  
  toward intimacy.  This ambivalence reflected the reality that Mae West’s first  
  exposure to sex was traumatic; she was a victim of what now would be   
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  recognized as child molestation.  In each case, adult men used her for   
  gratification. (24)43 
  In some real ways, it is reasonable to read West’s entire career as a kind of public renegotiation 
of her early victimhood, a kind of discursive and performative rebellion against it and/or a 
disassociation from it.  Helpfully, as Janice Haaken reminds us, much work has been done in 
clinical psychology in the past decades that focuses specifically on “sexual abuse survivors who 
do not recognize the imprint of their abuse experiences” (116).  This group, whose symptoms 
actually work to conceal and dissociate their earlier trauma, seems to include Mae West.  
Sometimes, Haaken explains, these types of reenactments are also means of forgetting and the 
revising of contexts and scenarios in which power was lost.  However West seems to control sex 
and its vestigial scars, it remains a defining rhetorical topos for her.   
 Mae West’s indirect feminist rhetoric starts with and turns on her constant reenactment of 
the power dynamics of sex and gender as a negotiation of early trauma.  In these reenactments, 
West forwards what Jeffrey W. Murray sees as a Burkean ethics of irony, a constant and fluid 
renegotiation of the very fact of what Burke called the intractable other, a recalcitrant, and in her 
case, abusive, other.  Here, she struggles with the other’s point of view as both a tributary of her 
own celebrity persona and performance style as well as the impossibility of its forgetting.44  It is 
a rhetoric unique to its moment in the emergent, early twentieth century spectacular media of 
stage and screen that challenges and topples traditional notions of women’s gender-power and 
attempts to overtly divide its audience into those potentially activated by this message and those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Of course, these assertions have to be tempered by West’s own attempts to claim ownership, even control, of 
these instances of abuse and trauma.  Her pursuit of sexual power over strong men (boxers, etc.) serves as at least 
indirect evidence of a recurring renegotiation of these traumas. 
44 As Murray argues, “[R]ecalcitrance and irony offer an initial discussion of the way in which Others, those with 
whom we are not already co-constituted, present themselves to us within language.  If we operate understanding 
Burke’s assumption of consubstantiality, we are sometimes met with the recalcitrance of the Other.  That 
recalcitrance is experienced as irony, as a clash of motives and constitutions” (34), a perspective that integrates the 
perspectives of others.  This is why, for Burke, of all the master tropes irony remains the most ethically important.   
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whose lack of awareness provides support for the humor of the enterprise by drawing the rhetor’s 
subtle critique.  Mae West’s hyper-sexualized feminine persona works toward her feminism in 
the same complicated way the theater (a seemingly bourgeois institution) worked for Brecht’s 
Marxism: it presents itself as a “commodity pertaining to the very logic it denounces,” at once 
deploying radical critique and redirecting that critique ironically back upon itself and the 
audience who enjoys it (30).  This double-implication of audience and self is the touchstone of 
Westian indirect rhetoric, but though it remains powerful, it also, especially in analysis, remains 
fragile as well.  It remains for the scholar, of course, rather difficult sometimes to write directly 
about indirection.45     
 Sex without consequences/inconsequential sex became a kind of mantra for the Mae 
West character, even in its incipiency.  The biographical West, though, at least while still in her 
youth, had not been completely subsumed by the persona and remained caught in a kind of 
intimacy-dance in which she could only ever simulate connection by conjuring the sex act itself 
in what would become a seemingly endless cycle of sexual-narcissism-as-echolocation, a process 
Musgrove and biographer George Eells explain as exemplified in West’s preferred coping ritual: 
she would, as her career progressed, often only be consoled when upset by images of herself.  
Musgrove recollected several times that he had a box of publicity stills ready for her “approval” 
just for such an occasion as she might feel depressed.  Indeed, West’s image was not just 
important to her, but part of her radical subtlety/psychological fragility came in her constant need 
to be reminded through her image that she was real.  In the end, sex became for West and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 We do know, though, that all indirection is context and medium specific and depends, largely, on isolating, as 
much as one possibly can, motives of rhetors.  This, of course, is dicey at times, but it is also why the framing of 
indirect rhetorics of all sorts should be conveyed as interpretive on the part of the scholar, never definitive.  
Indirection as a rhetorical motif is powerful, but it should not be deployed as a critical-rhetorical strategy that 
condones the unitary truth of a situation because to rely on traditional notions of the possibilities of Cartesian self-
knowledge works against the very overdetermined nature of human selves, situations, and motives.  Indirect rhetoric 
can only contribute to larger discussions as one voice in many and should not be deployed as a totalizing device.    
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West character a kind of reenactment of forgetting, perhaps even a retributive operation of 
psychological vengeance against the real intimacy and agency that had been stolen from the 
performer as a young girl.     
        Biographical evidence, as well, points to another kind of abuse West encountered early 
on in the person of her father, Battlin’ Jack West, an ill-tempered, streetwise Irishman, whose 
physique was reinvested in the star’s post-menopausal performances in Las Vegas, her cadre of 
bodybuilders enacting in reverse the straw man of her youth, perhaps best embodied in the 
person of her later caretaker, bodybuilder Paul Novak.  The extent and the nature of her abusive 
relationship with her father is unclear, but West remembered often cowering in corners out of 
terror, afraid that her father’s temper would turn her way.  An amateur pugilist, Jack West taught 
his small daughter “the manly arts of boxing, acrobatics, and weightlifting,”Watts recalls, noting 
that Jack West “immersed her in his world of physical brutality, taking her to the gym and to 
prizefights” (11).  West’s early relationship with violence and power, though, went much deeper: 
“Mae remembered battling her father in one-on-one boxing matches.  Pitting a grown man, a 
trained boxer, against a small child was not mere play,” Watts argues, but“was abusive.  The 
relationship between violence and power consumed Mae West as an adult, and she often 
associated it with her father” (11).   
 In another often told story, one in which the typical Westian humor and double-
voicedness are absent, West reminisced about her first sexual dream, at the age of 12; a huge 
bear with an erect, “reddish-brown penis” enters her room on its hind legs, places his paws over 
her headboard and proceeds to sexually penetrate her as she lay pinned beneath (Eells and 
Musgrove 24).  As Watts reveals, West once shared with a close colleague that the bear dream 
“worried me for a long time” and that, as an adult, “she was plagued by such intense dreams 
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about sex that she required sedatives so she could sleep” (24).  “But why a bear,” West later 
quipped in her typical offhand manner, “I was never interested in them” (Eells and Musgrove 
24).  In a nod to her 1932 film, I’m No Angel, she continues, “Lions were what I found fas-cin-a-
tin’” (24).      
 Mae West lives with her head in the lion’s mouth, as does her character Tira in Angel, 
and her indirect feminist rhetoric is rhetorically responsive to her troubling, confining, and 
sometimes sexually violent earlier relationships.  Though sold as the great conquistadora of sex, 
the great purveyor of innuendo, Mae West and her actual bodily relationship with sex and men 
suggests a continued negotiation with and fight against her own sense of confinement and 
insecurity.  Mae West’s indirect feminist rhetoric, then, represents an embodied technology of 
performance not dissimilar from her principal and earliest influence, Bert Williams.   
 Egbert Austin Williams (1874-1922) dominated vaudeville in the early part of the 
twentieth century with his ebullient singing and dancing, becoming what biographer Eric Ledell 
Smith called “the leading comedian of his time,” eventually starring as the first black performer 
in the Ziegfeld Follies (qtd in Forbes 603).  Another aspect of his show, though, the one that shot 
through young Mae West like a barbed spike, came in Williams’s donning of blackface, a double 
masking of his already African American identity and an early attempt at the kind of 
extradiegetical commentary West would later perfect.  While some viewed Williams’s 
performance as submissive to white stereotypes of African Americans, others, particularly 
African Americans in the crowd – though often separated off from the rest of the audience by 
strict spatial partitioning – saw in Williams’s comedy themes that subtly mocked the white 
audience and implicated them in their racist gaze, what James Weldon Johnson called, in a 
meditation on Williams in the American Mercury in 1928, the challenge of a writer “not to 
197 
	  
address a double audience, but a divided one” (Forbes 606).  Already by 1921, the year the 
young Mae West would dye her locks white-blond, she was being reviewed favorably as fronting 
her own doubleness, as engendered by her early love and appropriation of Williams.  Watts 
explains that “Mae was dangerous [to the critics]; by playing between extremes … she made her 
performance subversive and disquieting” (57).  At this phase in the late teens and early twenties, 
with West known primarily for her alluring dance, “the shimmy,” the performer existed less 
between the boundaries of male and female and more along the electric line between the races as 
publicly performed in 1920s New York.         
 Although Williams’s work had a deep impact on what would become Mae West’s gender 
performance, some Harlem Renaissance intelligentsia and later generations of African American 
scholars, critics, and writers would feel less inclined to elevate Williams as a pioneer, as his 
blackface-upon-African American identity performance tilted perilously on the very edge of 
American racism and its public critique.  Even Ralph Ellison, whose wily grandfather in 
Invisible Man, tells his grandson, whispering, in his dying breath to, “Live with your head in the 
lion’s mouth …. let ‘em swoller you till they vomit or bust wide open” (16), dismisses 
Williams’s work.  In Shadow and Act, Ellison explains that actors like Williams who “assume 
the group-debasing role for gain not only substantiates the audience’s belief in the ‘blackness’ of 
all things black, but relieves it, with dream-like efficiency, of its guilt” (49).  Ellison’s 
consideration of Williams’s work fails to take into account, though, a facet of the Williams-
performative that inculcates the audience, appropriates it, toward critical ends.46  As Michelle 
Ann Stephens argues, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Though perhaps an inspiration for Ellison’s Clifton character in Invisible Man, Williams, at least in this reading,, 
uses his performance to critical ends.  Clifton, of course, signifies his own hopelessness by returning to the streets in 
a highly disconcerting blackface-puppet act.  Certainly Ellison’s interpretation here is of great importance and 
should remain a caveat to my interpretation.   
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  Williams’s story involves two people – the man to whom the trouble occurs and  
  the person witnessing and laughing at the event.  When shared as a joke to a third  
  person, all the players in the scene shift to a more social level of interaction, as  
  Freud described in Jokes and Their Relationship to the Unconscious, published in  
  1905 and contemporaneous with Williams’ … first musical comedies.  Freud  
  argued that this third person, the one ‘to whom the comic thing is told’, was  
  ‘indispensable for the completion’ of a successful joke (Freud, 1963: 224).  The  
  success of a joke rests in part on the forming of a crucial alliance between   
  performer and audience, the first and third person, who together feel comfortable  
  creating a sense of community from their shared laughter at a suitable, second  
  other. (136) 
The traditional rendering of Williams’s minstrelsy, though, fails to articulate or notice a level of 
critical potential that brews between and among the audience and the performer in the moment of 
shared community.  It is in this very moment where a kind of tenuous identification is built that 
subversive social critique can be drawn – though not too sharply.   
 This moment in Bert Williams’s constructions of race and later in Mae West’s 
constructions of gender is elided by the performers’ desire for wealth, fame, and adulation, but 
this elision – as well as one that comes in the very anesthetic of the performed identity-as-drawn 
– creates space for radical subversion.  Williams, as he recalls in his 1918 essay “The Comic 
Side of Trouble,” is anything but immune to racism.  He explains, “I have acquired enough 
philosophy to protect me against the things which could cause me humiliation and grief had I not 
learned independence” (par. 5).  Some critics, like Karen Sotiropoulos, have drawn attention to 
moments in Williams’s performances when “‘black audiences in the balcony laughed … [and] 
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whites remained silent.  These moments made all too clear that [Williams] told jokes that went 
literally and figuratively over the heads of their white audiences” (Sotiropoulos 6).  In his 
transforming of the space of performance into the space of critique, Williams at the dawn of the 
age of mass communication, an age West would come for some time to dominate, successfully 
appropriated and then co-opted an audience.  Stephens explains what made Bert Williams a 
radical character was that the “joke was precisely that of his racialization as the figure of social 
ridicule” (136).   
 While Ellison, perhaps rightfully, felt uncomfortable with Williams’s performances 
because, as he thought, they enacted white audiences “own form of racial forgetting,” these 
critiques miss the radical potential inherent in Williams’s approach.  First, Williams was able to 
both attain a diverse audience (which, for any African American entertainer of that period, was 
difficult to do) and subvert that audience, while still maintaining enough performative gravity (or 
“entertainment value”) to keep the audiences in their seats.  The entertainment value of 
Williams’s work is, to my thinking, both the element that made Ellison so uncomfortable but 
also the necessary condition for the comedian’s larger, subversive agenda.  Camille Forbes is 
correct, then, to “consider his interventions not in simple terms of accommodation or radical 
resistance, but rather in terms of racial performativity, informed by Judith Butler’s work on 
gender performativity” (608).  What makes Forbes’s take on Williams-though-Butler interesting 
for this study is that long before Butler theorized drag as an ontologically subversive activity, 
Mae West had become, appropriating Williams’s technique (as well as his claim to the soothing 
balm of humor), the most famous female impersonator in the world, according to a 1934 Vanity 
Fair editorial.  Reading Williams through Butler has a particularly delicious presentist disregard 
for the sequences of history as well as representing the kind of zealous appropriation that Mae 
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West would have loved.  Williams’s tendency to disrupt the frenetic pace of the vaudeville stage, 
his propensity to talk-sing, and the appearance that he “hardly endeavored to make his audiences 
laugh, perhaps hardly cared whether they did nor not” had an enormous effect on the young 
West, and she appropriated each one of them, as they helped her create a kind of performative 
camouflage. But, as Jill Watts argues, Williams’ presence in her life and performance “went 
beyond her surface delivery and permeated the substance of her performance, providing the 
sustaining subtext for it” (23) – a subtext of radically unstable meanings, of publicity-as-
personal-negotiation of trauma, of the audience as surrogate lover, surrogate friend.  Most of all, 
though, what West draws from Williams is the notion of a carefully crafted and often dangerous 
public self, sometimes, in the performative shadow of the already sly Williams, who, as a young 
girl, she would channel and imitate at “church socials” as, what her stage-mother Tillie often 
called, “the beginning of her training” (Ward 108).           
Subverting Inversion: SEX, The Drag, and The Pleasure Man 
 In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler takes issue with Monique Wittig’s “oppositional 
relationship” to Freud, foregrounding “the function of language in which ‘the mark of gender’ 
occurs” (Butler 27).  Wittig’s rejection of what she sees as Freud’s heternormativity in his Three 
Essays on Sexuality is understandable, but Butler correctly warns her readers that despite that 
shortcoming, psychoanalysis provides some useful framework for understanding the modern 
agent, even a modern agent that practices sexual subversion. 
 Following Lacan and Irigary, Butler reveals that, traditionally, the feminine throughout 
psychoanalytic theory has been represented as “lack”; said differently, “the feminine is never a 
mark of the subject” (27).  This lack, though, functions as other in a system of othering, where 
even the male symbolic apparatus is “produced by the law that prohibits incest and forces an 
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infinite displacement of a heterosexualizing desire,” which, in any case, is just as absent as the 
lack in an ontological sense, though its presence is marked in the tides of publicness and public 
acceptablity (27).  This public propositionality is the mark of traditional rhetoric, whose conceit 
lies in the assumption of its fairness and open access.  This element of Irigiary’s Freud is 
exceptionally important for Butler’s theorization of the subject in her famous account of 
subversive sexual performance, or drag.  For Butler, drag represents a public and corporealized 
critique of the assumption of binaristic ontologies of gender.  Of course, Irigary’s decision to 
extrapolate a particularly feminine sexuality – one that exists and operates as presence and 
outside the law of the father, has led her into the realm of essentializing – a place Butler did not 
wish to go in her early work but explored more thoroughly in later works (particularly Bodies 
that Matter [2011]), acknowledging that certain behaviors do seem to persist despite efforts to 
define them as cultural products (29). 
 Butler’s earlier theory of performance – and drag in particular – seems tailor-made for a 
performer like West, ironically shaping her own performances of femininity on those of men-
playing-women; thus, she, following, at first anyway, the mannerisms of famous drag queens 
Bert Savoy and Julian Eltinge, becaming a woman-playing-a-man-playing-a-woman.  The 
question for this section is, as Butler puts it, “How is ‘being’ instituted and allocated through the 
signifying practices of the paternal economy?” (43). For performers like Mae West, who, as I 
will argue, have feminist messages to offer but prefer (or must) offer them to publics through 
indirect means, the very assumption of the “being” Butler discounts becomes the starting point 
for effective indirect rhetoric. 
 As was the case for Marcet Haldeman-Julius, who cloaked her feminist critiques of her 
abusive spouse, editor, and publisher in other women’s language, indirect rhetoric begins with a 
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public assumption of being: whether that being is as elemental as “being” a woman or as role-
dependent as “being” the editor’s wife, the public’s orientation that one “is” such-and-such 
creates a particular space where feminist critique can exist and can be offered to audiences.  
Butler’s critique of heternormativity as an ontology is important and, in 2012, is a well-accepted 
piece of the intellectual history of feminism and rhetoric, though it does no good to accept it 
without question, lest Butler’s important work fall into the kind of shallow academic repetition 
Foucault has been subjected to. I seek to go beyond the dilemma presented in Butler’s work, 
following Julia Walker’s lead.  Walker explains that Butler’s theory of performance “appears to 
be premised upon a contradictory model of agency, presupposing both a limited subject, 
constrained by the discursive networks that hail it into being, and a voluntarist subject capable of 
exerting a parodistic will” (162).  This subject-in-drag, in other words, both acknowledges the 
very limitation of being hailed within a heterosexual matrix, and even in the most extreme 
version of drag-type performance, is able to critique that matrix up to the point that the criticism 
points out, for Butler, the very constructedness of all gender.  That is, the critique, here, suffers a 
kind of circularity, where we can only speak to the way we are constructed in language.  As Julia 
Walker articulates, this “hopelessly [locks her subject] into a nominalist position, preventing her 
from speaking to the ways in which these terms are lived within the material conditions of 
reality” (166).  The strength, then, of Butlerean drag-as-gender-critique, is imminently tied to 
eradicating all but the linguistic foundations of being itself, and when that eradication is 
complete, the agent is left without non-parodic agency, largely because Butler “pushes the issues 
of context and reception to the margins of her theory” (167). 
 Indeed reception and context comprise two of the three elements that constitute indirect 
feminist rhetoric; the third is technique.  Mae West’s technique of indirect feminist rhetoric is 
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complicated and indeed defined by the fact that, unlike a performer in a drag show, she “is” what 
is being parodied, she lives in the body-made-unreal, and her message is scattershot, aiming at 
once to entertain the masses while stimulating, like a dog-whistle, those radicals in the audience 
who are inclined and attuned to her more radical critique of sexual power.  This critique, which, 
like Butler’s, foregrounds the plasticity of gender roles, has a larger, more radical impulse.  
Indeed, West’s own drag-like performances serve as smokescreens for her lifelong commitment 
to gay rights; replacing ostracized bodies with her own, she becomes a simulacrum exhibiting, 
absorbing, and returning the audience’s gendered expectation, and this cooptation is the key to 
her success.  Additionally, Mae West’s indirect feminism complements gay male life rather than 
working against it or ignoring it altogether.  Without a doubt, she saw the fates of homosexual 
men in New York tied up with her own.  As George Chauncey explains, “That gay men 
themselves shared this identification accounts, in part, for the popularity of ‘strong’ or ‘tough’ 
women, such as Mae West, as gay icons or drag personas” (61).  These women, after all, 
“disdained convention, were determinedly and overtly sexual in character, and did what they 
needed to get what they wanted” (61).47       
 The reason West as a historical and cultural actor provides a useful lens into Butler’s 
theories comes in what one might call “natural performance” – that West’s persona consists of a 
performative movement is not to be questioned, though the very artifice belies a core or depth 
there that never self-represents, allowing its very opacity to remain compulsory and enigmatic.  
In this way, West’s performances of gender go beyond drag, beyond camp, and into the realm of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Carol Ward continues: “Homosexuals expressed an early affinity for West’s brand of exaggerated, flamboyant 
sexuality.  Her pleas for tolerance toward gays (as demonstrated in her play The Drag) and her open affection for the 
‘chorus boys’ who populated her backstage life were additional reasons for homosexual respect.  As West remarked, 
‘Male homosexuals are generally witty and talented, so I am interested in them’” (Ward 66).  
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feminist rhetoric; a terrain in which the Butlerean subject is caught sans subjecthood.  Walker 
continues, 
  Even on the level of theory, though, Butler’s notion of agency as a temporal  
  dimension of subjectivity is problematic.  Though it would seem to clear her of  
  the charge that she has posited a contradictory model of the subject, it doesn’t  
  resolve that contradiction so much as occlude it by slipping between two different 
  fields of analysis.  One field operates according to a metaphor of space, where the 
  subject is constrained, within a synchronic structure of discursive    
  relations; the other operates according to a metaphor of time, where the subject is  
  potentially free to resist those structures within a diachronically – marked moment 
  in the process of their reproduction. (164) 
In many ways, agents of indirect feminist rhetoric negotiate both the dimensions that Walker lays 
out, but their negotiation of those dimensions is successful, both because it promises less in the 
moment but also because its potential for unlimited interpretive power in the future remains 
unbounded.  Characters like West move beyond the drag-subversion of gender normativity by 
activating future counterpublics at the same time as occupying dominant space in mass media, at 
the same time they themselves demonstrate and dance around the norm.  Where Butler’s subject 
subverts identity – as a philosophical category as well as a value locus – indirect feminist rhetors 
assert identity, albeit in the future.  This assertion of identity and identification with future 
audiences, counterpublics, archipelagos of culture attuned to radical messages, defines the 
rhetorical enterprise at work behind West’s performatively indirect rhetoric.   
 In terms of West’s own rhetorical significations, though, her presentation subsumes 
Butlerean camp and at once multiplies its strategies.  “For Butler,” as for West, “nothing 
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succeeds in subverting the straight like excess” (Bergman 11).  David Bergman elaborates that 
Butler “postulates some Ricardo-like law of the cultural imagination: recognition grows 
arithmetically, while signifiers can grow geometrically;” push up the supply side, and the gender 
system will collapse by its own weight” (11).  This movement, though, of collapse through what 
Butler calls “subversive repetition enabled by [dominant, heterosexual] constructions” is bent on 
creating “possibilities of intervention” – but what types of intervention?  This, exactly, is the 
location where Walker feels Butler’s theory breaks down, where the Butlerean agent/subject is 
both freed and constrained by the modes of dominant discourse (Walker 162).  At the bottom of 
Walker’s critique of Butler is also an underlying warning about the shaky terrain of camp, which 
is placed by some scholars, from Susan Sontag to Scott Long, in a nether region of political 
efficacy.  Even Sontag, Bergman reminds us, raised and then set aflame the banner of camp, 
arguing that its “sentimental relation to beauty is no help to women” (qtd in Bergman 8).   
 West’s camp functions as a consciousness-raising enterprise occasionally, while other 
times its political ramifications are subsumed in its own performances.  Unlike Butlerean drag, 
Mae West, as a writer, rhetor, and performer, presents a kind of hide-and-seek quality that has 
great potential to grow signifiers geometrically, as Bergman phrases it.  In this case, West’s 
clarion call is multivocal, directed at multiple audiences/audience members, and even, most 
radically, directed at a future audience.  The Westean subject is unrestrained compared to the 
Butlerean always-in-drag subject, because as a woman performing a man performing a woman, 
West’s cacophonous persona could cast a very particular rhetorical net: (re)creating traditional 
heterosexual identifications with some members of the audience – a cooptation of her traditional 
audiences – and at the same time performing, almost magically, a doubleness that, more like the 
traditional Butlerean subject, summons the uncanny through humor, parody, and irony: she is 
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highly sexualized for one of her audiences and highly politicized for members of her own 
audiences.  The bifurcation of these all-at-once personas is what makes West of particular 
importance to the history of rhetoric: hers is a double, perhaps a triple-identification – with 
traditional heteronormative sex symbol, with subversive drag operative, and with something that 
acknowledges both and supervenes them: West creates a kind of “affective identification,” as 
Davis explains it (referencing Freud), “with the other … who is not (yet) a discrete object or 
image or form” (125).     
 Like her stage performances, West’s ascent to national recognition was not 
straightforward.  From the teens to the middle twenties West shifted between traveling in stock 
companies, working bit parts on Broadway, and appearing on the bill at all levels of the 
Vaudeville circuit, from the vaunted Keith bookings to clubs across the country with less status 
and credibility.  Mae West became known as the queen of the shimmy and for her infamous 
rendering of “Frankie and Johnny” (Watts 59).  During these years, West worked with lots of 
partners and found herself particularly successful when paired with the dapper and talented jazz 
pianist Harry Richman, who, much to the chagrin of West’s business partner and sometime lover 
Jim Timony, started up a passionate affair with his costar that eventually ended with the duo’s 
involvement in what was to become West’s first Broadway starring role in The Ginger Box 
Review, sold to West by a crook named Paul DuPont (58).  A few weeks into the production, 
while West kept busy honing her appeal as “The Vamp of Broadway,” working on songs like “I 
Want a Cave Man,” “I’m a Night School Teacher,” and “Sorry I Made You Cry,” DuPont 
disappeared (Watts 60).  While the production sank further and faster into debt, the cast and crew 
became privy to the fact that DuPont, “also known by several other aliases, was really Edward 
Perkins, a producer with a long, disastrous track record” who had only a con man’s interest in the 
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production, leaving it, Watts recalls, “$10,000 in the red” (61).  To make matters worse, upon 
West’s departure from the failed play, Richman, despite an attractive and financially 
advantageous offer from the Keith circuit for a string of engagements, took off for his own first 
Broadway role, leaving West stranded.  Tricked by a con artist and deserted by her partner, West 
came to the idea that it was time to turn her own luck by drafting her first full-length play, The 
Hussy. 
 As Watts recalls, though West never got The Hussy produced, it “was a milestone in her 
evolution,” allowing West to “craft her fictional presence through a new means – 
autobiographical confession” (61).  Though The Hussy was a poorly written and unsuccessful 
reconstruction of The Ruby Ring, a developing sophistication is discernible in the text.  Watts 
considers this play a turning point for the following reasons: 
  First, she not only developed a prototype of her stage persona but was also  
  continuing her experimentation with the power of language. … Next, West pits  
  her character in a contest against men.  Again, she demonstrates the mutability of  
  identity, the transformative power of her tricksterism. (63)    
Lastly, West develops strategic evasions of female superiority.  “Men,” she explains, “never like 
to feel that you think you are superior to them” (Watts 63).  Instead, “they want you to be and if 
they don’t think you are – it’s a lost cause where you’re concerned, but they don’t want you to 
know you are” (63).  As West’s character in the play, Nona, warns her friends, “Never let a man 
see you care for him – keep him guessing” (63).  Finally, though, The Hussy represents a turning 
point for West because it marks the moment when she started “to use her work to explore and 
renegotiate the realities of her existence and oppression” (64).  The critical strain that undergirds 
most of her most important work in the twenties and thirties is born in The Hussy, which 
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represents a kind of pupa-like development of West’s relationship to her own spectacular public 
persona as well as to her own strategies of dealing with powerful men, trauma, and traditional 
gendered expectations.        
 West’s successful Broadway debut came only four years later with 1926’s SEX, which 
opened at Daly’s Theater on April 26th and ran well over 300 performances, surviving raids and 
shut downs by the NYPD, which hauled West to jail on charges of immorality.  Of course, the 
media frenzy that surrounded West’s arrest did wonders for the play, and it vaulted West into a 
stratum of fame new to even her.  During its run, 
  West established her sensuality and desirability with an image that ran counter to  
  the popular female archetype, the flapper.  In part, this was by necessity. Now  
  thirty-three, West was full-figured and did not possess the 1920’s voguish slim,  
  flat-chested, and “boyish” physique.  It did not go unnoticed – one critic decried  
  her as “over plump” – but West chose to exploit rather than downplay her   
  difference.  Embracing her natural body, she used it to assert herself physically  
  over SEX’s male characters. … Mae had begun to construct her body as both a  
  weapon of resistance and a battlefield, a place to wage war. (Watts 76)   
In point of fact, what Watts notices during West’s SEX years in the middle twenties, that she uses 
her body as a battlefield, was true for West’s entire life – her body, both an object of abuse and 
an object of power, best exemplifies the complexity not just of West’s situation but of her own 
attempts to wrangle financial, intellectual, and sexual control from an abusive, male world.  
Though its box office suffered a bit in the heat of the summer, Sex continued to be a hit for well 
over a year, but its success did not satiate West, who, with her first Broadway hit under her belt, 
did something startling: she began writing plays in which she not only would not appear – but 
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plays that were designed only for an all homosexual male cast.  Her interest in gay male 
subculture began during trips out to Harlem nightspots that featured female impersonators, and 
her early days impersonating a black man impersonating a white-man’s version of a black man 
came flooding back when she witnessed this.  At one such Harlem nightspot, she offered the 
whole cast free tickets to SEX, and those who showed up were asked to audition for West’s new 
comedy, The Drag (Watts 82).   
 The Drag represents an enormous change in West’s agenda.   According to Lillian 
Schlissel, this script  
  refute[s] West’s statement that she wrote because she needed material for the  
  stage.  She never appeared in The Drag … [the] play was meant to be performed  
  by a company of gay male actors while she starred in the heterosexual   
  playgrounds of SEX and then Diamond Lil.  Yet she was obsessed with the gay  
  plays, revising and rewriting them through the 1970s, hoping to turn them into  
  films. (2) 
Schlissel goes on in an introduction she writes for a collection of West’s plays that she 
republished in 1997 to say that the “vulgarity of Mae West plays was meant to disrupt standards 
of propriety … to sow the seeds of revolution” (2).  Schlissel goes on with what I consider to be 
a rather simplistic rendering of West’s “frontal assault on verbal taboos” which “turn the 
Broadway stage into a battlefield” (6).   
 What strikes me as odd about these characterizations of West, though they may well 
apply to her own performances, is how The Drag reads so differently from most of her other 
work.  It would be a stretch into fiction to call The Drag an assault of any kind; it is, rather, in 
my opinion, at least, quite the opposite: a philosophical meditation, a counter-propositional 
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rhetorical enterprise meant to slide a rhetoric of identification surgically through a spectacular 
cell-wall of audience expectation.   
 Michael Warner characterizes an important aspect of work that attempts to rehistoricize, 
recharacterize, commodities such as West’s plays as radical bits of indirection that speak, to a 
degree, in code, that are future-oriented, that invoke radical audiences all the while that they 
throw sops to traditional audiences’ value-sets.  Warner explains that these types of 
performances, those that surreptitiously critique traditional gender norms, often address “a public 
that does not yet [fully] exist” (130).  “[F]inding that their language can only circulate in 
channels that are hostile to it,” rhetors like West tend to “write in a manner designed to be a 
placeholder for a future public” (130).  Indeed, rhetors like West design their work to speak to 
divided audiences in different ways.  In the delivery of one line, West can chastise a third of her 
crowd for their traditional attitudes, alienate a third of her crowd by way of a complete assault on 
their sacred assurances about sex and gender, and, at once, liberate, congratulate, and titillate the 
remaining third of the crowd.  The latter “gets” the joke being told but also “gets” that the joke is 
on the other audience members as well.  For West as for Williams, this type of audience 
incision/derision is as dangerous as it was evocative.  While West’s biographer, Jill Watts, 
argues that she just wanted to “cash in” on the bustling gay night life of Harlem and Greenwich 
Village, I argue that something more genuine pulls West toward these plays (83).  Even if West 
wanted to “cash in,” she was earning a continually excellent living from SEX, and, more 
important, any close study of West goes to show that before money, before fame, even, West 
loved the power of performance.  Taking herself off stage and assuming the invisible role of 
writer may well represent the most incredible reversal in an already radically complex career.  
West knew that if the play made it to Broadway – which it almost certainly could not, due the 
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censorship campaigns being waged against her personally by New York district attorney Joab H. 
Banton – it would not be profitable for long.  Even though the gay nightlife maintained a close 
and committed following, its biggest stars, Savoy and Eltinge, could not draw in the mainstream 
community and perhaps did not want to.  West’s motives, then, paired with her lifelong 
obsession with and rewriting of these plays, remains a fascinating mystery.  
 That The Drag was meant to be played by a cast made up entirely of gay male actors, a 
move that immediately spectacularized the play and devolved quickly for West into legal 
difficulties, speaks to its placeholding status.  As George Chauncey recalls in Gay New York, 
many historians and even newspapers at the time speculated that when West was arrested in 
1926, ostensibly for starring in her play Sex, her incarceration was really on account of “the 
threat of The Drag’s being brought into the city” (313).  In fact, it was a mere two months after 
West’s February 9, 1927 arrest that New York’s state legislature “amended the public obscenity 
code to include a ban on any play ‘depicting or dealing with the subject of sex degeneracy or sex 
perversion’” (Chauncey 313). 
 Of course, The Drag, with its threat of such indecency must have been the very epitome 
of West’s boundary-pushing, right?  Wrong.  This is what makes the play so interesting.  It 
functions, despite having an all gay cast and adhering to the traditional spectacular characteristics 
of melodrama, as a play that humanizes as well as spectacularizes the struggles of members of 
dominated social strata.  West, at least in the first two acts, attempts to insert what takes place 
off-stage, as it were, into the public transcript.  According to Scott, the public transcript is 
typically characterized as a self-portrait of elites, one whose truth-value is jeopardized by its 
assumption of hegemonic expectations and of consequent performances from subordinate 
groups.  Quite counter to her own starring roles, The Drag is rather serious, beginning with a 
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learned discussion between a jurist and a psychiatrist of Karl Heinrich Ulrich’s theories of sexual 
inversion, theories that preceded and informed the more developed (and even more sympathetic) 
theories of Richard von Krafft-Ebing and later, Sigmund Freud.  West admitted, upon 
researching these plays, to reading heavily in the subject matter of the day, from Freud to Krafft-
Ebing to her favorites Ulrich and Havelock Ellis, who believed “homosexuals were ‘inverts,’ 
born with drives that had been turned inward” (Watts 82), drives that mirrored those of women, 
but nonetheless were populations that deserved legal and institutional respect and protection.    
 While Watts’s renderings of West are almost all exquisitely wrought, her take on certain 
secondary subjects, topics seemingly tangential, leads her analysis astray occasionally.  Her 
discussions of West’s relationship with sexuality and its discussion in psychological literature are 
a case in point.  Watts is correct to point out the effect of Havelock Ellis on Mae West, not only 
because he was a respected psychologist but also because of his unique publishing relationship 
with the Haldeman-Julius press.  The Haldeman-Juliuses wooed Ellis to write for them and 
wound up publishing hundreds of thousands of his books condensed into 16,000 words.  In short: 
Ellis’s works on sexuality were in wide and cheap circulation, and his theories on homosexuality 
were published four years before Freud’s “Three Essays on Sexuality” – not to mention that they 
gave the subject a much more in-depth treatment.  Though Watts, too, is right to point out the 
importance of Ellis’s theory of inversion, her analysis falls short in description.  Ellis’s theories 
of sexuality are hugely important to West, so much so that she will, after this period, often use 
his words verbatim and claim them as her own views.  One such impulse comes in the push for 
acceptance of homosexual lifestyles that underlies Ellis’s theory of inversion.  In Sexual 
Inversion, he explains,  
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  I had not at first proposed to devote a whole volume to sexual inversion.  It may  
  even be that I was inclined to slur it over as an unpleasant subject, and one that it  
  was not wise to enlarge upon.  But I found in time that several persons for whom I 
  felt respect and admiration were the congenital subjects of this abnormality.  At  
  the same time I realized that in England, more than any other country, the law and 
  public opinion combine to place a heavy penal burden and a severe social stigma  
  on the manifestations of an instinct which to those persons who possess it   
  frequently appears natural and normal.  It was clear, therefore, that the matter was 
  in special need of elucidation and discussion. (v)   
Unlike Freud, Ellis sees inversion – a particularly unfortunate term – as more a political or even 
sociological problem than a purely psychological one.  It is, in his view, a factor in all societies, a 
constant of sorts, and, in that vein, his work aims to lead readers to rethink their own positions in 
relation to homosexuality, rather than merely – like some of his contemporaries (such as Krafft-
Ebing) wrapping the topic in scientific language.  The first section of the book, importantly, 
includes a section on homosexuality, “Among Men of Exceptional Intellect and Moral Leaders,” 
while other sections cover homosexuality in animals, in soldiers, and among different cultures.  
That this section leads his study does not cover over the fact that Ellis still uses the unfortunate 
terms “inversion” and “abnormal” in his accounts, but it goes far in demarcating the problem of 
the reception of homosexuality as the real cultural malady.  
 In their initial discussion of Ulrich in the play’s opening moments, the judge pursues the 
traditional narrative of American masculinity, as he explains to the doctor that “A man is what he 
makes himself” (West 107), to which the doctor replies, speaking of one of his patients, that 
homosexuality is found “among persons of every state of society.  It has held sway on the 
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thrones of kings, princes, scholars, and fools.  Wealth, culture, refinement, makes no difference” 
(West 108).  The two continue for most of the first act to debate what the judge calls culture’s 
obligation to “suppress” this impulse and “stamp it out of modern society” through the use of law 
and the police apparatuses (108).  The doctor continues, always without irony, to inquire why the 
state should “force [these men] into secrecy and shame, for being what they cannot help being, 
by branding them as criminals and so lead them into the depths of misery and suicide” (108).  
 As the plot unfolds, the audience learns not only that the doctor’s daughter, Claire, and 
the judge’s son, Rolly, have just been married but that, unbeknownst to the doctor, Rolly is gay 
and has left his boyfriend in pursuit of another family associate, the straight engineer Allen 
Grayson.  When Rolly arrives at his father-in-law’s home one afternoon, he finds his ex-lover, 
David, seeking treatment from the doctor and becomes frightened that David will let the secret 
out.  Taking him violently in hand, Rolly demands to know whether David has told his father-in-
law, to which David responds, earnestly, “It’s not so.  I didn’t tell him I so much as knew you.  I 
came because I thought he could help me” (116).  Rolly responds and the scene ends with his 
belief that David is a fool, that the doctor “can do nothing for you – For any of us” (116).  As 
David explodes with anger and despair, shaking his fist at Rolly, the doctor enters the room, 
confused.  “My poor lad – What’s got into you?  It may be the drug I’ve given him,” he explains 
to Rolly; “poor devil,” the doctor continues to his son-in-law, who is now visibly shaken, “Thank 
God, Rolly, you’re not what he is” (116). 
 Several rhetorical points of interest emerge here.  First, other than David’s visit to Rolly’s 
father-in-law, nothing at all happens in this first act, and indeed in the second, that can be 
considered remotely campy or even melodramatic.  But what do we make of West’s attempts to 
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take the very bruises of homosexual life, the very banalities of secret shame, and to project them 
– these difficult social truths – onto a medium so spectacular as theater?     
 In many ways, answering this question – at least as it relates to indirect rhetoric – 
requires a short digression into the nature of spectacle as it develops out of critical theory.  The 
language of spectacle, like the language of queer identity in West’s work, is a language of 
“inversion.”  Spectacle, of course, gets its best and earliest explication by French Situationalist 
Guy Debord’s work Society of Spectacle, which characterizes the spectacle as “a concrete 
inversion of life” (12) that “serves as total justification for the conditions and aims of the existing 
system” (13), a complex, multi-layered, ethotic, sleight of hand, wielded by the dominant class, 
whose major effect, for Debord anyway, is the transforming of “[a]ll that once was directly 
lived” into “mere representation” (12).  Jacques Ranciere, also a radical Frenchman with Marxist 
sympathies (and a former collaborator of Louis Althusser’s), refers to spectacle’s role in 
capitalist ideology, attributing spectacle as an important element of its staying power, its 
impenetrability, playing on what Debord calls the tautological character of spectacle, its 
equivalency of means and ends; it becomes a negation of life, he explains, “that has invented a 
visual form of itself” (14).   For Ranciere, it is capable of dismissing, incorporating, or coopting 
any oppositional force.  
 West uses spectacle slightly differently, though, at least in The Drag.  She inserts a 
spectacle within the spectacle, as it were.  In Film Fables, Ranciere explains that “the spectacle 
within the spectacle will force the hypocrite into the open” (35).  In the case of West’s play, the 
hypocrite, if sensitized correctly by her rhetoric, becomes a particularly characterized invocation 
of the audience.  This is true not just in West’s notably non-ironic treatment of Rolly’s life but 
also his death as well. 
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 The element about The Drag that is most fascinating and at once most confounding is the 
structure of act three, which is, almost in its entirety a huge drag show.  The tone of the play 
changes completely for several pages of singing and dancing that take of the vast majority of the 
third act, pages where the narrative arc of Rolly’s life is completely ignored and the pure 
spectacle of drag is engaged.  The drag extravaganza provides one of two parallel events that 
shape the play’s third act.  The other is Rolly’s murder.  As the spectacular queens run about the 
stage, Rolly is shot by David in a manic move, one that is clearly the product of the pressure of 
secrecy, of not being seen, of not being heard.  David confronts Judge Kingsbury, Rolly’s father, 
in a somewhat grandiose but heartfelt soliloquoy at the end, saying 
  You Judge Kingsbury – the great supporter of justice – you would crush me,  
  destroy me – but your son was the same as I.  Yes, I killed him.  I came into the  
  garden – I heard all the music, the singing, the dancing – I waited until they were  
  all gone.  Then I shot him.  When you condemn me, you condemn him.  A judge’s 
  son can be just the same as another man’s son – yes, a king’s son, a fool’s son.  
  (West 139) 
Interestingly, the drag is the catalyst of David’s becoming real through the violent erasure of his 
ex-love.  Against the backdrop of a raucous and orgiastic celebration of male sexuality, against a 
spectacle and within a spectacle that foregrounds the act of seeing and being seen, the judge 
turns simply to the inspector and says “Report this – a case of – of suicide …” (West 140).  As 
the curtain closes, then, The Drag brings into almost unbearable tension the unhappy collision of 
the hyper-visible and historically invisible elements of queer sexuality, of gender expectation, 
and of the audience’s public culpability.  The fact that West rewrote The Drag over and over, 
even into the 1970s, suggests that she herself struggled with what is seen and what is unseen, 
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what is spectacular and what is real, what is just and what is feasible, what, in terms of the 
politics of history, is life and what is death.   
 I read this work as a radical act of gender insubordination on West’s behalf, one that 
subtly trumps her other, more ostentatious work.  The Drag demonstrates a legacy quite different 
from that of West as the type of person Ranciere calls “a burlesque automaton,” one who is 
“aesthetically constituted,” one who is “a hero of pure spectacle” (12).  If anything, the 
complexities of The Drag represent, for those of us in West’s future audiences who hope for 
more than entertainment, who long for political visionaries with radical and subtle rhetorical 
modes and methods, West’s most poignant investigation, not just of gender performance, but of 
the spectacle itself, wrapping her into the longstanding political and ideological questions raised 
by critical theorists, moving West from, as Marybeth Hamilton refers to her,  “… a female drag 
queen who personified camp,” to a social critic who both used camp and defined its limitations 
for social justice (1).   
 The significant part of The Drag, though, comes in its distinct lack of camp.  Yes, the 
grand spectacle at the end demonstrates a free-for-all of homosexual male desire, but it is a 
jumble and ultimately works only to cover over the act of murder.  For some reason, perhaps 
because it was shut down within a week in Bridgeport Connecticut and never made it to 
Broadway, or perhaps because it failed to fully convey the delight and frivolity of the gay 
lifestyle, a frivolity that West successfully conveyed about the heterosexual one, West 
considered the play a failure.  But this was not a failure she would let go easily, another sign that 
the subject matter had a real and deep link to the otherwise slippery biographical Mae West.  
Schilissel continues, during the huge success of 1928’s Diamond Lil,  
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  Mae West began to rewrite The Drag.  It may have been unquenchable egotism,  
  the stubborn refusal to let the Broadway establishment and the police shut her  
  down.  It may have been her affinity for the subject of gay life.  In any event, The  
  Drag was probably the only play Mae West ever seriously rewrote, and when it  
  was finished and retitled The Pleasure Man, it was a stronger, more dramatically  
  astonishing play than anything she would write thereafter. (18)  
The differences in the two plays are clues to West’s motives.  First, and probably most 
important, West wanted this play produced, and the most expedient avenue toward that end was 
to change The Drag’s main character, Rolly, from a homosexual to a heterosexual.  This 
augmentation, though, masked a more sinister loss.  While Rodney Terrill (the Rolly character 
rewritten as a heterosexual and made more palatable for tamer audiences), the roguish ladies-
man actor impregnates a young girl whom he quickly forgets, who dies in a low-budget abortion, 
his lack of feeling is impudent and transparent.  For Rolly, the young homosexual man who 
married the judge’s daughter to hide his sexuality, a deeper problem is afoot – a more purely 
dramatic – rather than melodramatic one.  Rolly’s marriage and eventual murder highlight his 
plight as a social outcast who is condemned to a lonely and invisible existence.  Rolly makes 
horrible mistakes in that play, including not caring for his young, innocent wife, but his mistakes 
hang on him like so many hooks until he is finally dragged into the abyss by his murderer at the 
end.  The murderer, too, exhibits the abysmal loneliness of the social outcast, and when Rolly is 
murdered, his father buries his son’s secret with him – preferring he is remembered as a suicide 
rather than who he really was. Here, in the gay plays, West escapes her own structuration as a 
rhetorical figure/body in space by figuring gay men’s lives.  Her uncharacteristic disappearance 
here, too, indicates a turn on her part to highlight traumas in the gay community as a way of both 
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negotiating her own early experience and extending her performative, writerly power.  West the 
spectacle and Rolly, in particular, function metonymically in the loss of name and identity, 
function as responses to the threat, always abounding in traumatic violence, of erasure.  In this 
testament to Rolly’s erasure, West’s rhetorical figuring, her exadversive indirect rhetoric is at its 
most powerfully ethical and its most fundamentally indirect. 
 Though The Pleasure Man certainly maintains the focus on homosexual men, it 
backgrounds the dramatic elements of that lifestyle behind a much more convincing camp-
screen.  It is this overdone façade in The Pleasure Man that has caused certain scholars to 
generalize that West was exploiting the New York gay culture in the 1920s.  As Kaier Curtin 
argues, her “persistent, mercenary attempts to exploit gay transvestites in the 1920’s stirred 
neither public tolerance nor compassion.  It reinforced the stereotyping of gay men as vulgar, 
sex-obsessed effeminates” (qtd. in Schlissel 25).  Curtin, I think, misses the point of The 
Pleasure Man and certainly misses the point of The Drag.  George Chauncey sees Mae West’s 
affection for Bert Savoy as the driving factor behind these performances.  Schlissel continues, 
  [T]he subject that preoccupied her in The Drag and in The Pleasure Man was not  
  so much homosexuality [which she understood better than most] as sexual  
  instability and the ways in which sexual identities are transformed. … Terrill’s  
  villainy is defined not by his seduction of a young girl but because he is a   
  chameleon.  He is not what he seems.  Paradise [the main drag queen] recognizes  
  the duplicity.  “I always knew you were a rotter … don’t try to scare me – what I  
  know, I know, and that’s that.  “If you’re a man, thank God I’m a female   
  impersonator.” 
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  In the strange ethical architecture of the gay plays, Paradise and all the “queers”  
  are the world’s innocents.  They do not lie about who they are.  Their fantastic  
  gowns and “disguises” confirm their identity.  The “straight” world is disguised  
  and the gay world is “straight.”  The ethical paradox at the heart of The Pleasure  
  Man was not lost on Mae West’s gay audiences, although it seems to have been  
  lost by most readers. (26-27)   
The honesty of the gay men who populate The Drag, in a performative honesty, one fundamental 
to West herself: to “put on” is to demonstrate the truth of oneself, a truth manifest in both layered 
sophistication and ostentatious grandiosity.  Here, again, and to great effect, in her usual 
exadversive way, inverts an inversion.  In 1934, when West recalled the difficulties she 
experienced in the production of those plays, her tone was close to righteous indignation.  “I was 
ten years ahead of my time.  Some day, I’m going to produce those plays again … We make 
things that exist too important by whispering about ‘em, rather than bringin’ ‘em right out into 
the open.  We talk around a subject and make it something it isn’t” (Ward 116).    
 It is possible that, in that recollection, West was being mildly facetious.  Doubtless, 
though, rather, she seems preoccupied with making these questions public.  She injects divided 
audiences into the middle of gender quandaries.  If it is possible to determine one unchanging 
element in Mae West’s persona in all its varied plasticity, as both a performer and a writer, it is 
her publicness, her consistent desire for and pursuit of display.  As Justus Nieland argues in 
Feeling Modern, “publicness,” though a strange word, works differently than “publicity” or “the 
public sphere,” the former conjuring “industrial-commercial media technologies” and the latter 
“Habermasian forums of rational-critical debate” (1).  Publicness describes an array of 
“encounters with public life in the early twentieth century,” and while Nieland’s aim is to 
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recover modernism’s affective registers in those encounters, his analytic scheme of searching for 
“their experimental, embodied, and affective dimensions” provides a framework that also helps 
to uncover West’s use of indirect feminist rhetoric, a rhetoric that contains elements of the 
modern while rejecting others (1).   
 Freud, whose philosophy of the divided, largely unavailable, desirious self underpins so 
much of public life in the first decades of the twentieth century, particualry those ensconced in 
“publicness,” remained a muse for West, as well as Ulrich and Ellis.  The public, perhaps, served 
as a kind of inverse of the unconscious, a place upon which to play out desire, a place in which to 
be known and therefore to known one’s self.  Hers was a public sexuality and below it a public 
subversion of sexuality, and both elements – the overt and the covert – were fastened to West’s 
ability to create and fulfill public desire, to suture herself, her image, and even her writing, to the 
public’s desire for libidinous indulgence and political challenge. 
 
Conclusion: Marriage and the Limits of Rhetorical Character Space 
 Despite her ever-evolving diaphanous sexuality and public persona, a terrible secret 
haunted Mae West through those Broadway years, though she managed to keep it hidden until 
1935, well into her Hollywood foray: Mae West was married and had been married for 24 years.  
Before West’s name was nationally known, she wooed and signed on to perform with a lanky, 
young jazz dancer, Frank Wallace, formerly Frank Szatkus, the son of a Lithuanian tailor, in 
1911.  According to Eells and Musgrove, 
  Frank wasn’t tall, dark and handsome.  He was of medium height and merely a  
  pleasant appearance, but his jazz dancing was a hit with audiences.  Mae, thinking 
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  she detected a big personality – and with Mae, bigger was always better –   
  proposed to Wallace that they do a double. (28) 
Wallace was soon smitten with West, who, only in her teens, had already perfected the kinds of 
antics she would become known for.  She dressed 
  in pink rompers with grey oxfords, wore no stockings and would unnerve Wallace 
  by lying on her back, throwing her shapely legs in the air and engaging in a  
  bicycling motion.  Whenever Wallace volunteered to show her a pleasanter  
  exercise, Mae would leap up and insist they tend to business.  It was agreed that  
  he dance and fake the singing while she would do the opposite. (Eells and   
  Musgrove 28) 
After their 10 week tour, the duo was hired to perform with Hugh Herbert and opera singer Etta 
Woods in Jacobs and Jermond’s Sporting Widow.  Though Wallace had, at the time, considered 
the two a couple, the 17 year old West made the sexual rounds with several of the other men in 
the troop, much to the chagrin of her colleagues.  One night, the older, more experienced Woods 
“took Mae aside to warn that with the hordes of men who were perusing and too often catching 
her, sooner or later she would find herself pregnant” (Eells and Musgrove 30).  West admitted 
Woods had a point and on April 11, 1911 married Frank Wallace.  Watts speculates that West 
may have married Wallace not just for cover of her multiple lovers but indeed because she 
suspected she may have become pregnant.  Though he later attested that the two were very much 
in love, they spent their wedding night in separate rooms and soon West would lock him in at 
night, laughing as she left at midnight for a lover and returned at 3:00 am.  As Ward explains, 
West was “immediately disappointed with the constraints of a legalized marriage and determined 
to find a way out of her contract as painlessly as possible” (5).  Soon, telling Wallace that he had 
223 
	  
to keep the marriage a secret and that her mother wanted her to tour solo, West dropped Wallace.  
She “never satisfactorily explained her behavior in this regrettable marriage, for she never liked 
to admit her mistakes” (Ward 5).  Of all the strange qualities of West’s life and career, this 
marriage remains the toughest to explain – it would also, eventually, all but end her career.   
 The middle years of the 1930s were difficult for West.  In 1934, she barred her longtime 
friend, agent, lawyer, sometime-lover, and confidant, Jim Timony, from all movie sets, and in 
1935 she experienced the death of her father.  Though she had successfully made the transition 
from Broadway to Hollywood, agents of the Hays Office continued to single her out, and by 
1935 Joseph Breen, the cinema-savvy, tough-minded, wildly anti-Semitic Catholic who took the 
helm from Will Hays, dug through each of West’s scripts with singular tenacity, forcing her, if 
she wanted her films made, to rewrite multiple times, excising any lines that might contain the 
potential for Westian double-entendre.  By 1935, despite being in Hollywood only for a short 
time, West had made several successful films, including She Done Him Wrong, I’m No Angel, 
Belle of the Nineties, and Goin’ to Town.  West went so far, with her next film, 1936’s Klondike 
Annie, as to screen an entirely different version of the film for Breen than the one that went out 
to popular audiences.  But, by 1936, West’s popularity was declining, not only because of 
Breen’s consistent removal of her more interesting material but because, though “Paramount had 
promoted her as down-to-earth … rumors of her extreme behavior trickled out to the public.  Co-
workers seemed more willing to testify that she was demanding, high-strung, and capricious” 
(Watts 200).  Most important to West’s sudden decline, though, in my opinion, was the 
discovery of her marriage to Frank Wallace. 
  It turned out that Myrtle Sands, a Milwaukee WPA worker assigned to refile old  
  vital records, had stumbled across a marriage certificate that bore the name of a  
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  Mae West of Brooklyn, New York, who in April 1911 had married a Frank  
  Wallace.  Sands notified the local press, and they immediately located an old  
  review of A Florida Enchantment [also called Sporting Widow] praising the  
  dancing team of Wallace and West.  By April 22, Associated Press newswires  
  carried the story across the country.  Fans read headlines proclaiming, “Mae West 
  in 1911 Wed in Milwaukee,” and scrutinized a hazy facsimile of the marriage  
  certificate. (Watts 202)  
The news devastated West and her public, and for several months after the story ran, West 
denied the marriage.  “The marriage severely threatened West’s star persona” (Watts 202) 
because not only did it inform the public of West’s real age (now over forty), it also cast the 
star’s wealth and lavish living arrangements in stark contrast to her impoverished husband (202).  
“In part,” Watts explains, “her image rested on her rejection of the cult of domesticity and its 
most fundamental institution, marriage” (203).  “The appearance of a husband jeopardized this 
rebellion. … [F]or West to be married was unthinkable, a contradiction to her image as an 
independent woman resisting male domination” (203). 
 Watts’s view here is correct, I think, though she misses the rhetorical element to West’s 
marriage disaster.  It is indeed true that her marriage worked against her commitment to sexual 
and social independence, but, more importantly for this analysis, it bounded and invalidated the 
rhetorical character space that West claimed; invalidated her principle rhetorical trope: the 
assertion through double-negative of a powerful space of signification, a blank canvas upon 
which America could project their innermost desires.  No longer was West “America’s most 
inviting sex symbol”; rather, she “was a married woman” (Watts 202).  Her open identity, her 
rhetorical mastery gone, she was turned from “a freewheeling celebrant of Eros into one of the 
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era’s most shameful of female figures, an adulteress” (203).  More important, though, than that 
shameful position, for West, is the abrupt closedness of her previously and uniquely open 
sematic-figural space.  Mae West was, for the first time, bounded, parametricized, closed in.  Out 
of the ether of her fictional space, the real, biographical West emerged for her public.  Her career 
would never be the same.   
 Despite her fall from grace in the middle thirties, West’s indirection, her near constant 
use of exadversive techniques in the creation of her ironic works and performative persona, 
makes her an exceptionally difficult and fruitful rhetor to analyze.  West’s work, her comedy, her 
irony, her camp is, according to Pamela Roberston, “a structural activity” that “has an affinity 
with feminist discussions of gender construction, performance, and enactment” (57).  Robertson 
continues that these modes of being and performing both articulate and subvert “the image- and 
culture-making processes to which women have traditionally been given access” (57).  She is 
feminist only – but strongly – through indirect means, and it “can only be described as feminist 
because it parodies drag by replacing and displacing it with the hyperbolization of the feminine 
through the masquerade,” Robertson explains; she “recuperates this aesthetic as a feminine 
aesthetic” (63).  
 Even throughout her experimentations on gender performance, power, trauma, and 
violence as they appear in the gay plays, West’s feminism shines through.  Her work is indirectly 
feminist because, like Bert Williams’s anti-racist performances, she highlights the traditional 
models of seeing and being as constructed, and her comfort in that constructed space with all its 
luminal fluidity, characterized not just her work but her persona as well.  In short, it is West’s 
exadversive work on her audiences (in moments where her extradiegetical assertions reinscribe 
the biographical West as desiring and desired, as playful and in-control, as subject and object, 
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moments that, like dogwhistles, are not noticeable to any but the keenest, the campiest, the 
queerest, or the most radically feminist observers) that makes her feminist, and though it is 
essential to recognize that not all audience members’ worldviews will be marked or complicated 
by West’s work (some will always see her as untalented, unaware, etc.), others walk away with a 
slightly fragmented sense of gender power, one in which the frame of gender and the frame of 
reality sit, however, subtly askew.  West herself walks effortlessly between them.  It is this gift 
that West bestows then and now upon her audiences, the gift of the open question, the gift of the 
call-to-action, or, at least, the gift of the intellectual itch, the worm of uncertainty.  And it is in 
this that Mae West’s indirect feminist rhetoric, her ironic exadversion, her proposition through 
double-negatives, where the recalcitrant other is both posited and then unmarred, forced into the 
diaphanous orbit in and among other Others, where selves are not self-same, where seduction 
conquers production, where irony, as Jeffrey Murray reminds us, becomes an ethical challenge 
(29).  It is in this ether where consubstantiality is created.  Murray explains, 
  Burke goes on to claim that irony “is based upon a sense of fundamental kinship”  
  and of “being consubstantial” (514).  But note that he gets ahead of himself.   
  Irony is not “based upon” an existing consubstantiality, but upon symbolic- 
  phenomenological recalcitrance.  A particular way of seeing becomes ironized  
  when it is called into question by another way of seeing.  The result of that  
  ironizing may be that one becomes consubstantial with the Other for irony to  
  occur.  Quite often, irony arises from Others with whom one is not already  
  consubstantial. (29) 
West’s particular method of indirection both creates recognition of the recalcitrant Other, but it 
does something beyond both Burke and Murray here, too: in the positing of the view of the 
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recalcitrant Other, West’s work destabilizes that other as well.  So, a Westian indirect-rhetorical 
ethics is not one of producing consubstantiation, almost the opposite.  In denying the possibility 
or even desire for consubstantiation, where selves are coequal and language is propositional, 
West circumvents misuse of traditional propositional and gender norms. 
 Here, theater for West becomes a mediation aimed at the dissolution of the gender roles 
that underlie its parody and hence its power.  Therefore, theater for West is a mediation aimed, 
ultimately, at its own dissolution, just as the Mae West character, even in her reemergence as a 
meta-figure in the 1960s and 1970s is aimed at self-evacuation-through-self-parody.  This, is 
both the limit of the art West produces, and it is also its highest compliment.  As Ranciere 
reminds us, “art do[es] not supply weapons for battles” (103).  Rather, it “can help sketch new 
configurations of what can be seen, what can be said and what can be thought and, consequently, 
a new landscape of the possible.  But,” he explains, it can “do so on condition that their meaning 
or effect is not anticipated” (103).  Mae West’s radical work is indirect and feminist, ultimately, 
because it is based on an evasion of propositional discourse that serves not to undermine its 
validity but to amplify its accessibility and electrify its message. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion: Strange Currencies  
 In “The Book I Couldn’t Write: Alice Paul and the Challenge of Feminist Biography,” 
celebrated women’s and feminist historian Susan Ware draws attention to what she calls a 
hallmark of “recent feminist biography,” its “focus on the interplay between the personal and 
political in constructing the narratives of individual women’s lives” (13).  Ware’s piece focuses 
not on her success as an author, though, despite her celebrated biographies of Amelia Earhart, 
Molly Dewson, Mary Margaret McBride, and, most recently, Billie Jean King.  Rather, Ware’s 
piece in the Journal of Women’s History focuses upon the very particular problem of writing 
feminist histories in which the subjects “are not amenable to such an approach” (13), as she 
discovered in her attempted biography of Alice Paul, whose seemingly complete devotion to the 
cause of feminism and whose control over her archives and public memory left no distinctions 
between her personal and public lives, exactly the distinctions sought after by historians of 
women and feminism.  She explains,  
In a profound failure of my historical imagination, I found myself at a total loss 
when searching for an overarching theme or hypothesis to make her life story 
compelling and relevant to contemporary readers. … How can you write a 
feminist biography when your subject has left no trail of breadcrumbs (as a friend 
called them) to recreate any kind of interior or personal life? (14) 
Ware’s predicament is both diametrically opposite the predicament that I faced when first 
conceiving of this project and fundamentally instructive for it.  Unlike Ware, my subjects had 
rich, complicated personal lives, but also unlike Ware, my subjects did not claim feminism; so 
while their rich interiorities may have been instructive or interesting enough for contemporary 
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readers, their relation to feminism seemed all but absent, at least in a propositional way.  Instead 
of a trail of breadcrumbs of an interior life, one that Ware struggled and ultimately failed to 
determine in her year-long study of Alice Paul, an original and century-long advocate for what 
ultimately became a failed equal rights amendment, my absent clue set seemed to exist in the 
liminal spaces around my subjects’ discourses and feelings about what feminism meant in their 
historical moments.  Feminism, as it existed in their lives, in the lexicons and political agencies 
available to them, was simply not attractive; so, a traditional feminist biography would not be 
appropriate.  Any biographical work that attempted to narrativize and explore the relationships 
between their inner lives, traumas, and incipient feminisms had to rely on rhetoric as an 
intermediary.   
 Attention to rhetoric is not a magic pill that solves the problems inherent in the historical 
absences or gaps I found in the public lives of Marcet Haldeman-Julius, Anita Loos, and Mae 
West, but it does allow me to insert myself conspicuously and honestly into the project of 
historical imagination, recovery, and interpretation.  Indeed, it is the rhetorical scholar’s 
interpretation of events, the political, hermeneutic, and personal preferences he or she carries 
internally, that often largely determine the rhetorical character of an event – beyond banal 
taxonomy.  This place of subjective location, infused with chance and characterized to a great 
degree by a scholar’s own agenda or interpretative lens, makes the study of rhetoric, at least in 
this instance, ambitiously unstable, full of tentative assertions that represent more of a 
relationship with subjects than a modernist portrayal or “summing up,” attempting to catch 
subjects in action, with all available (often overdetermined) motives, means, personal 
idiosyncrasies, and ambivalences.  Jacqueline Jones Royster and Gesa Kirsch call this approach 
strategic contemplation: 
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Strategic contemplation involves engaging in a dialogue, in an exchange, with the 
women who are our historical subjects, even if only imaginatively, to understand 
their words, their visions, their priorities whether and perhaps especially when 
they differ from our own.  As Cheryl Glenn suggests in her groundbreaking work 
on the rhetoric of silence, it involves recognizing – and learning to listen to – 
silence as a rhetorically powerful act.  It entails creating a space where we can see 
and hold contradictions without rushing to immediate closure, to neat resolutions, 
or to cozy hierarchies and binaries. … Central to such an open, contemplative 
stance are questions such as these: What do we notice when we stand back and 
observe?  What emerges most prominently?  How do we imagine, connect with, 
and open up a space for the women – and others – we study?  How does their 
work, their rhetorical prowess, their activism speak to us, inspire us, and help us 
understand the past as well as the present? … Finally, strategic contemplation 
means recognizing what was made possible for us as feminist rhetorical scholars 
through other women’s work, how their efforts have enabled us to stand where we 
are today, and how their visions make it possible for us to imagine a future worth 
working for. (21-23)  
Giving attention to feminist rhetoric, then, means situating one’s self in a milieu that not only 
honestly engages but also embraces the pitfalls of interpretation, of meaningful and often 
confusing connection with subjects.  Most respectful to subjects, this approach foregrounds the 
scholar’s limited frame but also encourages future discussion, allowing, even constructing, 
cracks through which more analysis and more extensive conversation can and should occur.  
This work moves even further in the direction of those conversations that push the limits of 
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traditional narrative history as well as traditional rhetorical studies, complicating the relationship 
between historical subjects and truth as a unquestioned construct; indirection works against all 
these.  As Ballif suggests, here, “[w]oman is a riddle, a paradox, an aporia” (125), distancing us 
from the terrible truth.  And what, she asks, “is this terrible truth?  That truth is not; that it is 
Woman” (126).    
 Articulating the use to which rhetorical indirection was put by this cohort of women 
rhetors has the potential to add significantly to conversations in rhetorical studies and 
composition studies.  For rhetoricians, the evidence of this effective indirection challenges the 
idea that rhetoric takes place only or most effectively out in the open, the terrain of traditional 
propositional debate.  Indeed, these women, unlike the physically constrained populations 
studied by James C. Scott, choose rhetorical indirection – for various reasons: Haldeman-Julius – 
out of a wonderfully salacious deviance in response to her traumatic marriage – desires to reach 
an audience through the critique of her principle gatekeeper while keeping him both out of the 
joke and out of range of propositional debate; Loos, on the other hand, develops her critical eye 
toward masculinity early on in her complex relation to her absentee father, and it manifests early 
in her career writing for the movies to slyly mock Douglas Fairbanks to impress D.W. Griffith 
and John Emerson, becoming fully developed through domestic and marital trauma analogous to 
Haldeman-Julius’s, with her abusive husband serving as her director and her critique being 
aimed as his avatars, particularly H.L. Mencken; finally, West’s indirection takes into question 
the very possibility of traditional gender norms, such as the norms that make possible masculinist 
power, and her most complex development comes in the cultivation of herself as a kind of 
rhetorical space, a rhetorical figure, a sashaying laboratory of gendered experimentation outside 
and above traditional gender relations, despite doing everything in her power to hide her early 
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marriage (and the significance that she is just, after all, a woman) to Frank Wallace – the trauma 
of this marriage being merely its existence and its challenge to West’s meta-critique/character 
space.   
 For rhetorical scholars, these women themselves represent a brave new terrain of 
rhetorical critique – one that has just begun to be hinted at by scholars like Joseph Janangelo, 
who articulates the need for studies such as this one, studies of celebrity rhetoric: “[w]hile we 
rhetorical critics and theorists have felt increasingly committed to analyzing public discourse,” 
some of us “have not paid as much attention as we should to these particular uses of media, 
which engage mass attention” if “the rhetor is an entertainer rather than, say, a politician” (158).  
Celebrity rhetorics deserve analysis, especially, as in this study, when the rise of a celebrity’s 
rhetoric coincides with the advent of a newly emergent modality of writing: for Haldeman-Julius, 
it was personality journalism; for Loos, it was scenarios and titles for early American cinema; 
and for West, in the period I investigate, anyway (as she wrote in several mediums) it was the 
early years of the Broadway musical, rife with spectacle.   
 This trio remains a curious set of rhetors to study because unlike most work on women in 
rhetoric and composition, these rhetors maintained, largely, apolitical guises.  From Aspasia to 
Susan B. Anthony, traditional subjects of feminist rhetorical recovery have been political or 
politicized women; instead, this cohort of celebrity rhetors functioned indirectly, in one sense 
anyway, because they presented themselves as apolitical, depoliticized, uncomprehending, or 
simply disinterested.  Rather, they went for fashion, for humor, flying well under the radar – one 
of the reasons that most scholars have left them out of feminist history and the history of 
rhetoric.   
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 So, in a strange way, this study functions as a kind of recovery, a concept well-tended in 
feminist rhetorical scholarship.  The fruits of this kind of recovery, though, blossom obliquely, 
and the recovery of women like these involves a redefinition of materials already seen, special 
attention to motive, and an attempt to dig into thick descriptions of rhetorical situations, 
descriptions that pay attention to materials overlooked my many historians of rhetoric.  This is a 
recovery out in the open, of women who are/were famous, known, of celebrity women; it is a 
recovery of rhetoric’s role in their struggles, of the exigencies born out of situations of domestic 
trauma, the negotiation of gatekeepers, the grappling with the strictures of what is and is not 
allowable in public discourse, the reading of humor’s layers, at last, a conversation with what 
was and was not said or sayable.   
 For composition studies, the study indirect type of writing in public situations can inform 
classroom discussions about what is allowable in public settings, encouraging discussion about 
the insidious and even sinister embeddedness of hierarchies of social power and privilege.  It 
asks students to consider, in their own written academic work, not only what is acceptable in 
academic prose but how to push those boundaries through the use of humor, indirection, 
cooptation.  Composition studies classrooms should become spaces where all the questions of 
social power and social acceptability are at play and attention should be paid to the entire 
spectrum of linguistic and rhetorical power as it interacts with developing modalities of writing 
and technology.  Indirect feminist rhetoric, in this instance, at least, is tied very closely to 
questions of technology, and it involves the admission that rhetoric itself, as Amy Koerber 
reminds us, is a “technology” (25), a tool that helps its users (speakers and writers) accomplish 
the task of constructing meaning,” invoking audiences, and raising consciousness (59).   She 
continues, 
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  feminist scholars should ask questions that attempt to account for the complex  
  relationships that exist between technology and conceptions of gender in society.   
  Such questions should attempt to determine what we can learn about the political  
  effects and consequences of technology. (Koerber 66) 
The study of indirection in written discourse should, for contemporary writing students, be 
historically situated, embedded in the technologies into which it folds, and partially responsible 
for (and traceable to) the larger social and cultural events it feeds and is fed by. 
 Composition studies, as a discipline interested in the production and analysis of written 
texts and their relations with power, education, and social movement, has a vested interest in the 
study of indirection.  Gutenberg’s printing press served as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for Martin Luther’s epoch-changing principles of faith alone, scripture alone, and the 
priesthood of all believers in its dependence upon the availability and accessibility of the biblical 
text, increasing literacy rates, and growing discontent with the stultifying presence of the 
Catholic Church’s bureaucracy and greed.  The rise of newspaper and pamphleteering culture 
gave way to the advent of the epoch of the (male) citizen, the French and American Revolutions.  
And now, the rise of social media thrusts writing and rhetoric forward into the unknown terrain 
of the Arab Spring and its complicated aftershocks.  Part of this story, a part we in rhetorical and 
composition studies remain at least partially responsible for telling, has been left out.  This is the 
story offered in this work, a story of gendered critique, of powerful and empowered women 
negotiating the realities of male privilege in and through the emergent technologies of 
personality journalism, early American cinema, and Broadway spectacle – all of which coincide 
and with a generation of women who functioned in a space that was ostensibly politically, 
sexually, and socially liberated, a space where women could vote, could practice safe methods of 
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birth control, could work, could write.  These conditions of liberation, though, brought with them 
the new and fluid constraints of a coalescing mass consciousness under the spectacle of 
entertainment.  Here, the public is accessible, but only under the conditions of the sayable, the 
acceptable, and these conditions brought with them specific limitations on what public women 
could say, should say, or even what public audiences could hear.  These were middling audiences 
with ears unturned to oblique critique.  The women of this study wrote for small selections 
within these audiences, those whose perceptions were pitched up, whose ears were sensitized to 
the frequencies of the radical within the mundane; the specialized within the popular.   
 The study of indirect rhetoric, in general, has great potential in rhetorical studies, with 
many and varied possible applications.  Any time when the free exchange of language is 
inhibited, indirect rhetoric is almost certainly afoot.  Any time when a rhetor wants to make use 
of language that critiques another but denies the potential for a counter-response, indirection is at 
play.  In every situation, indirection is partially a function of the modality in which it is 
articulated, which should make the study of digital writing rife with potential spaces for 
meaningful analysis.  Any such analysis, though, must always be closely tied to the person, their 
complex motives, exigencies, etc.  Unlike Bitzer’s or even Vatz’s notions of the rhetorical 
situation, though, indirect rhetoric typically lives in multiple, ambiguous spaces, and any 
rendering of it must embrace partiality, must consist to some degree of a gesture forward toward 
the conversational openness hinted at by Royster and Kirsch.  Because indirection avoids or 
coopts propositional discourse, its study must to some degree be indirect as well. 
 This partiality or ambiguity, though, is a strength, not a weakness.  It is the work of 
rhetoric to suggest what comes after the orgy, to draw from Ballif’s riff on Baudrillard’s essay 
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title (“What Are Your Doing after the Orgy?”), the orgy of modernism, the orgy of truth-telling, 
of claims-making, of political excess.  She explains, 
His title comes from the brief anecdote in which, during an orgy, a man whispers 
this unexpected question into a woman’s ear.  This anecdote encapsulates 
Baudrillard’s theoretical strategy: to ask what comes after the obscene; to wonder 
what lies the banality of truth, meaning, and representation; to question the joint 
project of modernism, humanism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, hermeneutics, 
semiotics, philosophy, criticism, and all other systems of production, which have 
attempted to master, to dominate, to appropriate the unrepresentable and thus 
render it obscene. (129) 
The partiality represented in any study of indirection underscores a rejection of the sequestration 
of the unrepresentable into the realm of the obscene; it is a partiality rendered meaningful exactly 
in its conversation with that which is unsayable, counterpropositional, unexpected, or 
unacceptable.  Not amending itself to a philosophy to render it comprehensible, the study of 
indirection, writ large, is part of the answer to what comes after the orgy.  Not without meaning, 
not without consequence, a humanized but not humanist reality in which motive and 
contradiction, fundamental aspects of human social intercourse, are brought to light while other 
aspects are obscured. 
 A theory of indirection, then, in a sense, would be contradiction in terms, or it would 
blend into postmodern multiplicity or simulations and thus obscure its larger productive capacity.  
Indirect rhetoric is rhetoric that, formally speaking, denies, circumvents, or parodies its exigence, 
and functions – when it works, anyway – to coopt mass audiences, to garner the attention of 
subsets that may be sensitized to watch for radical critique or revolutionary messages in mass-
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produced, middling, popular work.  A theory of indirection, then, if it were to exist, would be a 
theory about how humanity works itself around the fabric of propositionality, in the spaces and 
interstices of propositional discourse, thus working against and underneath the gatekeepers to 
publics.  The formal properties of indirection draw shape around and among the spaces in which 
propositions cannot be made or, for whatever strategic reason, are not made, and in so doing it 
does not amend itself to content, such as, say, feminism.   
Feminism and indirection share no organic ties beyond their situational origins; nor 
should studies of indirect feminism overtake studies of propositional or overtly political 
feminism.  They must work alongside each other, given voice by scholars who seek, together, to 
tell a more comprehensive story, not a more coherent story.  The divergency of coherence in 
women’s history, the flood of ambiguity and difference in women’s stories and approaches to 
telling those stories bodes well for the future of women’s history and feminist rhetoric.  No 
longer do scholars of feminist rhetoric need to defend the women we study, need to place them 
firmly in liberal discourses amenable to flattery in academe.  In fact, what indirect feminist 
rhetoric allows us to do is to allow the forms of indirect discourse to lead us to discussions about 
feminisms lurking below the surface of propositionality and social license, drawing scholars into 
the quiet corners of conversations that, up till now, created the din against which we have created 
our scholarship.  These conversations, these women, are no longer inaccessible; we can write 
about them, their lives, their rhetorical abilities, if we leave the comfort of traditional definitions 
of rhetoric behind, along with the totalizing effects of discursive horizons.  Only then, can we 
attempt to revisit and produce the books we once could not write.   
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